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SUMMARY 
The Assessment of Bureaucratic Corruption Control in South Korea: The Importance of 
Pol itical Wi I I in Government's Anti-Corruption Efforts by Sung-Hwan Kim. 
Despite various efforts at corruption control, corruption is a common phenomena in 
most countries. To explain the rampancy of corruption and its control, scholars 
concentrated various efforts on studying the causes of corruption and control strategies, 
along with the functions of corruption. Korea has the same difficulties because of 
corruption as other countries, but research was not enough and Korean scholars studied 
mainly fragmented aspects, such as its causes and measures such as strong punishment 
and adoption of corruption control agencies, etc. 
However, this research focuses on the concept that the effectiveness of a certain policy 
depends on how strongly the government pushes it forward, which can be called 
'political will'. In other words, this research stresses that political will in the process of 
corruption control policies is the most important variable for the success of corruption 
control whatever the measures adopted. 
This research hypothesises that the failure of corruption control in Korea is related to 
the insufficiency of political will. This research defined political will as the commitment 
of governmental actors to undertake actions with seriousness to control corruption and 
to sustain those actions over time. To assess political will, this research set up two key 
factors, (undertaking actions seriously and sustainability), and five indicators. In 
addition, a framework was suggested to analyse the results of assessment by indicators. 
The corruption control efforts from the First Republic to the Eighth Republic of Korea 
were analysed for an assessment of each of the Korean Government's corruption control 
efforts. The results of the assessment were as expected. 
This research confirmed that political will should be strong in order that corruption 
control becomes successful, and the political will model works significantly in the 
analysis of corruption control efforts. 
.. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Purpose of Research 
1.1.1 Introduction 
Corruption has been a persistent phenomenon in most countries throughout 
history although found in diverse forms and degrees. Neither developing countries nor 
developed countries are free from corruption. Scandals, bribery and other forms of 
corruption in developed countries have made headlines in the Western media. Similarly, 
corruption in its various forms exists in the communist states of Eastern Europe and 
Asia as well. No regime anywhere is ever entirely free from corruption. 
Nye (a functionalist theorist) believes corruption may actually improve efficiency 
and help growth. 1 In developing countries, bureaucratic corruption in particular is 
considered an inevitable phenomenon as government officials usually have considerable 
power in allocating resources. 
Functionalist literature on corruption suggests that corruption is a by-product of 
rapid economic development and social change. It is also presumed that corruption 
occurs during the early stages of a country's development and that it diminishes when a 
country becomes more developed.2 
However, empirically, it has been demonstrated that some countries have 
1 N ye, Joseph S., 'Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis.' 
American Political Science Review, Vol 61, June 1967, pp.417-27 
2 Werner, Simcha B., 'New direction in the study of bureaucratic corruption' Public 
Republic Review, Vol. 43, No.2, MarchiApril1983, p.146 
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successfully controlled corruption while others have experienced continuous and often 
more widespread corruption in the process of rapid economic growth and social 
development. In addition, if corruption is associated with the process of development 
that diminishes as a country becomes economically and socially established, corruption 
should be restricted to non-western countries that are commonly viewed to be less 
developed. However, as previously stated, corruption is not an exclusive phenomena of 
non-western countries in contemporary society. Therefore, corruption is not a 
transitional phenomenon that disappears at higher stages of economic growth and social 
development. Corruption can be a self-perpetuating social phenomenon that proliferates 
when not controlled. Thus, it is imperative to examine how corruption has been 
addressed within specific regions or countries to devise effective means of combating it. 
Furthermore, countries all over the world are mobilizing joint efforts against 
corruption. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has 
taken a major role in this movement. In February 1999, international treaties against 
corruption in international businesses were put in place. The treaties had been prepared 
by the OECD for more than ten years. Transparency International (TI), one of the NOOs 
contributing to the elimination of corruption, publishes a ranking of Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) of countries every year. This measures the corruption which is 
perceived to exist among government officials and politicians. It is clear that corruption 
is not limited to a specific type of country. A reputation for corruption can also affect the 
credit and competitiveness of a country. 
The Republic of South Korea (hereafter 'Korea') is suffering from corruption like 
many countries elsewhere. Corruption has been one of the causes for radical change in 
political and public administrative history in Korea. For example, the April Revolution 
2 
(i.e. the student revolution in 1960) was a giant revolt against President Lee's corrupt 
republic. However, until recently, corruption has still been one of the predominant 
issues in the Korean media. After the experience of a severe economic downturn in 
1997, the corruption of government officials was deemed to be a major factor leading to 
the economic crisis. 
In conclusion, the elimination of corruption has become an increasingly essential 
factor in sustaining Korea's social/economic position. Finding ways to eradicate it is 
not only beneficial but vital. 
1.1.2 Limitations of the Studies of Korean Corruption 
To date, there have been insufficient studies regarding corruption in Korea, even 
though corruption issues feature prominently in the media. This is because corruption 
issues have not attracted public concern in Korea, as they were concealed by rapid 
economic growth until the economic crisis of 1997. Fortunately, this economic crisis 
drew public attention to the origins of corruption that were linked primarily to the 
actions of Korean politicians and government officials. 
There are several articles from overseas which have addressed this issue. Those 
that do, mainly focus on the causes of corruption, general strategies to control it, and on 
the relationship between economic development and corruption. This focus on the 
relationship between economic development and corruption is linked particularly to 
Korea's rapid economic growth that has been achieved despite widespread corruption. 
3 
Caiden and Kim3 suggested a strategy to combat official corruption in South 
Korea. One aspect of their strategy was to institutionalise effective accountability 
mechanisms which include; an independent anti-corruption agency, stronger legislation, 
a more open government, investigative journalism, citizen watchdogs, a strengthening 
of the audit function, and protection for whistleblowers. Another strategy is de-
bureaucratisation which may be achieved by; deregulation, privatisation, 
decentralisation, and improvements in public management. The final strategy is a 
change of administrative culture which can be done by; fostering a public service 
ideology, improving political morality, and promoting civic virtue with are-emphasis 
on Confucian ethics. 
Moran 4 compared the relationship of corruption to political and economIC 
development in Korea and the Philippines. He argued that corruption is a manifestation 
of specific sets of state-society relations, political systems, and development trajectories. 
He indicated that corruption in these contexts should not be seen as a pathological 
phenomenon but as deeply integrated into the particular path of political and economic 
development. He also underlined the fact that the co-existence of corruption with 
economic development has, if not short-term implications, then longer-term 
implications, in his other case study of Korea. 5 
Kong analysed the relationship between corruption and economic and political 
change. He came to the conclusion that the effect of democratisation and liberalisation 
3 Caiden, Ger aId E. and Kim, Jung H., 'A new anti-corruption strategy for Korea' Asian 
Journal of Political Science, Vol 1, No 1, June 1993 
4 Moran, Jon, 'Patterns of corruption and development in East Asia', Third World 
Quarterly, Vol 20, No 3, 1999 
5 Moran, Jon, 'Corruption and NrC development: A case study of South Korea', Crime, 
Law & Social Change, Vol 29, 1999, pp.161-177 
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in Korea has been to strengthen one side of the government-business relationship rather 
than to undermine the dominance of that nexus per se. 6 
Quah analysed South Korea's experiences in curbing corruption as its political 
systems gradually move towards democratisation after many years of military rule. He 
insisted that the transition from authoritarian military rule to democratisation in South 
Korea had not minimised but widened the scope for corruption, which is already a way 
of life because of the prevalence of vote buying and low salaries of civil servants and 
political leaders. 7 
Two PhD theses undertaken at non-Korean academy deal with the issue of 
bureaucratic corruption in Korea. They are entitled, "A model building of bureaucratic 
corruption in developing countries: The case of Korea"g and "Bureaucratic corruption 
in the Republic of Korea,,9. 
The former thesis focused on building three creative conceptual corruption models: 
bureaucratic culture, neo-bureaucratic culture, and anti-corruption models, which can be 
applied to interpret corruption phenomena in Korea. In addition, it attempted to find the 
trends in corruption from empirical data by analysing the content of major newspapers. 
The main focus of the latter thesis is to review some of the major contributing 
factors of bureaucratic corruption in Korea. Among many contributing factors 
highlighted were human nature and public attitudes. Furthermore, this thesis 
6 Kong, T., 'Corruption and its Institutional Foundations: the Experience of South 
Korea' (IDS Bulletin 27, 2, 1996), pp. 48-56 
7 Quah,J. 'Combating Corruption in South Korea and Thailand' in Schedler, A., 
Diamond,L.&Plattner,M.eds. The Self-Restraining State. Power and Accountability in 
New Democracies, London, Boulder:Lynne Rienner, 1999, pp.245-256 
g Kim, Young -long, A model building of bureaucratic corruption in developing 
countries: The case of Korea, (Ph.D. Thesis, The Florida State University, 1985) 
9 Hwang, Kee-Chul, Bureaucratic corruption in the Republic of Korea, (Ph.D. Thesis, 
University of Southern California, 1996) 
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emphasised the importance of public ethics and civic virtue as effective deterrents 
against corruption in the future. Also, it recommended long-term and consistent 
strategies for the prevention of corruption. 
There is also a domestic literature which has studied corruption in Korea. 
According to the Korean National Assembly Library and the National Library, there are 
several books, articles and dissertations which have studied corruption in Korea. 
Existing studies examining corruption in Korea have tended to focus on: finding 
the causes of corruption, analysing the characteristics of corruption and suggesting anti-
corruption measures to root out the causes. Causes of corruption have been linked to 
environmental, institutional and human factors. Most of the causes of corruption in 
Korea referred to in this literature are attributed to cultural factors. 
For example, Jeon, Soo_I1 IO detected the causes of corruption in Korea by studying 
the cultural characteristics of Korea, and highlighted the importance of conscience and 
ethical conduct in reducing corruption. On the other hand, Kim Young-Jong II 
determined the causes of corruption in Korea after studying the political administrative 
system and Korean culture. Subsequently he highlighted the importance of the 
installation of an anti-corruption institution. 
To date there has been little literature dealing with government anti-corruption 
policies; only three academic papers and a few articles. These studies have included two 
M.A degree dissertations and a PhD thesis. However, they simply explain the content, 
trend, and approach of previous anti-corruption policies. Nor do other articles logically 
10 Jeon, Soo -11, Bureaucratic Corruption, (Seoul: Sun Hak Sa, 1999) 
II Kim, Young -Jong, Corruption: Cause and Measure, (Seoul: Soongsil University 
Press, 1996) 
6 
analyse government anti-corruption policies or draw conclusions for how to eradicate 
corruption. 
Kim, Jong-Reol 12 and Lee, Kang-Hyuk 13, in describing the contents of anti-
corruption policies, simply introduced for their M.A degrees a small number of 
representative anti -corruption movements led by the past three governments (4th, 5th and 
Sixth Republic). 
For his PhD degree Park, Yong-Ho l4 attempted to analyse and compare the 
policies of past regimes' to cope with corruption which analysed the approaches of 
political regimes since the establishment of the Republic of Korea. He suggested three 
methods of approach: incremental, drastic and the existing one, and described the 
characteristics of each approach. 
In conclusion, most of the literature published has been limited in its research 
subjects and aims. These research studies simply analysed the outward corruption 
phenomena and anti-corruption policies. However, they have not studied the 
Governments' activities for corruption control. In other words, even if the above 
researchers analysed various aspects and suggested various countermeasures, they 
insufficiently studied actual activities of the Governments'. For example, whether the 
efforts of that government were enough to eradicate corruption, or, if it were not enough, 
why the efforts were ineffective. This research aims to discover the causes of 
12 Kim, Jong -Reol, 'A study on the changing processes of policies corresponding with 
corruption in Korea' (M.A dissertation, Daegu : Keimyung University, 1993) 
13 Lee, Kang-Hyuk, 'A study for bureaucratic corruption prevention of Korean public 
servant' (M.A dissertation, Seoul: Dongguk University, 1996) 
14 Park, Yon g-Ho, 'Controlling Corruption in Korea' (PhD dissertation, Seoul: Seoul 
National University, 1999) 
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corruption's continuation through the analysis of the different aspects of Governments' 
efforts. 
1.1.3 Purpose and Significance of This Study 
In Korean history, for example, in the Yi Dynasty, the ideal public servant was the 
"poor nobleman", a person of power whose poverty testified to his rectitude. Bribery 
and corruption were not approved of in Korean culture. 
However, for some time now, government officials have been regarded as corrupt. 
Every past regime in Korea has made diverse efforts to change this undesirable situation. 
Why then is corruption still one of the big issues in Korea? What was the cause of the 
failings in the efforts of past regimes? Were the efforts enough? What will be the way 
for controlling corruption in the future? The purpose of this thesis is to determine the 
answer to these questions by assessing past governments' efforts to deal with corruption. 
This thesis also aims to pin point the precise limitations of previous government policy 
to effectively deal with corruption. 
There are several causes that bring policy failure. Judging from previous research, 
it can be classified into three major causes; human, structural and circumstantial. 
Among them, the human cause can be classified into several sub-causes which include 
irrational attitude, sense of values of policy makers, limitation of perception ability, 
insufficient knowledge and information, etc. 15 In same ways, structural and 
circumstantial causes can be divided into several sub-causes. In particular, 
15 Edward S. Quad e, Analysis for decisions, (New York: Elsevier Science Publishing 
Co., 1982), pp.3-4 
An, Hae-Gyun, The principles of policy, (Seoul: Da San Publishing Co., 1986), 
pp.490-94 
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circumstantial causes can be divided into many sub-causes such as cultural, political and 
economic causes. Each of the above causes will have an affect on the success of the 
corruption control policies. 
However, this research considers that the effectiveness of a certain policy also 
depends on how strongly the government pushes it forward, which can be called 
'political will'. Political will is generally defined as the commitment of actors to 
undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives and to sustain those actions over time. 16 
Therefore, it may say that 'political will' in corruption control includes both initiating 
the fight against corruption with seriousness in the first place, and subsequently 
sustaining the battle over time until results are achieved. In this research, actors are 
confined to so called governmental actors, such as elected or appointed government 
leaders and public agency senior officials whose work is related to corruption control. 
Therefore, political will in this research is defined as the commitment of governmental 
actors to undertake actions to control corruption with seriousness and to sustain those 
actions over time. 
In other words, insufficient political will of a government is the most important 
cause of policy failure, because it can be said that a goal is much more likely to be 
achieved (than not), if the government frequently promotes the measures in a sustained 
fashion even under the same human, structural and circumstantial conditions. Especially, 
in corruption control policies, high-ranking officials and politicians' political will is 
considered as the more important variable to influence policy success (because it is 
quite within the realms of possibility that most of high-ranking officials and politicians 
are not free from corruption.) 
16 Brinker hoff, Derick W., 'Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: An 
analytic Framework', Public Republic and Development, Vo1.20, 2000, p 242 
9 
In other words, it is necessary to assess the government's efforts mainly from the 
point of political will to find out the cause of policy failure. This point of view will 
increase the effectiveness of a public policy which is surrounded by a complicated 
system. Many analysts and activists neglected to study political will in corruption 
control activities, though they agree that strong political will is key for the success of 
anti -corruption activities 17. 
Thus, this thesis attempts to assess Korean governments' corruption control efforts in 
terms of political will on the hypothesis that the political will in corruption control 
efforts of Korea was not enough to eradicate corruption. Past policies and the process of 
making those policies will be analysed systematically and logically in order to identify 
how appropriate these efforts were. 
To this end, the initial objective of this thesis should be to identify the outline of 
bureaucratic corruption and institutionalisation of anti-corruption policies in Korea as a 
first step to analyse the past governments' corruption control efforts. The second 
objective should be to analyse past cultural, political and economic elements, which are 
related to corruption, to find out how those elements themselves affected the political 
will for corruption control. The final objective of this research is to find out whether the 
political will for corruption control of past Korean regimes was enough to root it out. 
This thesis will highlight the importance of political will in the policy making 
process, especially in terms of corruption control policies, and suggest an integrated 
analytical framework in 1.4 for assessing political will that partitions the concept into a 
set of indicators. The framework traces the links among the indicators of political will 
17 Brinker hoff, Derick W., op. cit., p.240. 
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and their resulting influence on the outcomes of anti-corruption reforms. In addition, 
this analysis will also contribute to a better understanding of Korean corruption control. 
Furthermore, this research will shed light on the reasons, why Korean governments 
have failed to identify and eliminate corruption in Korea. As mentioned above, Korean 
corruption studies have mainly focused on discovering the causes of corruption and the 
general strategies for controlling it corresponding to the causes. Almost all the previous 
studies did not systematically analyse Korean corruption control policies in an attempt 
to account for the lack of progress. This research will supplement the neglected part of 
Korean corruption control studies by analysing the political will of the efforts of past 
governments. 
11 
1.2 Definition of Terms 
There has been interest in the subject of corruption for at least 20 years. However, 
there has not been a corresponding concern with the definition of corruption. Many 
analysts have suggested different definitions of corruption. So it is difficult to find a 
definition shared by scholars both because the phenomenon of corruption varies and 
because the concept of corruption has changed with time. 
Etymologically corruption stems, from Latin origins, meaning rottenness, decay, 
and degeneration. Before it became the subject of modem social science, corruption was 
used primarily as a term of moral condemnation. I8 In moral terms, to corrupt means to 
pervert, degrade, ruin and debase. In the moral realm, an act identified as corrupt is 
something to be condemned. However, modem social science has not adhered to only 
the moral perspective on corruption. 
Heidenheimer classified the definition of corruption, which has been generally 
accepted by scholars, into three types I9 : a public-office-centred definition, a market-
centred definition and a public-interest-centred definition. 
In the public-office-centred definition, corruption is a deviation from legalistic and 
public rules to get money or any other private benefit. Nye stated that "corruption is 
behaviour which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-
regarding (personal, close family, private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates 
18 Robert Williams, 'New concepts for old?' Third World Quarterly, Vol 20, No 3, 
June 1999 . p.504 
19 Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Political Corruption: Reading in Comparative Analysis 
(New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, Inc., 1989), pp. 8-11 
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rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence. ,,20 
This definition assumes that behaviour is corrupt when it violates some formal 
standard or rule of behaviour set down by a political system for its government officials. 
Laws and/or regulations provide the appropriate measure for government officials' 
corrupt acts. While these definitions are useful for courts or tribunals, they do not cover 
situations in which the prevailing laws are ambiguous or out of fashion for one reason 
or another, but changes in laws and regulations may allow us to compare the political 
processes and value conflicts involved in setting rules ofbehaviour.21 
The public-office centred definition has been criticised by many scholars as too 
narrow or restrictive to cover a wider range of corrupt acts. This legally based definition 
is not comprehensive. That is, this definition focuses only on the government official as 
a bribe recipient, although the briber must be involved with the corrupt act as well. In 
addition, it is a problem that this definition does not consider the bribery of non-
governmental persons. For example, the bribery of a teacher who works in a private 
school is not considered corruption. In other words, it cannot account for some 
important determinants of corruption, such as public interest and public opinion nor 
does it identify which norms are important in distinguishing corrupt from non-corrupt 
acts. Corruption is not only the function of illegal acts and behaviours, but, it involves 
extralegal or even technically legal activities.22 Although this definition can serve 
certain specific ends, it does this at the expense of other important determinants, for 
example, non-legal issues such as questions of judgement and opinion. 
20 Recited from Arnold 1. Heidenheimer, op.cit., p.9 
21 Johnston, Michael, 'The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment.' 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 18, July 1986, p.460 
22 Berg, Larry L., Hahn, Harlan, and Schmidhauser, John R., Corruption in the 
American Political System, (Morriston, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1976), p.6 
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In the market-centred definition, rent seeking is an important concept in examining 
corruption. Corrupt government officials are motivated to maximise their own benefit 
by using a public position. They regard public position as an item to be traded in a 
market. 
Contributions in this category borrow from basic economic and market theory to 
establish definitions for bureaucratic corruption. Leff, when exploring the consequences 
of corruption on economic development in developing countries, limited his discussion 
to the practice of buying favours from the bureaucrats responsible for formulating and 
administering the governments' economic policies. As a result he defined corruption as 
"an extra-legal institution used by individuals to gain influence over the actions of 
bureaucracy". 23 
In the public interest-centred definition, corruption is defined as any acts that 
violate the public interest. Corruption involves the subversion of the public interest or 
the common good by private interest. 
Unlike the definitions mentioned in the previous two categories, the definitions in 
this third category use public interest as the proper yardstick for measuring corruption. 
Arnold Rogow and Harold Lasswell hold an act corrupt when it violates responsibility 
toward at least one system of public or civic order and is in fact incompatible with 
(destructive of) any such system. A system of public or civic order exalts common 
interest over special interest; violations of the common interest for special advantage are 
corrupt. 24 
23 Leff, N. H., 'Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption', American 
Behavioural Scientist, Vol. 8, November 1964, p.8 
24 Arnold A. Rogow and Harold D. Lasswell, Corruption and Rectitude, (Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p.132 
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This definition broadens the range of behaviour to be investigated by addressing 
the notion of public interest, but it also leaves us with the responsibility of determining 
what the public or common interest is before assessing whether a particular act is 
corrupt. In addition, the public interest-centred definitions allow individuals the 
opportunity to justify any act as "in the public interest." 
These definitions are respectively focused on a specific aspect among many 
diverse and complicated aspects. In addition to these definitions, there are many other 
definitions of corruption. However, every definition has its own limitations. Corruption 
in one society may not be seen as such within another society. Corruption in the past can 
become the target of criticism later. There is no all-purpose definition appropriate for all 
kinds of research, though some analysts still hope for a definitive definition. Ultimately, 
the definition of corruption depends on the perspective of the definers and their purpose 
in defining it. 25 Furthermore, corruption is a phenomenon, which is practised in relation 
to the administrative system and culture of a country, so, it can be defined in several 
different ways. Also, the issue of corruption should be dealt with in connection with the 
environment surrounding the republic. 
Perry strives to analyse corruption through the juxtaposition of geography, or more 
specifically through cultural relativism.26 
According to Perry, reliance upon culture as a source of corruption is not truly 
reliable as it can be too limiting. In essence, corruption is not an indigenous 
25 Robert Williams, op.cit., p 512 
26 Perry. Peter John. Political Corruption and Political Geography. (Aldershot. 
England: Ashgate, 1997). 
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characteristic of some cultures but rather permeates every society, regardless of cultural 
traditions and practices. Yet, through analysis of culture, Perry feels that the origins of 
traditions and specifically "gift-giving" can be a determinant of corrupt practices. Perry 
points to the significance of cultural relativism as a way of heightening the 
understanding of corruption in both developing and developed countries. 
As seen in the above, the purpose of this research is to deal with government 
officials' corruption. Governments actually judge government officials' acts, whether 
corrupt or not, by law and code of conduct which is one of the legalistic norms. In other 
words, statistics cited in this thesis are the count of disciplinary punishment because of 
the violation of law and code of conduct. Accordingly, in this research, bureaucratic 
corruption is defined as the abuse of public office and the neglect of civic duty by 
government officials, which should be performed in accordance with Korean law and 
codes of conduct. This includes bribery, extortion, embezzlement, and other types of 
malfeasance that government officials should not carry out, and excludes corruption by 
other subjects, for example general civilians. 
Another term that should be defined in this thesis is corruption control. Generally, 
the meaning of control is to restrain or adjust something. In other words, it may be said 
that control is based on the idea that it is possible to change intentionally the acts of an 
object. Controlling corruption is complicated in that corruption is difficult to control 
directly. A large part of the causes of bureaucratic corruption are related to the system or 
structure of an republic which is beyond personal cause. Therefore, a wide range of 
indirect ways should be used to reduce and restrain corruption. In addition, this thesis 
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deals with governments' anti-corruption policies. Therefore, the subject of corruption 
control in this thesis is restricted to the governments' efforts to limit corruption. 
Accordingly, in this thesis, corruption control is defined as reform activities by 
government targeting of government officials, administrative systems and the 
environment, to reduce and restrain bureaucratic corruption. 
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1.3 Controlling Corruption 
It can be said that the most difficult problem facing students of corruption is the 
selection of an appropriate analytical framework. As there is no single coherent theory 
of corruption, students of corruption have utilised a variety of approaches and 
conceptual frameworks to define, explain and control corruption. 
This section will outline the dominant conceptual approaches to the study of 
corruption control, and the importance of political will, thus paving the way for devising 
an analytical framework in the next section. 
1.3.1 Approaches for Corruption Control 
The approaches to explain corruption phenomena are diverse. Accordingly, the 
strategies for controlling corruption are different in each approach. Symptomatic 
treatment that regards certain corruption phenomena as a sort of crime focuses on 
analysing the direct cause of the corruption and taking measures against it. However, it 
is also important to understand the indirect causes, which form the background of 
corruption, in order to control it. 
Three kinds of major approaches can be identified from previous studies. The 
focus and basic logic are different for understanding and controlling corruption 
phenomenon in each of these three approaches. 
a) Corruption Control by Institutionalisation 
This approach is related to the standpoint that corruption is an inseparable by-
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product of modernisation and development, which is generally insisted on by 
"functionalists" 27. Generally, the interest of functionalists in corruption concerns 
function rather than causation. They emphasise positive functions of corruption in 
political and economic development rather than negative ones. For example, they insist 
that corruption decreases uncertainty, increases investments, raises efficiency and works 
as a hedge against bad policies in developing countries?8 
Huntington insisted that the differences in the level of corruption that may exist 
between the modernised and politically developed societies and developing societies 
reflect their differences in political modernisation and political development. 29 One of 
the causes of corruption in his view is that modernisation creates new values which 
clash with the existing values of society, and behaviour which was acceptable and 
legitimate according to traditional norms becomes unacceptable and corrupt when 
viewed through modem eyes. He contended that the complications between one group 
who had an old sense of values and another group with differing values caused 
corruption. 
Generally, the point that is emphasised by this functionalistic approach is the lack 
of institutions in developing countries. A common factor of developing countries 
compared with that of developed countries is that the former does not have enough 
27 Huntington, Samuel P., 'Modernisation and Corruption' in ed. by Heidenheimer, 
Arnold J., etc. Political Corruption(New Brunswick and Oxford :Transaction Publishers, 
1989), pp.377-88; Nye, Joseph S., 'Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis.' American Political Science Review, Vo161, June 1967, pp.417-27; 
Bayley, David H., 'The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation' in ed. by 
Heidenheimer, Arnold 1., etc. Political Corruption(New Brunswick and 
Oxford :Transaction Publishers, 1989), pp.935-954; Scott, James C., Comparative 
Political Corruption, (Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc.) 1972 
28 Leff, Nathaniel H., 'Economic development through bureaucratic corruption' in ed. 
bl Heidenheimer, Arnold 1., etc. ibid, pp.394-97 
2 Huntington, Samuel P., op.cit., p.377 
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institutions that can fulfil the increasing desires of the people in the modernisation 
process. That is, modernisation is the process of making institutions that are able to fill 
the gap between traditional norms and new values. Current institutions are still based on 
traditional values, whereas new values are flowing rapidly into industrialising countries 
where people are relying upon informal ways to fulfil their desires. These informal 
ways lead to corruption. For example, it is not easy to escape from the temptation of 
corruption when the national income and consumption rise because of industrialisation 
while the salaries of government officials remain at the same levels of ten years ago. It 
is a fact that Korea's institutional requirements were not satisfied because of growth-
oriented policy. Furthermore it can be supposed that corruption was mass-produced 
because of incomplete institutionalisation. There are many scholars who emphasise the 
weakness of institutions as a cause of corruption in Korea.3o 
Therefore, the strategy to control corruption emphasised in this approach is to 
reform institutions to reflect the values, which should be instilled for a non-corrupt 
society. Furthermore, the criterion of assessing corruption control policies in this 
approach is whether anti-corruption institutions are institutionalised properly. 
b) Corruption Control by Punishment 
This approach focuses on the idea that corruption is a result of rational choice. It 
contends that corruption occurs when the profits from being corrupt are larger than that 
of the cost of being corrupt. 31 
30 Kim, Young Jong, Corruption: Cause and Measure, (Seoul: Soongsil University 
Press, 1996), pp.27-34 
31 Gardiner, John A .. and Lyman, Theodore R., 'The Logic of Corruption Control' in ed. 
20 
Generally, corruption increases with the rise of opportunities and motivation for 
corruption. The opportunity for corruption means how easily government officials can 
become involved in corruption, which is not subjective but objective reality. This 
opportunity would increase, for example, in the enlargement of a public servant's 
discretion, greater secrecy in the decision-making process and less regulation on the 
public servant's conduct. Motivation reflects the extent of psychological burden of the 
corrupt official, who judges the benefit and cost of illicit conduct. Incentive is 
determined by various internal and external factors, for example, the level of salary, the 
possibility of being detected, and the level of punishment. 
The above factors can be considered on a personal level. Firstly, economic benefit 
and subjective satisfaction from being corrupt or not, can be earmarked as one variable. 
Other variables are the probability of being detected and the severity of punishment. It 
can be assumed that the decision to be corrupt or not is affected by the functional 
relation between these variables. In other words, corruption can be reduced when the 
intensity of punishment is increased. 
This kind of approach seems to be supported by the fact that in Korea most high-
ranking government officials' corruption is punished lightly32. This means that one of 
the reasons for current corruption in Korea is weak punishment. 
c) Corruption Control by Cultural Change 
This approach starts from the idea that corruption is a result of historically formed 
by Heidenheimer, Arnold J., etc. Political Corruption(New Brunswick and 
Oxford :Transaction Publishers, 1989), p.827 
32 Park, Cheol -Hyun, A Study on the Cause of Corruption in Korea, (Research Report 
98-14, Korean Institute of Criminology, 1999), p. 3 7 
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culture rather than inadequate social institutions, etc. In other words, it is said that 
corruption can be explained by cultural causes separate from institutions, whether it is 
the culture preferring objective rules to subjective judgement or not. 
The aspects of culture susceptible to corruption suggested by many scholars are, 
for example; personal relationships, tribal and kinship loyalties, and gift giving.33 
Greenberg wrote, "The prevalence in the society of personalism, primary loyalties being 
directed toward one's family and friends rather than toward government or 
administrative entity, has an important effect on the level of corruption,,34. In other 
societies, for example in Africa, Kotecha mentioned that tribal and kinship loyalties 
might create a climate conducive to corruption. 
.... 'Members of the African political elite corrupt themselves not only for 
personal gain but also for their immediate families and for those who belong to the 
same kinship group or tribe that make up their clienteles' ... 35 
The custom of gift giving is regarded as one aspect of culture leading to corruption. 
This gift giving culture permeating public service hinders fair execution of duty and the 
distinction between public and private matters. 36 
However, this cultural approach is being attacked by several scholars on the 
grounds that it is a Western-centred idea. Tignor, an African historian, points out that the 
33 Klitgaa rd, Robert, Controlling Corruption, (LA: University of California Press, 1988), 
p,.62 
4 Greenb erg, Martin H., Bureaucracy and Development, (Lexington, Mass.:D.C.Heath, 
1970), p.70 
35 Kotecha, Ken C., with Adams, Robert W., African Politics: The Corruption of Power, 
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1981), p.95 
36 Scott, James C., Comparative Political Corruption, (Eaglewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall Inc., 1972), pp.11-13 
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cultural approach is biased: 
The Europeans interviewed insisted that much of the corruption and bribery that 
took place was only traditional gifi-giving ..... that what was called corruption was the 
result of the misapplication of European norms of good government to quite dissimilar 
.. 37 
societies .... 
In order for the cultural approach to have validity, there are specific social 
conditions and cultural factors that need to be discussed. Without these, it is hard to 
explain the cases of some countries in which current corruption levels are higher or at 
least the same as the past, although the influence of traditional culture has been reduced. 
Apart from the above discussion, the measures that can be adopted in this cultural 
approach are to change the culture of society and to instil a collective belief in anti-
corruption. 
d) Conclusion 
The above-mentioned approaches each have important value within an analytical 
framework to explain corruption phenomena. In reality, we can see that many countries 
which have developed rapidly or are still developing have had severe experiences of 
corruption, although there are some exceptional countries such as Singapore. It is also a 
disputable claim that light punishment and cultures tolerant of a little corruption are 
some of the major reasons for the failure of effective corruption control. 
In the case of Korea, many scholars point out the fact that lack of institutions, light 
37 Tignor, Robe rt L., 'Colonial Chiefs in Chiefless Societies' in Bureaucratic corruption 
in Sub-Saharan Africa: Toward a search for causes and consequences, ed. Ekpo, 
Monday U., (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc. 1979), p.200 
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punishment and undesirable culture are some of the major reasons of continuous 
bureaucratic corruption.38 
Each approach above has a reasonable explanative logic in its own way. At the 
same time, the approaches have their own limitations in explaining kinds of corruption 
and effective means of dealing with them. Corruption needs to be analysed by not only 
one criterion but by the use of various criteria. In the same way, an integrated approach 
needs to be adopted to control corruption effectively because the phenomenon of 
corruption is a result of various causes. 
In addition, the above approaches placed an emphasis on the substances of 
corruption control activities, like high-level institutionalisation, strong punishment and 
cultural changes, but a government's efforts shown in the process of adopting certain 
countermeasures needs to be analysed as well. In reality, the effectiveness of policies is 
influenced by the government's efforts. It can be said that the effectiveness of a certain 
approach amongst the above depends on how strongly a government pushes it forward. 
Therefore, this research places emphasis on how strongly a government pushed forward 
the whole process of corruption control policies. This approach shall be called 'political 
will approach' in this research. In the next section, the operating logic of 'political will' 
in the policy process will be examined. 
1.3.2 Causes of policy failure and political will 
It may be said that the most important reason for assessing policies is that the 
policies expected to succeed often fail. Many researchers tried to find out the reasons 
38 Park, Cheol -Hyun, op.cit., p.43 
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for failure. By combining this body of research it is possible to classify the causes into 
three reasons; human, structural and circumstantial. 39 
a) Human Causes 
The main body in policy process is the human being and the limitations of human 
beings function as an obstacle to rational policy process. The limitations of human 
beings as a subject of policy process are as follows. First, to some extent, human beings 
behave irrationally. This irrationality can lead to a failure to recognise social problems 
and, can also lead to poor decisions in the policy process. Lastly, it brings about policy 
failure. In addition, human beings do not have the ability to perceive circumstances 
perfectly. Furthermore, human beings cannot perfectly perceive a policy's 
circumstances which are more complicated than other social phenomenon. This makes it 
difficult to make a policy rationally and to solve a problem. Together with the above 
limitations, human beings do not have perfect knowledge and information in order to 
make rational policy. It is very difficult to predict the result of policies without 
sufficient information and knowledge. 
b) Structural causes 
We can say that policy is the result of reciprocal action between actors in a political 
structure. So, if the political structure is centralised, the power to decide policy 
concentrates too much upon the upper echelons. The centralised structure hinders wider 
39 Edward S. Quad e, Analysis for decisions, (New York: Elsevier Science Publishing 
Co., 1982), pp.3-4 
An, Hae-Gyun, The principles of policy, (Seoul: Da San Publishing Co., 1986), 
pp.490-94 
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participation of those who have a role to play and this makes it difficult to examine an 
alternative plan. As a result, the quality of policies decreases. The precedent and rules 
that are embedded in a certain political structure also hinder rational policy process. If 
the structure regards the precedent as important, there is more possibility of neglecting 
to detect an alternative plan. Deficiency of various resources for policy making and 
implementation, for example, enough time and data, will also function as a restriction. 
c) Circumstantial cause 
Circumstantial causation refers to all kinds of influence from outside the policy 
system. The relation between a policy system and the environment varies all the time, 
so policy makers have to commit to tum the circumstance to their advantage. To make 
successful policies, demand and support from outside of the political system have to be 
inputted without restriction. However, the countries in which the level of political 
development is low and in which the institutions for political participation have not 
been prepared usually have a weak input system. It becomes more difficult to deal with 
policy agenda that is related to many levels of society if a press and stakeholders' 
organisation has not been established. In addition, if the cultural and economic situation 
is negative to a certain policy, the policy has a greater possibility of failing. In this case, 
the efforts of people who are related to policymaking and implementation will be 
limited. 
d) Conclusion - Political will as another cause 
It can be said that the above three causes influence policy failure individually and 
simultaneously, as circumstances dictate. The political will of policymakers influences 
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overall causes including human, structural and circumstantial. If political will is weak, 
policy makers will not make the effort to get more information, to respond to the 
problem which needs to be addressed, to change precedent or to open the channel to 
receive demands and support. 
Therefore, this research considers that the insufficient political will of policy-
related individuals is the most important cause of policy failure. Especially, in 
corruption control policies, high-ranking officials and politicians' political will is 
considered as the most important variable to influence policy success. 
1.3.3 Political Will in Corruption Control 
Judging by the experience of many Asian countries such as, Singapore, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan, political will is a predominant factor in effective corruption control40. 
Kpundeh contends that 'political will is a critical first starting point for sustainable and 
effective anticorruption strategies and programs,41. Langseth, Stapenhurst and Pope also 
note the importance of political will.42: 
40 Quah, Jon S. T., 'Controling corruption in city-states: A comparative study of Hong-
Kong and Singapore', in Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 22, No.4, 1995, pA08. 
Kisubi, M. Mohammad, 'Involving Civil Society in the Fight against Corruption' in 
Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr 1. Kpundeh, eds., Curbing Corruption, (The World Bank: 
Washington. D.C., 1999), p.l21 
Langseth, Petter, Stapenhurst, Rick and Pope, Jeremy, 'National Integrity Systems' in 
Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr 1. Kpundeh, eds., Curbing Corruption, (The World Bank: 
Washington. D.C., 1999), p.131 
Kpundeh, Sahr 1., 'The Fight against Corruption in Sierra Leone' in Rick Stapenhurst 
and Sahr 1. Kpundeh, eds., Curbing Corruption, (The World Bank: Washington. D.C., 
1999), p.211 
41 Kpundeh, Sahr J, op.cit., p.211 
42 Langseth, Petter, Stapenhurst, Rick and Pope, Jeremy, op.cit., p.131 
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Fundamentally, a leader s commitment is key to successful anti-corruption policies . 
... ... In addition to political commitment at the highest level, sustainable anti-corruption 
efforts must include commitment from other agents of the state as well. 
The importance of political will can also be explained by Klitgaard's corruption 
model. According to Klitgaard's principal-agent-client model, which is one of the useful 
frameworks for analysing corruption, three actors, principal (P), agent (A) and client (C), 
always participate in any corruption deal43 . 
P (principal) 
A 
(agent) (client) 
< Figure 1.1 > Principal-Agent-Client Model 
The principal employs an agent to provide a service to 'P' himself or to a client, 
and the agent interacts with discretion on the principal's behalf with a client. Corruption 
occurs when 'A' uses that discretion in an illicit manner for private gain. That is, 
corruption occurs when 'A' has undertaken some illegal transactions, for example, 
bribery or extortion, with 'C', and when' P: abuses committed discretion, for example, 
43 Klitgaa rd, Robert, Controlling Corruption, (LA: University of California Press, 1988), 
p.69 
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misappropriation, against 'p,.44 Therefore, Klitgaard suggests several sorts of activities 
to reduce corruption which mainly focus on the control of the agent45 . Those activities 
include selecting agents for honesty and capability; changing the rewards and penalties 
facing agents and clients; gathering and analysing information in order to raise the 
chances that corruption will be detected; restructuring the principal-agent-client 
relationship to remove the corruption inducing equation (that is, corruption equals 
monopoly power plus discretion minus accountability) and changing the attitudes about 
corruption. 
In Klitgaard's model, all of the three actors, the principal (P), the agent (A) and the 
client (C), are in a very important position to carry out anticorruption policies 
successfully. First of all, it can be said that corruption control is more likely to fail if A 
and C are affected by a corrupt culture and have more opportunity to transact with each 
other to their mutual benefit. Therefore, in order for a cultural, political and economic 
environment to exist where anti-corruption policies can be successfully implemented A 
and C need to be estranged from corruption themselves. Also, 'P' occupies a vital 
position in curbing corruption. That is to say, 1) 'P' selects 'A', 2) P sets A's rewards and 
penalties, 3) also, P has the power to affect moral costs of A and C of being corrupt. In 
other words, in this model, the success of a policy depends on P to conduct anti-
corruption policies. Therefore, no effective measure can be produced without the strong 
political anti-corruption will of P. On the contrary, dependence on P in the model shows 
that P will be an obstacle in the reform process if P is deficient in political will. In many 
countries, we can see that principals, for example, the Presidents or Prime Minister, lead 
44 The cas e which C perverts against P, for example, tax evasion, is usually classified as 
a crime rather than corruption. 
45 Klitgaa rd, Robert, op. cit., p.74 
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corruption control movements, whilst at the same time, they are absorbed in corruption. 
In those cases, most Ps have unsound political will in their corruption control activities 
derived from a desire to advance their own political interests. 
In conclusion, it is worth analysing political will to discover one of the reasons of 
the failure of certain country's anti-corruption efforts. The bulk of analysis and action, 
however, has concentrated upon tracing corruption's complexities and devising long-
term strategic interventions to reduce and eliminate corrupt practices. Despite the 
acknowledgement of its importance to anti-corruption activities, political will itself has 
received relatively little study. Hence, this thesis attempts to identify and assess political 
will as it relates to anti-corruption activities. 
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1.4 Framework of Analysis 
This research will analyse the political will behind the Korean government's anti-
corruption policy and efforts made to evaluate this policy. This section will establish an 
analytical framework for the purposes of further analysis. 
As seen the above, political will in this research is defined as the commitment of 
governmental actors to undertake actions to control corruption with seriousness and to 
sustain those actions over time. 
In conclusion, therefore, undertaking actions seriously and the sustainability for 
undertaking appropriate actions are two key factors to judge strong political will. It is 
not accurate to say that there is strong political will when judged against the observation 
of frequent government action to tackle corruption. It may appear that there are 
undertakings but these are often based upon unsound political motives. Certain 
republics exploited the issue of corruption control as a way to de-legitimise the previous 
regime, purge the opposition, manipulate the political agenda or temporarily win public 
support. 46 Therefore, contents and process need to be analysed systematically and 
comprehensively to assess whether political actions are sound and free of corruption. 
Sustainability is also a very important factor to consider. It can be said that 
effectiveness is produced under sustained action. The effect of corruption control 
activities does not emerge in the short term. In other words, corruption control needs 
long-term efforts and perseverance. Nevertheless, corruption control activity that is 
designed for 'display purposes only' is not sustainable in the long term A government 
46 Kpundeh, Sahr J., "Political will in fighting corruption" in Corruption and Integrity 
improvement initiatives in developing countries. OECD, 1998, p.94 
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lacking in legitimacy usually exploits corruption control activities as a means of gaining 
the support of the voters at the outset, without any serious intention of maintaining 
effective policy delivery. There is a good deal of evidence to show that many regimes, 
particularly in developing countries, started corruption control activities with a serious 
political will, but this political will has degenerated as a means of strengthening their 
reign.47 
Therefore, this analysis focuses on two variables; senousness of practical 
undertakings and the sustainability of actions in order to identify whether there has been 
strong political will in the corruption control activities of past Korean governments. 
The former addresses the question of whether they took action to achieve 
corruption control with serious intentions or from other motivations such as 
propagandistic point scoring. In other words, it addresses the question of whether past 
Korean governments have seriously pursued corruption control. 
In the latter, sustainability looks at how continuously they have pursued corruption 
control. In some periods, they have undertaken a number of anti-corruption policies, and 
worked enthusiastically to identify corrupt government officials using sustainable 
approaches, but, in other periods, this has not been the case. 
In conclusion, two variables, 'serious undertaking or unserious undertaking' and 
'high sustainability or low sustainability' were chosen to analyse Korea's corruption 
control efforts. From these two variables, a matrix can be created as follows. 
47 Kpundeh, Sahr J., ibid, p.94 
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Low sustainability High sustainability 
Unserious undertaking Type 1 Type 2 
Serious undertaking Type 3 Type 4 
Fig.I-2 Matrix of Two Variables 
Types I and 2 are cases in which corruption control efforts were not made in 
earnest. For example, in Type I, it is the case that the government has no serious 
intention to eradicate corruption. The intention of corruption control efforts in this type 
is to just show up or double purpose, that is, not only to eradicate corruption but to 
achieve other political effects. Generally, a government which does not have a serious 
intention, will not be sustainable in its actions to combat corruption. In this case, it is 
hard to produce substantive corruption control measures. In conclusion, the corruption 
control measures and other activities outlined for Type I are poor. 
However, in some situations, even though a government does not have serious 
intentions, it may try to appear as though its intentions are serious and sound. For 
example, this may occur in response to public pressure to adopt corruption control 
measures and the subsequent need to maintain public support. Formal measures rather 
than substantial measures are usual in the case of Type 2 which is defined by this 
paragraph. 
In contrast, if corruption control efforts are made in earnest as in Types 3 and 4, the 
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prospects for corruption control become much brighter than in Types 1 and 2. In Type 3, 
a government's undertaking for corruption control is serious, but the government does 
not sustain it actively for one reason or another, for example, minimising objections 
from interest groups. In Type 4, a government not only seriously wants corruption 
control, but actively sustains it. Of course, this typology is the most ideal in reducing 
corruption. 
It is useful, therefore, to analyse the efforts of past Korean republics to control 
corruption by identifying which republic belongs to which category. Furthermore, this 
analysis can identify whether there has been sufficient political will in corruption 
control to effectively identify the failings of past republics. 
To date, in the assessment of corruption control policies, most researchers have 
concentrated on the following fragmentary factors; the establishment of an independent 
anti-corruption agency, well-planned long-term measures, an anti-corruption act and the 
need for confidentiality. 
However, it can be said that successful outcomes from corruption control activities do 
not arise from individual piecemeal measures alone such as the strengthening of 
detection, punishment and improvement of institutions. It is, instead because corruption 
control efforts bear fruit through the reciprocal relationships established within social, 
political and economic spheres. In this case the surrounding factors, which influence the 
outcome of government policy, become more important, especially, in terms of South 
Korea whose politicians lied during the course of rapid political and economic 
development. 
Therefore, to assess corruption control policies of a country, it is necessary to 
34 
analyse policy and policy processes together. It is also necessary to find which factors 
affect the policies and how effectively the government controlled and utilised the factors, 
using strong political will. 
The principal purpose of the assessment of political will is to distinguish between 
superficial or formal efforts that are intentionally designed only to bolster the image of 
political leaders and substantive efforts that are based on strategies to create change, and 
between high sustainability and low sustainability. 
It is extraordinarily difficult to make a judgement on the sincerity of a policy. It is 
not easy to say how serious or genuine the intentions of political leaders or policy-
makers have been in a certain policy area, and particularly in the formulation of 
corruption control policies. People rarely make their motives or the background of their 
policy decisions explicitly known. Rather it is left unexplained or apt to remain secret. 
Therefore, the availability of relevant data in this field is very limited and it will be 
quite difficult to form a comprehensive analysis. 
Then, how can we assess the variables of political will, that is, seriousness of 
undertaking and extent of sustainability? Political will refers to the intent of actors to 
attack the manifestations and causes of corruption in an effort to reduce or eliminate 
them. As seen the above, it is defined as the commitment of actors to undertake actions 
to achieve a set of anti-corruption policies and programmes, and to sustain those actions 
over time. It is possible to identify several indicators that demonstrate the relative extent 
of political will. However, too many diverse indicators can be extracted from various 
dimensions and would overlap. 
This research suggests the following comprehensive indicators that are related to the 
seriousness of undertaking and the extent of sustainability. These indicators are 
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extracted from both the contents of corruption control policies and through the process 
of their implementation, because political will is mostly related to the intention of 
decision-makers and often manifests itself during the policy making process. Thus, it is 
necessary to look into both the contents of policies and the process in which policies are 
established. 
The indicators suggested in this research to assess the seriousness of political 
undertakings and the extent of sustainability are a) Degree of Seriousness on the Initial 
Stages, b) Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions, c) Long-Term Strategy, d) 
Frequency of Efforts, e) Mobilisation of Support. 
Each of these five indicators is related to both variables, undertaking and 
sustainability, but the first two indicators are usually related to the seriousness of 
undertaking and the last two indicators are usually related to sustainability. The middle 
indicator, Long-Term Strategy, is related to both variables. 
The case that has high score of all five indicators means most strong political will. 
In using these five indicators to assess and measure political will, it is important to take 
into account them together. This means that a low score on one or two of the indicators 
does not necessarily signal a complete absence of political will. For example, some 
governments can progressively commit to reform without any Mobilisation of Support. 
a) Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 
A good beginning is very important for a good ending. In the same way, the 
effectiveness of the corruption control efforts depends on how serious the government 
was when commencing its actions. Therefore, the degree of seriousness at the outset is 
the first indicator to assess corruption control. Further sub indicators can be identified 
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as: the recognition of the serious realities of corruption and the degree of analytical rigor. 
a-I) Recognition of the serious realities of corruption 
The most important element for effective corruption control is correct 
understanding of the serious realities of corruption. This is the starting point of the 
policy making process and for establishing strong political will. In the case of 
corruption phenomena, the recognition of the serious realities and harmfulness of 
corruption by a political leader is important in that it is generally considered that the 
revealed parts of corruption are less than the hidden parts. Many scholars agree with this 
standpoint. For example, Quah stresses that recognition of the seriousness of corruption 
by political leaders is the critical factor for guaranteeing the effectiveness of corruption 
control policies.48 Klitgaard emphasizes that the recognition and diagnosis of a problem 
is the first step for establishing strong political will.49 Therefore, it can be said that an 
effort to get accurate recognition of corruption symptoms is essential to create strong 
political will. 
a-2) Degree of analytical rigor 
Another sub-indicator, degree of analytical rigor, entails the extent to which the 
reformer, or reform team, undertakes an in-depth analysis of corruption and its cause 
and uses that analysis to design a technically adequate and politically feasible reform 
programme. Has the reform team sought to recognize the complexities that give rise to 
corrupt behaviour? Has the team analyzed the costs of corruption and weighed those 
against the costs of combating particular types of corruption? Reformers who have not 
48 Quah, IS. T., Singapore's Experience in Curbing Corruption, in Heidenheimer,A.J.(ed), 
Political Corruption, (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1990), p.849 
49 Klitgaard, Con trolling Corruption, (LA: University of California Press, 1988), p.17 
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gone through these analytical steps, and/or who advocate actions that are clearly 
insufficient to address the 'problems (e.g., symbolic purges of a few corrupt officials), 
demonstrate insufficient willingness to pursue change. The above indicators would 
aggregate the answers to these questions into rankings using a high-low continuum. 
b) Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 
The sincerity of political will immanent to policy can be measured by observing the 
rank of government officials targeted by the policy and the extent of sanctions made. It 
can be said that the government which has weak political will is more lenient toward 
corrupted high ranking officials, whereas low ranking officials have a tendency to be 
punished more severely. So, we can judge political will by the rank of officials targeted 
by the policy, and how many high rank government officials are punished. 50 
In terms of indicators, the rating continuum would run from strong application of 
highly credible sanctions, associated with a greater degree of political will, to weak 
application of ineffective sanctions, signifying a lesser degree of political will. 
c) Long-Term Strategy 
It is a well-known fact that corruption is a phenomenon that is affected by many 
kinds of causes and needs various measures to cure it. Corruption control efforts in 
order to show visible outcomes in the short term focus mainly on the improvised 
punishment of completed corruption and publication itself. In other words, if there is 
strong will to eradicate corruption, the long-term efforts to cure the causes of corruption 
50 Kpundeh, Sahr J.,"Political will in fighting corruption" in Corruption and Integrity 
improvement initiatives in developing countries. OEeD, 1998, p.1 00 
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should be followed. 
Long-Term Strategy includes time and cost consuming efforts. Institutionalisation 
and long-term plans are also helpful to sustain corruption control efforts. Without long-
term plans, it will be very hard to continue corruption control because corruption is 
mostly related to power holders and they will try to obstruct corruption control efforts if 
the efforts are not based on long-term plans. 
Anyway, active Long-Term Strategy not only show that an republic's political will 
is serious, but also make corruption control activities able to be continuously effective. 
Therefore, as the other indicators, Long-Term Strategy would signal more political will, 
whereas one-shot effort would indicate less political will. 
d) Frequency of Efforts 
This indicator is related to the sustainability of political will. Generally, it is 
possible to assume that goals are more readily achievable through sustained efforts. 
Even though policy makers want to eradicate corruption, they cannot realise their ideal 
without frequent action. Undertaking actions such as publishing policies and detecting 
corrupt officials need to be sustained throughout a whole period for it to be seen as 
sustainable. 
e) Mobilisation of Support 
This indicator firstly deals with whether the government has developed a strategy 
that is participative and incorporates the interests of important stakeholders. To obtain 
sustainability in corruption control, it is necessary to achieve the support of the public 
and key stakeholders. It includes, for example, the participation of civil society in 
39 
policy-making and implementation, and the support of government officials. While 
leadership is crucial to the implementation phase, shared responsibility is equally 
essential in ensuring sustainability. Participation of stakeholders is time consuming, but 
it enhances opportunities for success. Therefore, when the government has a stronger 
political will, it is more likely to consider a participative strategy. 
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1.5 Methodology 
UNIVERSITY 
OF SHEFFIELD 
UBRAPY 
As mentioned above, the objective of this research is to assess the levels of political will 
for corruption control in Korea. Furthermore, it seeks to understand why, in spite of an 
apparent continuous commitment, corruption control efforts have not achieved any kind 
of startling results. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to analyse the overall efforts 
of past Korean governments to control corruption. However, it should be noted that 
these Government efforts include both direct and indirect policies.51 The indirect policy 
efforts are broad in range, are of too wide a scope to analyse and not being directly 
related to political will for controlling corruption (in as much as the published primary 
intention of those policies was something other than corruption control), are therefore 
excluded from this research. 
This research is limited to analysing direct corruption control efforts, for example, 
those policies which were explicitly published for the purposes of corruption control 
and law-enforcement. Even when limiting research to those records of direct corruption 
control efforts, it is still impossible to examine the whole range of records because they 
are simply so large in number. Therefore, this research mainly concentrates on the 
documental records, such as White Papers, which were published by the governmental 
agencies directly related to corruption control, such as the Ministry of Justice, the Police 
Agency, the Prosecutor's office, the Commission Against Corruption, and the Ministry 
of Government Republic. In addition where pertinent, this research draws upon 
supplementary records, such as a collection of President's addresses, which were 
51 In this research, 'indirect policies' means all the other government's policies whose 
primary intention was not corruption control. However it can affect on corruption 
control efforts indirectly. 
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published by the secretary's office for the President, the Prime Minister's Office, and the 
Ministry of Public Relations, etc. Furthermore, this research collects additional data 
about corruption cases and attempts to control them from sources such as newspapers, 
precedent researches and articles. Among the large amount of data in the collected 
records, necessary data will be selected in the light of the indicators, previously 
suggested in section 1.4. 
This research sets out to assess the political will which is inherent in corruption 
control efforts of many republics of Korea, and so relies on objective data which was 
published as policy. Therefore, a document method is an efficient way to carry out this 
research in order to find out the objective intention of a government. Data collection of 
the existing data by using a document method will be useful for historical research 
(such as comparisons over time), and has the advantage of being unobtrusive. From 
other methods, like interview or questionnaire methods, it is possible to collect more in-
depth information about policy processes, however information, which was not 
published as policies, is not a completed policy which can affect on corruption control, 
so, it is not judged to be the direct object of this research for assessing a particular 
government's policies. 
This research at its core adopts a qualitative approach to analyse the collected data 
based on the framework which was suggested in section 1.4, supplemented using 
quantitative analysis in some parts. 
This research adopts a relative assessment between many republics because it is 
very difficult to find absolute criteria to assess whether a certain republic's political will 
is strong or not. Therefore, a historical analysis is used to carry out a case study on 
Korean corruption control policies. In order to assess the efforts of past republics, 
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each discrete republic (adjudged by the highest political leader) will be considered in 
tum. However, several republics need to be analysed in the same phase because some 
republics have held power for a short period of time or have a similar situation and 
policies as their predecessors. Therefore, in the course of this analysis, six distinctive 
phases were discernible in the period of 1948 to 2002: 
Phase I (1948-1961, 1 st and Second Republic), 
Phase II (1961-1979, Military junta, 3rd and Fourth Republic) 
Phaseill (1979-1987, Fifth Republic) 
PhaseIV (1988-1992, Sixth Republic) 
Phase V (1993-1997, Seventh republic) 
Phase VI(1998-2002, Eighth Republic). 
The main body of this research IS the analysis of each phase, based on the 
established analytical framework. 
In conclusion, this research is formulated to assess the political will which is 
inherent in direct corruption control efforts enforced over the last fifty years by 
successive Korean Governments. For this analysis, this research relies largely on a 
document method through analysing the records of activities undertaken by past Korean 
governments. 
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1.6 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of two parts with eleven chapters. In the first part, from chapter 
One to chapter Four, it introduces the basic idea of this research and suggests a 
theoretical framework for the research of bureaucratic corruption control in Korea, 
based on the literature review. 
Chapter One briefly introduces the purpose, definitions of terms and methodology 
used in this research. In addition, this chapter suggests the framework of analysis for 
assessing political will in the process of corruption control efforts. 
Chapter Two provides an overview of the circumstances of each of the Korean 
Republics to give a basic understanding of Korea. This chapter also chronicles the 
magnitude and characteristics of Korean bureaucratic corruption. 
Chapter Three describes the relationship of corruption to several dynamic elements 
III Korea, such as culture, politics and the economy. This chapter explains the 
complexity of Korean corruption. 
Chapter Four explains how the institutionalisation against corruption has been 
cultivated in Korea. 
In the second part, from chapter Five to chapter Six, the efforts of the Korean 
government to control corruption will be analysed based on the above framework, and 
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several suggestions will be made for the future of corruption control in Korea. 
Chapter Five examines the period of 1948-1961, in which the 1 st and Second 
Republics lost power due to rampant corruption. 
Chapter Six deals with the period 1961-1979, the 3 rd and Fourth Republics, in 
which a military coup took place by General Park under the flag of eradicating 
corruption. However, on the other hand, this period provided the root of bureaucratic 
corruption because government officials had a great deal of discretion in the process of 
rapid economic development. 
Chapter Seven analyses the period 1980-1987, the Fifth Republic, in which 
President Chun who was another former General took power. In this period, a big social 
reform movement was conducted to eradicate corruption. 
Chapter Eight analyses the period 1988-1992, the Sixth Republic, in which the 
other President Rho who was also a former General took power. However, the President 
was directly elected by the people. 
Chapter Nine deals with the period 1992-1997, the Seventh republic, in which a 
real democracy had been established in Korea. A genuine civilian candidate, who had no 
previous professional military career, was elected president. He tried to reform 
administrative and political situations in many ways. 
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Chapter Ten deals with the period 1997-2002, the Eighth Republic, in which power 
was changed, for the first time, from the party in power to the opposition party. 
Chapter Eleven summarises the research in order to draw a conclusion. Shifts not 
only in corruption control policies but also in the political will for corruption control are 
discussed. In addition, this chapter examine the value of this research. 
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Chapter 2: Circumstances of Korean republics 
and the Extent of and Trends in 
corruption of Korea 
This research aims to assess the political will of corruption control efforts in Korea. To 
do this, it is necessary to form a general overview of corruption in Korea. 
In the past, particularly until Korea had a President elected directly by the people in 
1988, many people did not believe that the government's efforts to eradicate corruption 
would succeed, because they doubted the sincerity of the government's efforts. Several 
Presidents took power only with the backing of the army. They constantly tried to get 
the support of the people by various inducements, such as economic development and 
corruption control, to compensate for the weakness of the orthodoxy of their power. To 
develop these inducements, they needed the assistance of government officials, so, at 
the time, it was not convenient to launch genuine corruption control measures against 
government officials. 
In addition, Korea IS a country whose economy has been developed through 
government initiative since 1950. In the course of development, government officials 
had a lot of power to distribute resources, and, as a result of that power, the situation 
was not favourable to maintain governmental departments without corruption. However, 
since Presidents have been elected democratically without the backing of military power 
and the economy has been developed to some extent, the situation has changed. 
Therefore, we need to understand the social, political and economic contexts of 
previous Korean republics to achieve the desired objectives of this thesis. This chapter, 
first, describes the social, political and economic situations of previous Korean 
republics. This will provide information to ascertain the particular circumstances that 
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gave rise to corruption and how effectively the republics were able to deal with it. 
Secondly, this chapter describes the causes, magnitude and characteristics of 
bureaucratic corruption in Korea in order to provide greater understanding of the 
phenomenon. 
2.1 Circumstances of previous Korean republics 
As mentioned in the first chapter, divergent views emerge in the determination of 
whether it is the presence or absence of social, political and economic stability that 
contributes to policy reform success. Some analysis contends that periods of crisis and 
shock are conducive to reform making, including corruption control activities, while 
others argue that economic and political crises undermine leaders' will to consider and 
engage in difficult reforms such as mitigating or eliminating corruption. 52 
Nevertheless, Korea has experienced a great many changes in politics as well as in its 
economy, such as rapid economic growth and transition to democracy. With a 
centralised power structure, the government played a critical role in this process. Strong 
government and weak civil society were typical features during the rapid economic 
growth period. 
The purpose of this section is to outline the historical circumstances surrounding 
republics. In doing this, this section attempts to examine how the role and status of 
government officials have changed and what impact these changes have had on 
corruption and its control. 
52 Brinker hoff, Derick W., 'Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: An 
analytic Framework', Public Republic and Development, Vol. 20, 2000, p.245 
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2.1.1 The newly established republic and reconstruction period (1948-1961) 
The period from 1948 to 1961 in Korea was stirred up by many political events. After 
the liberation from Japanese totalitarianism in 1945, Korea has officially been divided 
into the South and the North since the southern part, which had been under the control 
of United States Army Military Government in Korea after the end of World War II in 
1945, alone had a separate election in 1948.53 South Korea, with a newly established 
government, adopted a new political system that she had never had in four thousand 
years of history. Chosun dynasty, which ruled the Korean peninsula before Japanese rule, 
was a pre-modem society ruled by an absolute monarch. The new government was a 
mixed form of the Presidential system and the cabinet system. 54 
The political system of South Korea can be characterised by what is called "tutelary 
democracy", which combines "democracy" in theory and "autocracy" in practice.55 
South Korea adopted both the formal norms of the democratic polity - universal 
suffrage, freedom of association and of speech and publication and the like - and the 
structural form of democracy based on the principle of checks and balances and 
separation of powers among three branches of government - executive, legislative and 
judiciary56. In practice, power was highly centralised in the executive branch and the 
53 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which had occupied th e northern part since 
1945, refused to participate in the national election. For more information, see George 
McAfee McCune, Korea Today(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p.252 
54 B yun,Tae-Sub, An introduction to Korean history(Han Guk Sa Tong Ron),(Seoul: 
Sam Young Sa, 1988), p.503 
55 Yoon,Woo Kon, Korea n Public Bureaucracy, (Seoul,Korea: Sung Kyun Kwan 
University Press, 1982), p.80 
56 Yoon,Woo K on, Ibid, p.80 
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President as a chief executive. The legislature tended to be relatively powerless. The 
judiciary made few independents decisions. Local self-government was non-existent57 . 
The new republic had to face serious challenges from the leftists, who opposed the 
establishment of a separate government in the South. There was a series of leftist 
revolts; a full-scale guerrilla war on Cheju island, and subsequent uprisings in Yosu and 
Sunchon. These revolts were repressed by the police. Under these situations, the 
republic was able to use coercive powers through the enactment of laws, most notably 
the National Security Law (enacted in December 1948). In addition, the Korean War, 
from 1950 to 1953, was a great psychological shock. As a result of the fear of war and 
communism, anti-communism and national security became a hegemonic ideology. The 
ideology of national security was exploited by the Seung-Man Lee regime to deal with 
the ideological conflicts, and leftist movements were ruthlessly suppressed under the 
flag of anti-communism. The Lee regime used to resort to these coercive powers not 
only to suppress leftists but also to silence its opponents under the banner of 
maintaining liberal democratic order. The Lee regime created another source of political 
challenge to its political legitimacy by excluding even the conservative opposition from 
politics.58 
The Lee republic showed the characteristics of arbitrary dictatorial rule, by abusing 
government power, including the police. The constitution was amended three times in 
order for Lee to be re-elected as President. The administrative, legislative, and judiciary 
branches came under Lee's dictatorship. The focus of government building was on the 
57 Yoon,Woo Kon, Ibid, p.80 
58 Choi, lang-lip, 'Political Cleavages III South Korea' in Choi, Sang-Yong (ed.), 
Democracy in Korea (Seoul: The Korean Political Science Association, 1997), pp.187-
88. 
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restoration of security-related institutions such as the police and the military. By 
mobilising these institutions, the Lee regime established dictatorship, rather than a 
democratic government. 59 In conclusion, the political situation of this republic 
contributed to the abuse of government power and growing corruption. 
Sung-Joo Han contends that many factors contributed to the formidable power and 
corruption of the government. Firstly, because of the Confucian belief system, the 
majority of Korean people at the time were used to conforming and obeying the 
government. Secondly, there was no strong social organisation which could challenge 
the authority of the government, while the highly centralised police organisations and 
administrative bureaucracy contributed to the supremacy of government power. Thirdly, 
the existence of a communist threat from the north, as well as from within South Korea 
itself, provided the government with a favourable situation to abuse its power. All this 
was an obstacle to the solid development of democracy, giving an advantage to the Lee 
regime, which attempted to perpetuate its rule by dictatorship. 60 
On the other hand, the Korean economy was devastated by the Korean War, which 
destroyed almost two-thirds of all productive capacity. 61 With most of the industrial 
base and agriculture destroyed, the scarcity of necessities caused high inflation. The 
main policy goals in this period were to reconstruct the infrastructure and industrial 
59 Kim, Suk-Jun, The Government, Public Policy & NIC Development, (Seoul: Dae-
Young Munhwasa, 1988), p.232 
60 Han, San g-Joo, 'South Korea: Politics in Transition' in Choi, Sang-Yong( ed.), 
Democracy in Korea (Seoul: The Korean Political Science Association, 1997), p.24 
61 Lawrence B. Krauser, 'The Political Economy of South Korea: Fifty Years of 
Macroeconomic Management, 1945-1995,' in Cha, Dong-Se, Kim, Kwang-Suk, & 
Dwight H. Perkins, The Korean Economy 1945-1995: Performance and Vision for 
the 21st Century, (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1997), pp.l08-9. 
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facilities destroyed by the war, and to stabilise pnces. Many of the post-war 
reconstruction programmes were assisted by foreign aid. Between 1953 and 1960, 
assistance from the United Nations was in the region of$120 million.62 
Economic growth in this period was disappointing. The Korean economy had almost 
the same industrial structure in 1961 as it had in 1953. The economy was still 
dominated by agriculture. The manufacturing sector was mostly composed of light 
industries and remained relatively underdeveloped.63 The period began and ended with 
agriculture and other primary production. Thus, Korea remained an agricultural 
economy throughout this reconstruction period. Instead of economic development, the 
Lee regime mainly concentrated its efforts on security maintenance and power-seeking. 
Furthermore, it did not have efficient and effective institutions, economic policy tools 
and networks to pursue economic growth. Under these circumstances, it is no wonder 
that many kinds of corruption cases occurred within every field. 64 
At last, a student revolution toppled Lee's republic in 1960, and the Second Republic, 
Chang regime, was established. The April Student Revolution in 1960 was an 
unprecedented event in that the people's power toppled a regime that could not meet the 
62 Mason, Edward S., Kim, Mahn-Je, Perkins, Dwight H., Kim, Kwang-Suk & Cole, 
David C., The Economic and Social Modernisation of the Republic of Korea 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), p.93 
63 Nam, Sang -Woo & Kim, Jun-II, 'macroeconomic Policies and Evolution', in Dong-
Se Cha, K wang-Suk Kim, & Dwight H. Penkins, The Korean Economy 1945-1995: 
Performance and Vision for the 21 st Century, (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 
1997),p.148 
64 There were many big and small corruption cases in the First Republic. There are 
cases that over two hundred tax collectors were disciplined together and some of 
Ministers, like Jae-Sul Jung, the Minister of agriculture and forestry, Hae-Jung Park, 
the Minister of Transportation, were suspected of bribery. 
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demands of its people. The major demands of the people on the regime were political 
democracy and economic development to meet basic needs rather than authoritarian 
dictatorship. This April Revolution, however, was self-limiting, because the core 
members of the revolutionary group were students, intellectuals, and the urban lower 
class. Although it succeeded in overthrowing the dictatorship, it failed to take over the 
new government, as most of the students immediately returned to their campuses after 
Lee's step down. The revolution brought a new turning point in the development of 
political socialisation. However, this Second Republic failed to take strong action 
against the corruption of Lee's republic. This caused political and social chaos again.65 
The failure to repress radical leftist agitation and to settle social turmoil alienated the 
Chang regime from most supporters of liberal democracy, because of prevailing anti-
communism amongst most of the population. Lacking any independence, even from its 
own supporters, the Chang regime could not reconcile the conflicting demands from left 
and right, and failed to maintain order. 
It is a well known fact that the Chang regime tried to give its first priority to economic 
development. It devised a comprehensive five-year economic development plan, but 
could not implement it because of low government capacity. Due to all these factors, the 
Chang regime was later criticised as weak and ineffective by the military coup leaders. 
Failing to solve the socio-political turmoil, the Chang regime was overthrown by a 
Military Revolution, led by General Park Jung-Hee, on 16 May 1961. 
In the above two republics, the bureaucracy was the chief tool for the maintenance of 
power. The public bureaucrats were also authoritarian in an autocratic politico-
65 B yun,Tae-Sub, op.cit., p.512 
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bureaucratic environment. 66 These political, economic and social circumstances were 
very vulnerable to corruption and did not provide enough motives to control corruption. 
2.1.2 Park's authoritarian regime and Economic growth (1961- 1979) 
The military Revolution of the 16th May 1961 toppled the Chang government under the 
banner of 'Modernisation of the Country', accusing the civilian leadership of being 
corrupt, incapable of defending the country from internal and external threats of 
communism, and unable to perform economic and social transformations. 
Martial law was proclaimed and remained in force until late 1963. For the military 
leaders, the most urgent task was to establish a secure basis for its political power. For 
this purpose, it was essential to improve economic conditions in order to secure the 
legitimacy of the regime. 
With the declaration of martial law, the military banned all activities of political parties 
and unions, in order to break the political networks of the former regime. In July, a 
Revolutionary Court and Prosecution were established to try those accused of various 
crimes, including corruption and the illicit accumulation of wealth. 
The bureaucracy and military were not immune from 'the movement for purification'. 
2,000 officers were retired, including 40 generals. The newly established Korean 
Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) screened 41,000 government officials, and found 
66 Yoon,Woo -Kon, op.cit., p.SI-157 
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that 1,863 had been involved in corruption and anti-revolutionary activities.67 
Most of the people were disappointed at the inefficiency of the Chang regime, while 
the military's effort to get legitimacy through mobilisation was successful. Above all, a 
weak civil society helped to consolidate the new regime's political power basis. The 
business community was weak and the working class was small and unorganised, 
because of poor socio-economic conditions, as seen above. 68 
After the April Revolution, the three major demands from people were corruption 
control, political democracy and economic development. As seen from the socio-
economic conditions described above, an average Korean earned a mere $80 or so a 
year in 1961. Economic development became the primary objective of the military 
regime in this socio-economic environment, and it was regarded as the main factor that 
would legitimise the new government. 
In an effort to consolidate political power and establish an institutional framework to 
pursue economic growth on a secure political basis, the military created several 
institutions. Firstly, a Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR). This was 
superimposed on the existing bureaucratic structure, by holding all powers of the three 
branches of government as a step towards building a new Third Republic.69 Secondly, 
the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) was created as a pre-emptive political 
organisation, under Kim Jong-Pil's leadership, on the 10th June 1961. With the creation 
67 Stephan Haggard, Byung-Kook Kim, & Chung-In Moon, The Transition to Export-
Led Growth in South Korea, 1954-66, World Bank Working Paper WPS 546, 
November 1990, p.14 
68 Alice H. Amsden, Asia's next giant: south Korea and late industrialisation, (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1989), p.l47 
69 Kim, Suk -Jun, op. cit.( 1988), p.318 
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of the KCIA, the core group of the coup maintained a dual system of power. Most of the 
younger colonels of the 8th class of the Korean Military Academy were in this apparatus, 
penetrating all aspects of Korean society, while higher Generals acted in fonnal 
managerial posts, such as SCNR and ministries.7o At first, the KCIA worked as an 
anti-coup apparatus, as well as an internal power security force. Thirdly, the Democratic 
Republican Party (DRP) was created under the instruction of Kim, Jong-Pil, using the 
organisation of the KCIA as a basis. In tenns of its constituents, DRP seemed to have a 
wide range of support, representing every social class. 
Thus, with the creation of KCIA and DRP, the Park regime was able to maintain an 
efficient control system. With the support of these two organisations, Park was able to 
win the Presidential election in November 1963. 
Park succeeded in being re-elected in the 1967 Presidential election. This victory owed 
a lot to the successful performance of economic development, which will be discussed 
later. 
In order to remain in power, President Park amended the Constitution several times. 
In 1969, he revised the section of the Constitution restricting the presidency to two four-
year terms. This seriously undermined the legitimacy of the regime.71 In the 1971 
Presidential election, President Park defeated, by a narrow margin, the chief opposition 
candidate, Kim Dae-Jung who received 46 percent of the valid votes cast. 72 
70 Jang, Dal-Jung, 'Je 3 Konghwaguk gwa Kwenwijuuichuk Keundaehwa'[The Third 
Republic and Authoritarian Modernisation], in An, Chung-Si (ed.), Hyundai Hanguk 
Chungchiron [The Politics of Modern Korea] (Seoul: Bummunsa, 1995), p.243. 
71 Han, Syung-Joo, op.cit.(l983), p.33 
72 Sohn, Hak-Kyu, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea, (London: 
Routledge, 1989), p31 
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In October 1972, the President proposed the 'Yushin Constitution', announcing the 
Special Declaration to change the Constitution. The 'Yushin Constitution' was an 
autocratic system, in that the power of the three branches (the executive, the legislative, 
and the judiciary) was concentrated in the President. According to the 'Yushin' 
Constitution, the President was elected by an indirect election of the National 
Conference for Unification, enabling Park's continued stay in power. The President had 
the right to appoint all the judiciary and one-third of the Assemblymen in the National 
Assembly. 
Although, throughout Park's era, there had been a series of demonstrations and 
strikes by the students, intellectuals, and the press, he could repress the opposition 
effectively via the instrument of the KCIA, the military, and government bureaucracy. 
However, the large-scale protests by students and citizens in the cities of Pusan and 
Masan seriously undermined the political legitimacy of the Park regime, which had 
been secured by rapid economic growth. 
During the Park regime, economic development and state strengthening proceeded 
rapidly. On the 1st January 1962, barely six months after the military take-over, General 
Park, in his capacity as chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, 
announced with great fanfare the "First Five-Year Economic Development Plan, 1962-
1966". Park evidently decided to risk his own future and that of what was called 
"military revolution" on this comprehensive economic initiative in the hope of 
justifying his military coup and legitimising his regime. 73 He quickly committed the 
73 Oh, John Kie -chiang, Korean Politics,(lthaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
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full weight of his power and that of his military junta in support of the unprecedented 
economic plan. It was an audacious legitimisation by economic growth. Park launched 
the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in July 1961, which was designed to be Park's 
central headquarters to co-ordinate economic development. In the process of this 
economic development, government officials adopted the central role. 
With few natural resources and a small domestic market, the Park government shifted 
from the lSI (Import Substitution Industrialisation) to EOI (Export Oriented 
Industrialisation) policy, an outward-looking development strategy, aiming at 
promoting economic growth through expansion of exports. The Park government began 
by promoting labour-intensive manufacturing exports in which Korea had a 
comparative advantage. This government-led developmental strategy was carried out 
via a wide range of government intervention in the market economy. 
With the announcement of the ambitious First Five-Year Economic Plan (1962-1967) 
in January 1962, the Park regime took comprehensive measures to promote exports. 
The government provided a series of incentives: extensive direct export subsidies; a 
variety of tax exemptions; low rates for public utilities; tariff rebates for import destined 
for re-export; simpler customs procedures; and accelerated depreciation allowances. 74 
This aggressive government intervention in the market economy proved to be successful. 
With the results of drastic changes in policy goals and institutional structure, the Park 
1999), p.52. 
74 Sub, Sang-Mok, 'The Economy in Historical Perspective,' in Vittorio Corbo & Sang-
Mok Sub (ed.), Structural Adjustment in a Newly Industrialised Country: The Korean 
Experience (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp.11-12. 
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government attained a real growth rate of 8.5 percent, exceeding the target of 7.1 
percent, for the First Five-Year Economic Plan. 
This was a surprising performance at the time because of poor performance during 
. 75 S h ..(' prevIOUs years. uc economIc perlormance gave the Park regime a landslide victory 
in the 1967 Presidential election, which indicated a popular consensus for the necessity 
of economic growth. 
With this strong goal-oriented planning and implementation of policy, the Park 
government was able to attain a real growth rate of 9.7 percent in the Second Five-Year 
Economic Plan (l967~1971).76 During this period, President Park made a resolute effort 
to build an integrated iron and steel mill at Pohang, together with plans for a nation-
wide road network infrastructure, centring on the Seoul-Pusan Express Highway. 77 The 
average annual growth rate of real GNP between 1963-1971 was 9.5 percent, which was 
more than double the 1954-62 average. On a per capita basis, real growth for the period 
was about 6.9 percent, compared to 0.7 percent for the period 1954~62.78 
During 1971-1979, including Third Five-Year Economic Plan (1972-1976), the 
6 79 average annual growth rate of exports and GNP was 9. percent. 
During the Park regime, the Korean government bureaucracy had assumed strenuous 
and overwhelming tasks of managing and guiding socio-economic development, as the 
prime instrument for the achievement of national development. Since the early 1960's, 
75 Economic Planning Board, Kaebal Yondae ui Kyungje Jeongchack [The Economic 
Policy of the Economic Development Period] (Seoul: Miraesa, 1982), pp.358-359. 
76 Ibid., pp.360-361. 
77 Lee, Hahn-Been, 'Korea Development Revisited,' in Choi, Sang-Yong (ed.), op. cit., 
pp.lOO-l01 
78 Suh, Sang-Mok, op.cit., pp.13-14 
79 Sub, Sang-Mok,op. cit., pp. 19-20. 
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the Korean administrative system has served as the central instrument of the governing 
elite whose utmost aspiration has been the fast achievement of national development 
goals. The public bureaucracy has long suffered from discrepancies between the 
expected level of performance and its actual capacity to deliver. The administrative 
system has been hard pressed by the extrinsically imposed burden of development 
republic; it has been pushed by political aspiration for rapid development and 
challenged by economic development programs. With the beginning of the 1970's, the 
administrative system itself gradually emerged as a basic policy issue of the government. 
At that time, the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement (Government's Purification Campaign) 
was launched. This movement had significant strength to mark an epoch in the 
development history of the Korean administrative system which had struggled to carry 
out overwhelming tasks especially when faced with the administrative modernization 
tasks of 1980's. The movement had basic value premises like efficiency and 
transparency. Among those premises, the anti-corruption activities within the 
administrative system comprised the central portion of the movement. 
Although corruption control was presented as one of the pretexts of the military coup, 
ironically, the third and Fourth Republic had more room for corruption because of the 
abuse of the centralised power of government officials, the discord among social classes 
caused from the imbalance in the process of political and economic development, and 
the disharmony between modem values and traditional values80. 
2.l.3 Two General successors' regime (1979-1992) 
80 Kim, Young Jong, Corr uption: Cause and Measure, (Seoul: Soong Sil University 
Press, 1996), p.191 
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Park's Presidential rule lasted over a decade and a half, through the Third and Fourth 
Republic. However, violent demonstrations opposing Park's dictatorship broke out in 
1979, and finally Park was assassinated by one of his loyal followers. 
The assassination of President Park caused a great political vacuum and acute crisis 
over political order. As Korean society was used to strong leadership, it came as a great 
shock to the Korean people, along with the paralysed political power structure under an 
emergency situation. For progressive social groups, it meant an opportunity for 
democracy, and an end to the authoritarian regime. With the so-called 'Spring of Seoul,' 
the students, intellectuals, and progressive social groups began to ask for changes 
towards democracy, staging a series of nation-wide demonstrations. 
In comparison with the 1960s, strikes and other actions in the 1980s were much more 
intense and of a significantly larger scale, reflecting the tremendous expansion of the 
industrial workforce during the rapid economic growth period. 
This series of demonstrations met the promulgation of martial law by the military in 
May 1980, prohibiting political activities and all illegal demonstrations, under the 
auspices of social and political security. 
Thus, General Chun Doo-Hwan came into power through the so-called' 12.12 coup,81, 
maintaining the authoritarian regime. Chun Doo-Hwan was elected by indirect election 
81 T he real seizure of power had already occurred when a coup occurred within the 
military, the locus of naked power in Korea, on 12 December 1979. The coup, which is 
called "12.12 coup", was led by Major General Chun Doo-Hwan, head of the Defence 
Security Command which was given the task of conducting the official inquiry into the 
assassination. (Choi Po-sik, Che 5 konghwakuk chonya: 12.12 pyon (The Eve of the 
Fifth Republic: The 12.12 Phase). Wolgan Chason (May 1996): pp. 497-631) 
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as the eleventh President of Korea in the National Conference for Unification (NCFU) 
on the 27th August 1980. The Chun regime, however, had, from the start, a serious 
legitimacy problem. By means of a coup, Chun seized power, after quashing the 
democratic hopes aroused following Park's death. 
Chun did not set out to reform the governmg structure, nor did he change the 
government's major policies. There were continuities between the authoritarian 
'Yushin' system and its successor Chun regime in terms of institutions and politics. 
These included a powerful executive, a weak legislature, a politically strengthened core 
of technocrats, and a willingness to suppress all opposition in order to pursue political 
and economic goals. The government was insulated from the legislative and civil 
society, mirroring Park's authoritarian rule. 
By the early 1980s, the Chun government was facing serious economic problems, such 
as high inflation, adverse terms-of-trade stemming from the second oil shock, over-
investment and low profitability in the heavy and chemical industries, heavy foreign 
debt and rising unemployment. The Chun government tried to tackle the problems by 
means of stabilisation and structural adjustment policy, which had been adopted during 
the later Park years. 
The goals of the stabilisation policy were: price stability including repression of high 
wage increases, market liberalisation, and balanced economic growth. Due to the 
coherence of policy, the Chun government was able to succeed in both curbing inflation 
and achieving economic growth. Compared with the inflation rate of 150/0 in the 1970s, 
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wholesale pnces In 1986 actually declined by 2.2%.82 The nation's economy was 
growing at an astounding rate of 12.8 percent, a record high since 1977. Major factors 
behind the high growth in this period were the so-called three lows: the low price of 
crude oil, the low value of the U.S. dollar against the Japanese yen, and low 
international interest rates. 
As seen above, the problem of the Chun regIme lay in the fact that economic 
performance could not guarantee support from the public because of the crisis of 
legitimacy. Its limitation in legitimacy resulted from the Kwangju Uprising in May 
1980. 
In the democratic movement of Korea, students have been one of the strongest 
opposition forces against authoritarian regimes, along with other dissident groups, such 
as intellectuals, industrial workers, and the radical wing of the church. 
In spite of the suppression, the democratisation movement forces were able to 
gradually draw together. Against Chun's ruling coalition, the opposition forces were 
organised into a cohesive anti-ruling coalition, the Unified People's Movement for 
Democracy and Unification (UPMDU) in 1984. The UPMDU comprised twenty-three 
organisations representing banned trade unionists, farmer groups, intellectuals, 
dismissed journalists, church and temple activists. To challenge military rule, they 
pursued national unification and democracy as ultimate and simultaneous goals of their 
movement. The key agenda had been democratisation through the constitutional 
amendment for' direct Presidential election' and democracy since 1984.83 
Street violence reached its peak after the 10th June when Roh Tae-Woo, who was a 
82 Suh, Sang -Mok, op.cit.(l992), p.29 
83 Kim, Suk -Joon, op.cit.(l988), pp.462-63 
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former military General and a classmate with Chun in the Military Academy, was 
nominated as the DJP's Presidential candidate for the ruling Democratic Justice Party. 
under the existing constitution, which provided for an indirect Presidential election. 
Young white-collar workers joined in the demonstrations, supporting the voice of the 
students. In time, their participation in demonstrations grew larger and larger. 
On the 29th June 1987, Mr. Rho, the ruling party's nominated Presidential candidate, 
made a surprising announcement that the government would accept key opposition 
demands for the amendment of the constitution for direct Presidential election. 
Roh's declaration succeeded in settling the immediate crisis by accepting popular 
demands for a direct Presidential election. 
Soon after Roh's 29th June "democratization" declaration, the National Assembly 
formed a special commission to amend the constitution that heard some 100 proposals 
made by the ruling and opposition parties. By October the National Assembly had 
adopted sweeping revisions to the constitution, which was ratified by a national 
referendum on the 27th October. 
The most important change embodied in the 1987 constitution was that the President 
was to be elected by a universal, equal, direct and secret ballot by the citizens for a 
single term of five years. 
In the 1987 Presidential election, Roh Tae-Woo, the ruling DJP candidate, who 
promised political stability and continued economic growth, won with 36.6 percent of 
the votes cast. His largest support was in the south-eastern provinces, among middle 
class voters, and in the rural areas. 
The December Presidential election contributed to resolving a dilemma of legitimacy 
that had loomed large throughout the Chun regime. Most people accepted that the 
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Presidential election by a direct popular vote passed the test of due process. The Roh 
government was more democratic than any other previous regime. It was chosen by 
open and competitive election, and it respected the basic freedoms of expression. 
assembly, and organisation. All the societal actors enjoyed freedom and the beginning 
of the democratisation process. 
Roh's inauguration on the 25th February 1988, marked the first peaceful transfer of 
Presidential power in Korea since 1948. If a basic criterion of democracy is free and fair 
elections leading to peaceful changes of governments, albeit to a handpicked successor, 
the Koreans finally met this test in 1987. In contrast President Lee, of the First Republic, 
was ousted from office through the student uprising of 1960; the Second Republic of 
Premier Chang was overthrown by the military coup led by Park in 1961; Park in tum 
was assassinated in 1979; and Chun had seized power through another coup in 1979. 
President Roh thus declared in his inaugural address: 
We gather . .. to proclaim a new beginning. ... I assume the presidency forty years 
after a democratic government was first established in this country... With the 
launching of the new Republic, we will sail steadfastly toward democracy. ... 
The day when freedoms and human rights could he slighted in the name of 
economic growth and national security has ended. . . . The time has come to achieve 
a just and fair distribution of income so that every citizen can share the fruits of the 
growth. 84 
84 James Cotton, ed., Korea under Roh Tae-Woo,(Canberra: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 
pp.322-24 
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In spite of the peaceful transfer of power, it was questioned whether Roh, who was the 
member of 12.12 coup, would have the ability and legitimacy to manage a "democratic" 
government. 
In addition, the economy was indeed weakening, growing only 4.7 percent in 1992. 
far below the government's expectation of 7 percent. This was the worst growth rate in 
decades. Powerful and rich conglomerates could absorb temporary setbacks, but 
numerous small and medium sized businesses could not. A record number of 
promissory notes were dishonored in 1992, and 10,769 medium and small firms went 
bankrupt. The number of unemployed workers rose sharp I y from 1991, and real estate 
prices, which had been skyrocketing in overpopulated South Korea, plummeted in 1992. 
Under the circumstances stated above, the role and status of the government officials 
in the Chun and Roh regime was the same as that of the previous Park regime. Military 
presidents, who did not have the experience in the governance of the country, needed 
the support of professional government officials to maintain power. Also, there were 
insufficient civil organisations to check government officials. After all, government 
officials could maintain their vested rights. The situation, which was vulnerable to 
corruption continued. Furthermore, there were few groups attempting to control 
corruption. 
2.1.4 First Civilian President, Kim Young-Sam's regime (1992-1997) 
As Roh's single-term presidency was ending in 1992, the ruling Democratic Liberal 
Party held its party convention on the 19th May, and nominated Kim Young-Sam as the 
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government party's Presidential candidate. Predictably, Kim Dae-Jung, Kim Young-
Sam's long-time rival, was formally nominated of the opposition Democratic Party on 
the 27th May.85 This nomination, too, was properly conducted within the major 
opposition party, which maintained order and decorum throughout the process. 
Indicating a growing disenchantment among business conglomerates with the 
government and/or the line-up for the emerging Presidential candidacy, multibillionaire 
and chairman emeritus of the Hyundai Group, Chong Ju-Young, hurriedly organised his 
own political party, the United People's Party, in early 1992 and proclaimed his 
Presidential candidacy. This was the first time that a chaebol 86founder had personally 
entered a Presidential race as a candidate, and it was evident that the Hyundai 
conglomerate's unlimited financial resources made this last-minute political debut 
possible.87 
In an unprecedented move, the Korean military signalled for the first time in more 
than three decades its "neutral" stance in a series of lectures delivered at the National 
Defence Graduate School by the defence minister, the chairman of the joint chiefs, and 
the army chief of staff. These men emphasised that the military must concentrate its 
energies on its proper tasks of defending the country from external menaces. 88 This was 
in sharp contrast to the widely known practice of military commanders from the 
previous republic. 
The activities of civil society provided further examples of unprecedented behaviour, 
most notably the Citizens' Coalition for Fair Election, initiated by Pong-Ho Son, a 
85 Hankook Ilbo(Hankook newspaper), 27 May 1992, p.1 
86 This means a big busin ess person or group, who has large affiliated companies. 
87 Kim Eun Mee, Bi g Business, Strong State, (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New 
York Press, 1987), p.200 
88 Hankook Ilbo (Hankook newspaper), 23 September 1992, p.2 
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Seoul National University professor.89 Unlike the Presidential elections held during the 
previous three decades, all three major Presidential candidates in 1992 were real 
civilians, with no military background or visible backing by the military. 
Following the election result, Kim Young-Sam emerged the winner by a substantial 
margin. Kim Dae-Jung conceded defeat promptly and gracefully. In a healing 
concession speech unprecedented in Korean politics, Kim "humbly accept the people's 
judgement", adding that he firmly believed in Kim Young-Sam's "ability to develop 
democracy in Korea and lay the ground work for national reunification".9o 
When Kim took the Presidential oath for a single five-year term on the 25th February 
1993, it marked a number of firsts. Kim was the first civilian to be democratically 
elected in thirty-two years. This was the first Presidential inauguration of a seasoned 
politician who could genuinely claim that he was a "fighter for democracy." It also 
meant the launching of a regime that was not burdened with questions about its 
legitimacy. 
However, Kim had been a member of the same political party as the previous President, 
Roh. This meant that he could not be free in conducting activities for eradicating the 
remnants of corruption from the previous republic. 
At the time of the birth of the civilian government, the overall Korean economy was 
stagnant, if not faltering. The competitive edge that Korea had enjoyed for decades, 
partly thanks to wages kept low by authoritarian regimes, had eroded because the 
politically uncertain Roh regime could not afford to appear anti labour. Under a civilian 
and democratic government labour disputes now could not be arbitrarily resolved by 
89 Hankook Ilbo (Hankook newspaper), 24 March 1992, p.12 
90 John Kie -chiang Oh, Korean Politics,(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1999) 
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unleashing the power of public authority, often displayed in the form of thousands of 
riot police quashing demonstrating workers or those physically occupying production 
facilities or managers' offices. At the same time, entrepreneurs were uncertain about the 
economic direction of the government headed by the unpredictable Kim Young-Sam, 
and their ambivalence was reflected in the low rate of long-term investments in 
industrial plants and equipment at the beginning of the Kim regime. What big business 
and the workers did know was that Kim Young-Sam had promised a new, revitalized 
economy as one of the regime's primary aspirations. 
Within a month of Kim's inauguration, in March 1993 his government moved quickly 
to announce a 100-day new economic development plan while the seventh five-year 
economic and social development plan of the previous republic underwent revisions. 
During the 100-day period public utility fees such as charges for water and electricity 
were lowered to stabilize prices that would benefit ordinary citizens immediately. 
Producers were also encouraged to keep prices as low as possible on twenty basic 
consumer items such as rice, beef, sugar, and milk. As a result, the supply of funds for 
investment in industrial plants and equipment in 1993 rose some 15 percent from the 
previous year. These and similar measures demonstrated the government's keen concern 
with bringing the economy out of recession which, at the time, formed part of a global 
economic downturn. 
The embodiment of the Kim republic's vision for a "new economy" to support his 
well-publicized vision for creating a "new Korea" was released at the end of June 1993 
in the five-year plan for a new economy.91 The plan highlighted reforms, deregulation 
and internationalisation. It emphasized reforms to promote economic justice through 
91 , Document: Major Programs for New Five-Year Economic Plan', Korea Annual, 
The Economic planning Board, 1994, pp.359-67 
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fair income distribution, deregulation of economic activities to align the Korean 
economy for growing liberalization and globalisation trends. 
As seen above, the Seventh republic had limitations, III political capacity, to 
eradicate corruption particularly due to the difficulties associated with succeeding the 
previous republic. However, in economic terms, the republic had the chance to eradicate 
corruption related to the distribution of capital, because the conditions, that demand 
resolute reform focused to realise economic justice, had been established. 
2.1.5 The first President from the Opposition Party, Kim Dae-Jung's regime (1998-2002) 
In spite of the efforts of Kim Young-Sam's republic to facilitate new economIC 
development, the economic situation was seriously depressed at the end of Kim's 
regime. Finally, the pattern of large enterprise bankruptcy had been broken. The 
bankruptcy of Hanbo enterprise in 1997 was the start of a catalogue of bankruptcies 
involving large business, such as Sammi, Jinlo and Kia. Foreign banks lowered the 
credit rating of the Korean economy and stopped credit transactions. After all, Korean 
government received a relief loan from the IMF(International Monetary Fund) in 
November 1997, to cope with rapid foreign exchanges deficit. 
Under the cloud of economic chaos, the presidential election for 15th President was held 
on the 18th December 1997, and Kim Dae-Jung, who was the opposition leader, was 
elected. This result was the first case in which an opposition leader was elected and a 
peaceful handover of political power between government party and opposition party 
achieved. 
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The IMF supplied relief loan came with conditions for achieving strong economic 
reform. The IMF demanded mass dismissal of surplus labour in banks, removal of 
governmental assistance for improperly-run enterprises, the opening of the market for 
overseas investment and a curtailed budget. 
These demands meant that the developmental strategy and structure which had led 
the Korean economy should be changed. So far, the Korean government dominated 
financial institutions, like banks, by indirectly holding the majority of shares. Under this 
domination, the government intensively supported weak areas, and this strategic 
decision brought preferential financing for specific enterprises, this practice was 
referred to as Chebul. 
International organisations like the IMF held the view that the crony capitalism, which 
had brought about the IMF bailout, had been formulated through the relationship 
between government, financing and enterprises.92 In other words, it signifies that the 
Korean economic crisis originated from the serial occurrence of bankrupt enterprises 
and from insolvency in general. However, the root causes of the crises came from the 
governmental led financing system. 
Despite this, Kim Dae-Jung's republic faithfully fulfilled IMF demands after he 
officially commenced office on the 5th February 1998. At the same time, the republic 
made every effort to settle the impending crisis of national bankruptcy by expanding the 
amount of foreign exchange holding. As a result of the effort, the amount of foreign 
exchange rose up to the fourth highest in the world from 3,900 million dollars in 1997 
92 IMF managing director, Michel Camdessus, emphasised the necessity to liquidate 
big business, (Chaebol), in Korea when he had a talk with Korean Government 
officials.(Jung-Ang newspaper, 3 Dec. 1997) 
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to 121,400 million dollars in 2002. In addition, the republic adopted active 
macroeconomic policies and the economy recovered. The major economic indicators in 
Kim Dae-Jung's republic were as shown in Table2.1. 
Table 2.1 The major economic indicators in Kim Dae-Jung's republic 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Economic growth rate (%) 4.7 -6.9 9.5 8.5 3.8 7.0 
Export growth rate (%) 5.0 -2.8 8.6 19.9 -12.7 8.2 
Balance of trade payments (100 
-85 390 239 117 93 108 
million dollar) 
Balance of current account (100 
-81.7 403.6 244.8 122.5 86.2 66.8 
million dollar) 
*sauce : The annual report of the office for statistics. (1997-2002) 
Along with the economic recovery, Kim's republic declared the new founding of a 
country and pushed forward with the structural reform of four major sectors; enterprises, 
financing, public sector and labour market. As a result, the financial structure and 
governing structure of enterprises had been improved. Financial companies had also 
become economically sound. Many public enterprises came under private management, 
and relations between labour and capital were rationally established. 
As a result, the economic crisis in Kim Dae-Jung's republic was an amicable chance 
to push forward strong reform and corruption control policies. 
Throughout Kim Dae-Jung's republic it suffered from political instability. The 
previous President, Kim Young-Sam, belonged to the biggest party, the new Korea Party, 
72 
which had 139 of the 299 members of the National Assembly. However, Kim Dae-Jung 
was the president of a small party, the Democratic Party, which had only 79 members. 
Generally, in developing countries it is always disputed whether the government has 
intervened in the election process. This means that the presidential candidate of the 
ruling party holds an advantage. 
Kim Dae-Jung as a candidate of the opposition party had to overcome a 
disadvantageous situation. Therefore, he joined forces with Kim Jong-Phil, who was a 
president of another opposition party, the United Liberal Democrats, which had 50 
members of the National Assembly, and became a sole candidate of opposition parties. 
As a result, he won the Presidential race, but still this unity could not achieve a majority 
in the National Assembly. This limitation provided a negative influence against the 
creation of strong reform. Furthermore, the United Liberal Democrats was based on 
conservatism, but on the other hand, the Democratic Party was founded on 
progressivism. This difference in ideology was another obstacle to reform. 
To overcome this difficult political situation, Kim Dae-Jung's party strived for 
achieving a majority in the next general election, but subsequently failed. Political 
instability continued the entire length of his term of office and prevented the necessary 
reforms to achieve corruption control. 
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2.2 Extent of and Trends in Bureaucratic corruption in Korea 
The extent of, and trends in bureaucratic corruption can be drawn from an analysis of 
the frequency and substance of corruption cases. Furthermore, we can recognise the 
serious realities and characteristics of corruption through analysis of situation and trends. 
Basically, the frequency and substance of corruption cases can be extracted from the 
number of criminal cases in which government officials have been prosecuted and from 
the number of government officials who have been disciplined. 93 However, these 
statistics have their limitations. 
Firstly, bureaucratic corruption cases are hard to uncover because, for instance, those 
offering bribes are also accomplices. Most bureaucratic corruption cases are not usually 
detected by information from those offering bribes but through the operation of the 
statutory agencies. Therefore, the statistics for detected corruption are lower than the 
true amount of corruption. Accordingly, current statistics reflect partly the degree of 
governments endeavour to eradicate corruption. As a result of this limit, a survey of 
public opinion where the anonymity of respondents is guaranteed is often employed to 
find out the actual extent of corruption. 
Secondly, the statistics of criminal cases in which government officials are involved 
and of disciplinary punishments imposed on the government officials are made on the 
basis of the present Criminal Code and The National Public Service Law. Accordingly, 
these statistics need to be revised to constitute statistics which deal only with corruption 
93 If government officials are involved in a criminal case for corruption, they ar~ 
disciplined simultaneously by their organisation. However, sometime~ ~he~ theIr . 
misconduct is not serious, they are not prosecuted although they are disciphned by theIr 
organisation. 
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cases. To do this, first it is necessary to identify which behaviours are considered as 
corruption under Korea's present laws relating to government officials. 
2.2.1 Types of bureaucratic corruption in the Korean law and code of conduct 
In the prevIOUS section, corruption is defined as an abuse of public office and 
negligence of duties, which should be performed by the law and the code of conduct of 
Korea, for private gain. 
Therefore, the current law and code of conduct are important to identify which 
practices are corrupt, because this research focuses on government responses following 
the law and the code of conduct to eradicate corruption. If the law and code of conduct 
are changed, the types of practices which are regarded as corruption will also change. 
In this research, three categories of corrupt practice are classified from current criminal 
law and the code of conduct. 94 These are as follows. 
1) Corruption r elated bribe: corrupt behaviour which is related to bribery, extortion and 
promise of 'present' after the real is completed.( e.g., The Korean criminal code, article: 
129,130,131,132,135) 
2) Corruption related document: corrupt behaviour which is related to the forgery and 
alteration of an official document.(e.g., The Korean criminal code, article: 225, 227, 
229) 
94 Accordin g to " The state of punishment and countermeasure of corruption" (from 
Corruption Prevention and the Countermeasure Committee, 19~8, Seoul), types o.f 
corruption under current criminal law and the code of conduct III Korea are classified 
by bribe, document and embezzlement. 
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3) Corruption related duty: corrupt behaviour which IS related to misfeasance, 
dereliction of duty, embezzlement and misappropriation. (e.g., The Korean criminal 
code, article: 122, 123, 225, 356) 
2.2.2 The extent of and Trends in bureaucratic corruption of Korea 
To ascertain the significance and trend of corruption in Korea, several different types of 
aggregated data on corruption practices have been collected. 
According to the number of criminal prosecutions of corrupt officials, which is a part 
of the official data published by the Korean government, the corruption level has varied 
significantly during the last 30 years, as shown in Fig. 2.1 and Table 2.2. 
Fig. 2. 1. The number of criminal prosecutions of corrupt officials (per 10,000) 
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Table 2.2 The number of criminal prosecutions of corrupt officials (per 10,000) 
Year Number Total Number of Year Number Total 
of number prosecuted of number 
officials of officials per officials of 
prosecu officials 10000 prosecu- officials 
-ted (A) (B) (A/BX10000) ted (A) (B) 
1966 1,274 332,688 38 1985 1,083 670,637 
1967 1,000 359,955 27 1986 1,203 691,670 
1968 1,355 381,918 35 1987 1,189 705,053 
1969 1,308 398,050 32 1988 1,385 737,225 
1970 1,103 417,348 26 1989 1,668 781,346 
1971 842 436,636 19 1990 2,045 818,121 
1972 2,149 438,573 48 1991 2,448 854,082 
1973 1,362 452,054 30 1992 2,338 886,179 
1974 1,210 466,444 25 1993 7,091 899,826 
1975 1,377 478,562 28 1994 7,938 907,598 
1976 1,238 502,702 24 1995 8,446 905,390 
1977 950 519,110 18 1996 9,389 925,794 
1978 1,091 540,658 20 1997 10,121 935,759 
1979 1,017 564,058 18 1998 9,413 888,334 
1980 1,297 596,431 21 1999 8,640 875,672 
1981 1,200 665,895 18 2000 7,602 869,676 
1982 1,262 647,851 19 2001 6,748 868,120 
1983 1,279 650,914 19 2002 6,900 889,993 
1984 1,314 657,214 19 
* Source: Annual report ofPubhc Prosecutors Office (1966-2002), 
Annual report of the Ministry of General Affairs (1997) 
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More specifically, the magnitude of corruption had been stabilised from the 60's to the 
early 90's, but it has grown significantly since the middle of the 90's. 
During the time when President Park Jung-Hee was in power, from 1966 to 1979, the 
number of prosecuted government officials fluctuated slightly but remained stable. The 
number of prosecuted government officials per 10,000 was over 20 per year except in 
1971, 1977 and 1979. 
In the meantime, during the time when the next two Presidents Chun Doo-Hwan 
(1980-1987) and Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1992) were in power, the number of prosecuted 
government officials per 10,000 stabilised at about 20 per year. After 1993, in which 
President Kim Young-Sam was inaugurated, the number of prosecuted government per 
10,000 officials increased suddenly up to over 70. Government contends that the 
increase of prosecuted government officials for corruption during the 90's is due to the 
more strictly enforced anti-corruption measures.95 That is, the increasing number of 
prosecuted government officials for corruption, in some aspect, reveals the level of 
government's efforts against corruption and their effectiveness rather than the actual 
corruption level. 
Despite this, there is no distinctive proof which shows that the corruption level has 
decreased during the last 30 more years in terms of the number of the criminal 
prosecutions of corrupt officials. 
On the other hand, the number of disciplined government officials per 10,000 for 
corruption, as shown in Fig. 2.2, is more than the number of prosecuted government 
officials per 10,000 for corruption. 
95 The Office of the Prime Minister of Korea, Korea's Anti-Corruption Programs, 1999. 
Seoul, p8. 
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Fig. 2.2 The number of disciplined government officials for corruption (per 10,000) 
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* Source: Annual report of Ministry of Government Republic(1976-1998) 
Table 2.3 The number of government officials disciplined for corruption (per 10,000) 
Year Number Total Number of Year Number Total Number of of number disciplined of number disciplined 
officials of officials per officials of officials per 
discipli- officials 10000 discipli- officials 10000 
ned (A) (B) (AlRXI0000) ned (A) (B) (A/BXI0000) 
1973 10,361 452,054 229 1988 3,146 737,225 42 
1974 7,966 466,444 170 1989 4,397 781,346 56 
1975 10,662 478,562 222 1990 4,656 818,121 56 
1976 15,297 502,702 304 1991 3,996 854,082 46 
1977 10,423 519,110 200 1992 4,092 886,179 46 
1978 8,050 540,658 148 1993 7,116 899,826 79 
1979 7,349 564,058 130 1994 6,223 907,598 68 
1980 7,184 596,431 120 1995 5,061 905,390 55 
1981 6,681 665,895 100 1996 5,308 925,794 57 
1982 6,259 647,851 96 1997 5,689 935,759 60 
1983 5,361 650,914 82 1998 6,140 888,334 69 
1984 4,528 657,214 68 1999 5,866 875,672 66 
1985 3,580 670,637 53 2000 4,507 869,676 51 
1986 4,094 691,670 59 2001 3,682 868,120 42 
1987 2,991 705,053 42 2002 3,898 889,993 43 
* Source: Annual report of Ministry of Government Republic (1976-1998) 
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The number of disciplined government officials per 10,000 for corruption reached its 
peak in 1976 by reaching the figure of 304. After that time, the number of disciplined 
government officials per 10,000 for corruption decreased to around 60 per annum. The 
decrease continued to 42 in 1987. Meanwhile, the number of disciplined government 
officials per 10,000 for corruption increased on a general basis during President Kim 
Young-Sam's republic. The number of disciplined government officials per 10,000 for 
corruption jumped to 79 in 1993, and stayed around 60 per annum until he handed over 
power to his successor. On the other hand, during President Kim Dae-Jung's republic, 
between 40 and 70 government officials per 10,000 had been disciplined. 
Characteristics extracted from the above bureaucratic corruption trends in Korea are as 
follows: 
Firstly, it can be established that government anti-corruption activities have been 
initiated at the early stage of the each Republic. That is, the number of prosecuted or 
disciplined government officials per 10,000 for corruption had increased with the advent 
of the new Republic, but the number decreased as the Republic term progressed. 
Secondly, as above mentioned, the number of disciplined government officials per 
10,000 for corruption are more than the number of prosecuted government officials per 
10,000 for corruption except for the period of President Kim Young-Sam's republic. 
From 1994, the early stage of President Kim Young-Sam's Republic, to 1997, the 
number of prosecuted government officials per 10,000 for corruption rather exceeded 
the number of disciplined government officials per 10,000 for corruption. This means 
the corrupted government officials had been dealt with as criminal cases rather than as 
purely disciplinary cases. 
Unfortunately (and not overly surprisingly given the relative newness of democracy in 
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South Korea in the Twentieth Century) it is not easy to find published materials that 
studied the absolute levels of corruption Therefore, this research will work with what is 
available and analyse the level of corruption in Korea through several indexes, and the 
results of public-opinion polls about the corruption in Korea. 
One of the representative indexes which shows the corruption level of Korea is the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International(TI).96 CPI 
is composed from several public-opinion poll results which were surveyed by other 
organizations within last three years, (not by TI itself), and other resources. TI does not 
compare annual CPI because CPI reflect many kinds of up-to-date resources, so sample 
sources and methods as well as results vary each year. Therefore, simply comparing the 
annual ranking of each country's CPI is a non-objective way for understanding the level 
of corruption. In addition, there are many countries which are not included in the subject 
of survey, so comparing the annual ranking of each country's CPI has another limit. In 
spite of those limits, the CPI ranking is useful for understanding the level of corruption 
in Korea because major countries in terms of economic and political power are already 
included. 
The level of corruption in Korea judged from the CPI has not improved as seen in 
Table 2.4. The CPI ranking of Korea was 27 among 41 countries in 1995, when the 
survey was started. The ranking came above 40 in 1998 and still could not get out of 
those levels. It means that the ranking of Korea has not been changed practically if 
compared with other countries which has similar economic and political power, even 
though the subject countries of survey have been substantially enlarged. In particular. in 
96 Transpa rency International was established in 1993 as a Non Governmental 
Organisation for anti-corruption in the international economic activities and publishes 
CPI every year from 1995. 
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the survey that questioned the prospect of the corruption level in Korea for three years 
hence, 45% of the respondents answered that the corruption will be increased. This 
means that corruption is still a serious social problem, considered that only 32% of the 
respondents had same answer in 2005 survey. 97 
Table 2.4 The annual CPI of Korea 
Year CPI Score Rank 1 Number of CPI Score Rank 1 Number of 
surveyed country Year surveyed country 
1995 4.2 27/41 2002 4.5 401102 
1996 5.0 27/54 2003 4.4 501133 
1997 4.2 34/52 2004 4.5 471145 
1998 4.2 43/85 2005 5.0 401158 
1999 3.8 50/99 2006 5.1 421163 
2000 4.0 48/90 2007 5.1 43/179 
2001 4.2 42/91 
Source: 
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research!surveys_indices/cpi/previous_cpi_1 
We can judge the corruption level in Korea through other researches that dealt with how 
seriously the corruption was perceived. According to the research by The Korea 
Institute of Public Administration, which was surveyed five times from year 2000, we 
can assume that corruption in Korea has been slightly improved. In the survey on the 
perception of the frequency of corruption occurrence, which questioned how frequently 
the respondent think the bribe offered in the gove rnmental agencies in Korea, the 
answer of 'frequent' was decreased from 68.8% in the year 2000 to 50.4% in the year 
2006. The answer of 'rare' to the same question was increased from 31.2% in the year 
2000 to 49.6% in the year 2006, as seen in table 2.5. In addition, we can also assume 
97 http://www.transparen cy.org/policy _research!surveys_indices/cpi/previous_ cpi_l 
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that the perception on the seriousness of corruption in Korea has been improved. As 
seen in table 2.6, the frequency of the answer 'serious' decreased from 75.6% in the 
year 2000 to 64.8% in the year 2006, and the answer 'not serious' was increased from 
24.2% in the year 2000 to 35.2% in the year 2006. 
Table 2.5 The frequency of bribe offer in the executive agencies in Korea 
(The result of pUblic-opinion poll, 0/0) 
Year Very Very Total Total Frequent Rare 1-3 4-6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2000 3.8 22.0 43.0 17.0 11.6 2.6 68.8 31.2 
2001 6.9 21.2 34.3 22.6 11.5 3.6 62.4 37.6 
2004 6.0 19.0 35.6 25.0 9.0 5.4 60.6 39.4 
2005 5.2 18.8 32.2 24.6 14.0 5.2 56.2 43.8 
2006 5.4 10.0 35.2 22.0 18.6 9.0 50.4 49.6 
Source : An analysis of the actual state and trend of corruption in Korea, The Korea 
Institute of Public Administration, 2006, p.13 
Table 2.6 The perception on the seriousness of corruption in Korea 
(The result of public-opinion poll, 0/0) 
Very No Total Year Serious Serious 1-3 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2000 9.6 18.6 47.4 19.4 4.4 0.6 75.6 
2001 11.9 17.0 41.4 23.2 5.5 1.0 70.3 
2004 15.2 21.8 40.2 17.6 4.8 0.4 77.2 
2005 9.4 17.8 43.8 20.8 7.2 1.0 71.0 
2006 12.2 17.8 34.8 25.0 7.8 2.4 64.8 
Total 
4-6 
24.4 
29.7 
22.8 
29.0 
35.2 
Source: An analysis of the actual state and trend of corruption III Korea, The Korea 
Institute of Public Administration, 2006, p.15 
However, other researchers show that corruption in Korea still a big social problem. 
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According to Park Jong-Min, the ratio of the public who think that government officials 
are not honest reached 93 % in year 2007.98 
In addition, according to the survey for measuring integrity levels by Korea Independent 
Commission against Corruption in 2006, the general integrity level of the governmental 
area had been improved from 8.38 point out of 10 in the year 2004 to 8.77 point out of 
10 in the year 2006. However, the corruption structure had been aggravated in that the 
bribe had been customised in some vulnerable areas and the scale of bribe had been 
increased. According to the survey results in the year 2006, of those respondents who 
had had occasion to offer a bribe, the average number of those occasions was 3.46. This 
is compared with an average of 3.26 times in the year 2005, it can be said that the 
corruption has been customized. The average scale of the amount which was offered as 
a bribe by the respondents had also increased; from 1,020,000 Won (about 500 Pounds 
Sterling) in 2005 to 1,510,000 Won in 2006. This means that the corruption has been 
aggravated in some sense, although it possibly takes into account a fall in the value of 
money. 99 
In conclusion, although we agree that corruption in Korea has been improved as Korean 
society becomes more transparent along with economic and social development, it can 
be said that corruption is an issue in Korea that still remains as a serious social problem. 
98 Se -gae Newspaper, 27 Dec. 2007, page 2; Park Jong-Min, P: s.tudy on the a~itud~ of 
government confidence, policy benefit and government impartIalIty, Korea Umversity 
99 Seoul Newspap er, 18 Jan. 2008, page 9; 
http://www.crc.go.kr/open_contentlindex.htm 
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Chapter 3: The relationship of corruption to 
several dynamic elements in Korea, 
such as culture, politics and the 
economy. 
It can be said that corruption is influenced by a lot of elements. Furthermore. the power 
of influence of these elements depends on the circumstances of time, space and 
environment, so it is hard to specify the reasons which can be commonly applied to any 
societies. For example, in Ghana where Nepotism is wide spread, it is considered as a 
natural duty for persons in power to provide a job and other interests for their 
relatives. 100 
In the past, the approach style of a corruption study was classified in terms of 
'functionalism' and 'post-functionalism'. 101 According to the proponents of 
functionalism, which was the mainstream approach in 1960s, corruption is a self-
destructive phenomenon which disappears when a country reaches a certain extent of 
development. In other words, corruption is an unavoidable phenomenon in a developing 
country. Under the functionalism, corruption is a dependent variable for development 
and has a positive effect on development. 
However, this approach was revised in the late 1970s. Under the new approach, so-
called 'post-functionalism', corruption is not a self-destructive phenomenon but a self-
100 Recited from "Yoon, Tae-Burn, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Condition: 
Some Experimental Approach, Korean corruption studies revielt', (Seoul: The Korean 
Association for corruption studies, 1999), Vol.3, p.79 
101 Werner, Simcha B. New Directions in the study of Administrative Corruption, 
Public Administration Review, 1983, Vo1.43, No.2, pp. 148-149 
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perpetuating phenomenon, which is not overcome as a country develops. Under this 
approach, the spill-over effect of corruption is stressed. Also it is considered that 
corruption can be detected at any level of political development and 
institutionalization. 102 
In recent years, both of the above two approaches, functionalism and post-
functionalism, have been rejected by some scholars. They think that it is 
meaninglessness to contend that corruption is either a self-destructive or self-
perpetuating phenomenon. Rather, they think, it is more important to understand the 
multilateral attributes of corruption. 103 
It seems that there can be as many theories for the cause of corruption as there are 
theories as to its effects. It would therefore be short sighted to place limits on its 
effects or its causes. Different elements exist in differing ways in different societies and 
the interplay between them and that particular society will effect how the corruption is 
manifested in that society. Corruption in Ghana and South Korea are unlikely to have 
identical root causes and manifestations because they are two different societies at 
different levels of development. 
In this chapter, the relationship between corruption and three specific elements, 
culture, politics and economics, (which are generally understood as being deeply related 
elements to corruption in Korean society), will be described. 
102 Werner, Simcha B. op. cit., pp. 145-150 
103 Yoon, Tae -Bum, op. cit., p.78 
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3.1 The relationship between corruption and culture in Korea 
There is much contention over the substance of corruption. One of the most contentious 
issues is whether or not corruption itself is a cultural phenomena. 104 The debate is 
whether, or not corruption is an actual entity which is internalized within government 
officials and the public under the influence of cultural elements. Therefore, it is 
impossible to control corruption without cultural reform. What can be agreed is that 
culture is deeply related to corruption. The reason why corruption was internalized in 
the public's life deeply related to the fact that the political, administrative and business 
culture was abnormal. 
In case of Korea, political culture is still outdated. Political culture includes an entire 
political attitude, a sense of values and consciousness of the public, and the members of 
political system. The political culture of Korea is still influenced by nepotism, and 
familism rather than rationality. The Korean political culture also can be called 
factionalist and a migrant culture which lacks convictions. This kind of political culture 
provided a good habitat for corruption. 105 
An immature administrative culture in Korea also stimulated the corruption 
phenomenon. Administrative culture is one of the most important factors to determine 
administrative attitude and outcomes. It can be said that Korea has an authoritarian 
administrative culture which arose from a traditional Confusion culture. Korean 
104 Kim Young long, The healing of a culture of corruption: Toward improving the 
~uality of life, Korean Corruption Studies Review, 2003, Vol.8, No.1, P.3 
1 5 Kim Young long, ibid, p.5 
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administrative culture reflects on a government officials' way of thinking and attitude. 
The government officials in Korea were key players in making the country develop into 
an industrialized nation in the 1970s. However, it is also a fact that an undesirable 
administrative culture was a help to make structural corruption. 106 
A chronic undesirable business culture in Korea is also familiar with corruption. A 
business culture in a company is a comprehensive concept which includes the values, 
beliefs, ideology and habit, norm and tradition, and knowledge and skills which are held 
by the members of the company. Korean business culture has several chronic traditional 
practices which are familiar with corruption, such as tax evasion, misappropriation of 
public money, and a close relationship between political and business circle, etc. 107 
Corruption in Korea is deeply related to the undesirable chronic culture in its political, 
administrative and business areas. According to many scholars who study the corruption 
in Korea, basic cultures which cause corruption are familism, nepotism, a desire for 
peace-at-any-price, red-tapism, taking a serious view of ranking, and affectionate 
h . 108 umamsm, etc. 
3.1.1 Confucianism 
It can be said that these corruption familiarized cultures are generally related to 
Confucianism. Therefore, rampant corruption in the Korean society seems to be mainly 
attributable to confusion in the value system of the people. 
106 Kim Young long, ibid, p.5 
107 Kim Young long, ibid, p.7 . . 
108 Shin, Eun R yung, A study on relationship between bureaucratic corruptlOn .and . 
administrative culture, (Seoul: M.A. dissertation in Sook-Myung Woman's UmversIty, 
1990), pp.1 7 -19 
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Confucianism is a kind of knowledge, morality and statesmanship which was built and 
developed by Confucius, the Chinese sage. Confucius, who is believed to have lived 
during the sixth century B.C. set up an ideal ethical-moral system intended to govern 
relationships within the family and the state in harmonious unity. It is a system of 
various subordinations: of son to the father, of younger to elder brother, of wife to 
husband and of subject to the throne. 109 
There is no any other ideology that has influenced the public's life and way of thinking 
as much as Confucianism has from the Yi dynasty(A.D. 1392-1910) to the present. 
Though Buddhism was a widespread religion in ancient Korea, Confucianism served as 
the basis for the philosophical and structural foundation of the state. 11 0 During the Yi 
dynasty, Confucianism was the doctrine and policy of the country. It was a fact that 
Confucianism infiltrated into the public's life and operated as a code of conduct of 
general public and government. The main idea of Confucianism is human relations. 
Human relations in Confucianism are not an equalitarianism which treats every person 
as an independent character, but are unequal discriminative relations which treat persons 
. f" I d b d' tIll m terms 0 a pnnclpa an a su or ma e. 
Moral principles in Confucianism are for the ruler. In other words, Confucianism is 
political morals which demand the surrender of people to the ruler and political 
109 Mar garet Key, Corruption in South Korea: An Explanation Through A Cultural 
Framework, (Seoul: M.A. dissertation in Yonsei University, 1998), pp.33-35 
110 Chun, Soo II, A study on bureaucratic corruption: socio-cultural perspective. Korea 
Public administration science journal, 1984, Vol 18, No 1, p.155 
111 Chun, Soo II,op. cit., pp.155-157 
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principles to defend and guarantee the superior position of the ruler. 112 Therefore, a 
rational attitude is not in Confucianism. Confucianism deals with relations between 
person and person who are specifically tied, such as father and son, ruler and ruled, 
husband and wife, etc. Importantly, however it does not suggest public morality for a 
society or a specific group. 
In addition, Confucianism has elements of class consciousness, people are very clearly 
distinguished by occupation, such as the scholarly, agricultural, industrial, and 
mercantile classes. It developed to become the corrupt custom of putting government 
above people. It does not have an idea that government officials exist for the people, but 
have strong idea that the people exist for government officials. Under this idea, 
government officials exercised absolute power over the people. l13 A tendency to aim at 
an official position, which is a symbol of an authority, is related to this circumstance. A 
bureaucratic authoritarianism became the tradition from the Yi dynasty onwards; that it 
was possible for a man to accumulate a fortune if he became a government official and 
to be one of the governing classes. It seems that this was a lesson reinforced by the 
behaviour of Japanese government officials under the rule of Japanese imperialism. 
In addition, it can be said that the tendency of Confucianism to distinguish the upper 
and lower classes in social status built a vertical consciousness structure. This is a 
tendency not to agree to a person in a low rank but to obey a person in a higher rank 
without any critical attitude. In this tendency, generally, inferiors endure an insult of the 
112 Yoon Tae -Rim, The personality of Korean, (Seoul: Hyundai education books 
publishing company, 1977), pp.147-157 
113 Chun, Soo II, ibid, pp.155-157 
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superiors even in the circumstances of an infringement of their interests. 
It can be said that this Confucian tradition brought about an irrational culture and 
caused corruption. 
3.1.2 Familism 
Familism is a phenomenon that obliges any member of a family to render devoted 
service and remain loyal to the family. It is not just a phenomenon that is a manner of 
living in a family, but one that is expanded to the outside of family, that is, to general 
social relations. 114 In other words, familism is a kind of loyalty to the primary groups 
such as relatives, birthplace, friend, same clan, and alumni as well as family. 
Loyalty to family connected by blood relationship is a normal basic link all over the 
world, and there is normally a limit to how big the family is. However, if the loyalty is 
expanded from the primary groups such as relatives, to birthplace friend, same clan and 
school and then university alumni, there is a possibility that the loyalty eventually splits 
a society. 
The patriarchal system in the family of Korea and its expansion to outside the family 
deeply influenced the social character building of Korea. Koreans were inculcated with 
obedience towards the head of a family from their childhood with thought that it will be 
guaranteed to be in their own best interests if they submit themselves to the will of the 
head of the family. 115 
114 Lee, Seo Hyeng, Corruption and Culture in South Korean Society, Korean 
Corruption Studies Review, 2001, Vo1.5, No.1, p.66 
115 Lee, Seo Hyeng, op. cit., pp. 66-68; Chun, Soo II, ibid, pp.157-159 
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Korea has a characteristic social structure in which a family is a basis of social activities 
and connections. There are many reasons that familism prospered in Korea, but, it can 
be said that one of the reasons is the tendency to consider personal connection seriously. 
Koreans have a tendency to confirm if they have any personal connection with the other 
side when they meet a person for the first time and to treat every thing accordingly as a 
result of the confirmation. This attitude of giving priority to connections refers to the 
propensity to give importance to blood relations and academic connections and then to 
treat coldly other groups with whom they have no connection. 
Korean bureaucrats, who went through this process of socialization where paternalistic 
values are emphasized, tend to act following special relations rather than general norms, 
and uncontrollable abnormal relations are likely to be formed here. That is, in such 
human relations, they dare to conduct unreasonable behaviours for their own mutual 
benefits. 
This loyalty to primary groups is a manifestation of the sense of faith. The spirit 
respecting the sense of faith is an Oriental way of thinking originating from the tradition 
of Confucian culture. The concept of faith is linked to the sense of recompense to 
others' hospitalities or favors or connective family relations. In other words, it means 
the solicitations and corruptions in bureaucratic societies. This sense of faith affects 
bureaucratic societies resulting in favoritism in addition to sectionalism. 
Although this paternalism has a long history (it began from the Agricultural Age 
where a family made a basic production unit,) it was established as a generalized value 
system with the positioning of Confucianism as the general living principles for 
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Koreans. Confucianism is based on paternalism. 
Families were the places where society members internalized and practiced the 
Confucian values and norms specifying their vertical and hierarchical social relations. If 
in one direction of the social interactions arising from hierarchical social relations were 
obedience and loyalty, there were protection, charity and support in the other direction. 
As such, Confucian paternalism cultivated the social relations of supporter-customer. 
With the developments of industrialization, the functions of blood communities 
weakened and people began to seek for territorial connections and academic 
connections as complementary measures to the communities that they left behind, 
thereby weaving the nets of connections with paternalistic symbolism across the 
societies of citizens. These nets of connections are not only communication channels 
but also the paths through which social resources are distributed and are essentially the 
stage of the exertion of authorities. 116 
The reason why paternalism is corruption friendly is in essence that it causes people to 
follow private emotions, obscuring the borders between public affairs and private affairs 
and thereby privatizing public domains. The propensity to attempt to accommodate even 
somewhat steep solicitations from persons with which one has an acquaintanceship 
instead of refusing them and the propensity to connive with the misconducts of seniors, 
subordinates or colleagues are all the by products of paternalistic exertions of authorities. 
Paternalism sometimes mixes up warm-hearted behaviours and corruptive practices 
preventing distinctions between the two. 
116 Lee, Seo Hyeng, op. cit., pp. 66-68 
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3.1.3 Affectionate humanism 
Another corruption-inducing culture can be said to be affection. Most of human 
relations in Korean societies are woven with sticky emotional affections. Affection 
becomes the root of corruption because it avoids objective criteria and appeals to 
humanism. In Korean societies, the ones who go about life in a detached, objective 
manner and not with the relations of affection are considered to be shallow-hearted and 
cold-blooded persons. As such, interests that demand detachment become the subject of 
hatred and Koreans generally dislike objectivity.II7 This can be said, in most part, to be 
the outcome of the process of socialization tamed with affection. 
But the affection in Korea can be said to be sticky affections within each group. The 
affections as such make the problem more serious. The affections in Korea involve 
closure and exclusiveness. In other words, the persons connected with affection help 
and take care of each other. This actually creates division and partition, because there is 
no motive to find common agreement if no emotional attachment exists. These 
tendencies toward partitions and dissolutions in Korean societies can be said to be the 
outcomes of no other than affections. The academic connections and territorial 
connections in Korean societies can be considered to be the outcome of the support of 
the culture of affection along with the paternalistic propensity.II8 
The culture of affection does not like open competitions and tacitly demands sacrifices. 
There is a tendency to sort things out quietly behind the scenes and avoid conflict. 
Corruption can not easily inhabit in openness and competitions, but emotional 
117 Bak Wan -Ki, political culture and corruption, Korean corruption studies review, 
(Seoul: The Korean Association for corruption studies), Vol.1, No.1, 1997, pp.3-5 
118 W K' . 5 Bak an - 1, op. Cit., p. 
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connections like covert and internal states of things and do not like open and external 
states of things. Consequently, corrupt actions flourish in the culture of affection. 
The reason why affections are directly connected to corruption is in their blindness of 
faith and unconditional acceptance. Affection does not like distinguishing between right 
and wrong and determining based on objective criteria. 119 Friends should be 
unconditionally favoured. One who seeks reasons and distinguishes between right and 
wrong is already not a friend with affection. As such, affection destroys objective public 
order. Involving unconditional loyalty, blind faith and sacrifices, affection sometimes 
exerts huge powers. Human and physical resources can be mobilized at the maximum 
for the accomplishment of a goal. A work which would take a month by objective 
procedures can be completed within 2 weeks. 
3.1.4 Authoritarian culture 
Another culture that induces corruption III Korean societies is the authoritarian 
culture. 120 Although the concept of authoritarianism can be defined in many different 
ways, it is to be defined here as the hierarchical mental attitude based on governing-
obedience or superiority-inferiority relations. Therefore, the most basic concept of 
authoritarianism can be considered to be the attitude attempting to grade all things or 
people. The authoritarian culture in Korean societies can be considered as originating 
from the previously mentioned patriarchal family system. 121 Accustomed to lives 
119 B ak Wan-Ki, op. cit., pp.3-6; Shin, Eun Ryung, A study on relationship between 
bureaucratic corruption and administrative culture, (Seoul: M.A. dissertation in 
Sook-Myung Woman's University, 1990), pp. 24-25 
120 Bak Wan -Ki, op. cit., pp.7-9 
121 Shin, Eun R yung, ibid, p.2l 
95 
accepting ranks between family members and the authority of the patriarch as being 
natural, higher ranked persons demand obedience from lower ranked ones and lower 
ranked ones offer dedicated sacrifices to higher ranked ones, regarding it as their 
societal obligation. 
This authoritarian culture gives rise to the thought of the preponderance of official 
power which compromises the principle of liability of administration. 122 In the societies 
where only vertical hierarchal orders are emphasized in all human relations, the thought 
of preponderance of official power is a natural result and general people are commonly 
required to unilaterally obey official power and undemocratic outcomes such as 
hierarchical systems are brought on internally in administrative organizations. 
Also, authoritarianism boils down opinions or behaviours in an organization to unity 
and uniformity thereby inducing corruption. The authoritarian behavioral patterns of 
bureaucrats are based on top and bottom status relations, thus in the authoritarian 
vertical structures, subordinates often can do nothing but follow unjust orders from their 
supenors. 
3.1.5 Red-tapism 
Another culture inducing corruptions in Korea is red-tapism. 123 Red-tapism is the 
cases where deviations appear between formalities and realities, including the cases 
where reasonable and justified things are pursued superficially while still internally 
clinging to unreasonable and selfish things. 
122 Shin, Eun R yung, ibid, p.34 
123 Shin, Eun R yung, ibid, pp.22-23 
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Red-tapism is characterized by giving importance to rules and procedures and thereby 
strictly observing them. Therefore, the strict observations of rules and procedures by 
bureaucrats in administration objectively bear no problem. Problems arise however, in 
that red-tapism is superficially transcendental while internally bearing the sense of 
being connected to private individualism. That is, red-tapism gives priority to legal 
procedures over all factors, thereby causes and effects are reversed resulting in the 
phenomenon of a reversal of goals where the observance of rules and regulations itself 
becomes a goal. 
In this course, bureaucrats intentionally delay administrative processing emphasizing 
formalities and procedures. From this springs the causes of corruptions. 
Above, several cultural characteristics inducing corruptions in Korean societies were 
discussed. Although there may be corruption-inducing cultures in any society, the 
evidence that Korean cultures are especially corruption-friendly is also evinced from 
many public opinion surveys. 
According to a public opinion survey executed on May 11 by the Council for Korean 
Pact on Ant-corruption and Transparency, 73.5% of general people replied that a sense 
124 . I fbi' .. of connections influences policy processes. Also, III the resu ts 0 a pu IC opimon 
survey publicized on January 26, 2007 by the Korean Overseas Information Service, the 
statement that 'there are many misconducts and corruptions in Korean societies' was 
agreed with by 89.7% of respondents and the opinion that 'success requires good 
connections and family backgrounds' and 'the problem of corruptions can't be solved 
124 http://cafe.naver.comlkicac.cafe?iframe _url=/ Artic1eRead.nhn%3Fartic1eid=114 
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without the improvement of paternalism' posted 82.5%.125 
It can also be considered that there may be interpretations contrary to the analysis frame 
suggesting that the characteristic cultures in Korea are the causes that can induce 
corrupt activities. 126 It is because the utilities of cultural values or regimes themselves 
may vary with the changes in times. Depending on changes in environments, they may 
sometimes function positively and sometimes increase inefficiency. Also, a cultural 
explanation that looks to, at first glance, indicate clear causal relations is, in fact, often 
simply justifying the status quo or hiding the ideological intention to drive situations 
toward a certain direction. It is considered that eventually cultures will put certain 
restrictions to human behaviours, but may change themselves or bring about a new 
effectiveness depending on active manipulations of meanings by humans rather than 
determining human behaviours as fixed value systems. Whereas the Asian values of 
giving importance to human relations and mutuality played a role in bringing about the 
various ill effects of crony capitalism, it can be considered that they also contributed to 
the outcome of low crime ratios and the maintenance of high grade public security 
through social control. Rather than establishing simple causal relations presuming that 
certain cultures will inevitably bring about corruptions, the fact should be understood 
that the concept of corruption itself involves ethical judgments of values. The 
presumption that certain cultures resulted in corruption and thus corruption would be 
eliminated if only those cultures could be changed would be a hasty conclusion. 
125 http://www.viewsnnews.com/article/view.jsp?seq=11478 . 
126 Han, Seoun g Mi, Cultural Characteristics and Corruption Structures of East ASIa. 
Yonsei Business Review, Autumn, 1998, Vo1.35, No.2, pp.263-266 
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3-2. The relations between corruption and politics in Korea 
Various political variables are also closely related to corruption. These variables may 
include the political situations of the times, the high cost political system structures, the 
extent of democratization and many others. 
Korea has a short political history of only 60 years from the time it became independent 
until now. It has not been sufficient time for Korea to be equipped with completely 
reasonable political systems. In this section, the issue of how much influence the 
political systems and environments of Korea exerted on corruption will be reviewed 
along with major political variables. 
3.2.1 Historical-Political factors 
Among political and historical situations throughout the last one hundred or so years, 
the ones that are unique to Korea are the colonial reign of Japanese imperialism for 36 
year and the 2 years and 11 months of the period of the military administration by US 
army. 
Following the successful invasion of Korea and subsequent 'Union Treaty' in 1910, 
Japan exercised absolute power over the Korean land and people. 127 During this period, 
the public administration in Korea strengthened the paternal bureaucratic systems armed 
with absolutism and imperialism. This Japanese governing method brought about 
127 Chun, Soo II, A study on bureaucratic corruption: socio-cultural perspective, Korea 
Public administration science journal, 1984, Vol 18, No 1, pp.160-161 
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several rna] or changes in the thoughts and behavioral patterns of Koreans toward 
bureaucrats. Bureaucrats were perceived as the subjects of fear privileged beings and as 
governors rather than servants for people. The authoritarian behavioral patterns of 
Korean bureaucrats were reinforced. Furthermore, it brought about the behavioral 
patterns of Korean bureaucrats observing laws for law's sake. In other words, when 
there was any problem to be solved, they concentrated their efforts on strict legal 
interpretations rather than on reasonable judgments. 128 It can be said that this 
observance of laws for law's sake is desirable in a way, but it resulted in red-tapism, 
where normalized formalities and procedures are strongly adhered to. It fosters stiffness 
and inflexibility of thinking and facilitates passive attitudes in bureaucrats. Also, it 
brings about the adverse effects when the results of legal interpretations are bent, 
lacking fitness to purpose, depending on the intentions of bureaucrats. The military 
administration of Korea by the US Army is another significant event which is also 
considered to have played a role in fostering corruption-friendly cultures. In August 
1945, Japan was defeated in World War II and Korea was liberated from the colonial 
reign of Japan and came under the temporary reign of US Army's military 
administration. Although Korea was full of the desire to create a new independent 
country through self-supported independence, imprudent political greed resulted in 
chaos with political disorder and a complete lack of direction. During the period of 
military administration by the US Army, dispersed with all the disorder and turmoil, 
bureaucrats were highly prone to work for their own interests. This can be seen from the 
fact that interpreters were blamed as necessary evils because they showed up many 
misdeeds and contradictions within the system and were accused of intentional 
128 Park, Moon Ok, New Korean Government Theory, (Seoul: Shin Chun Publishing 
Co., 1981), pp.l74-175 
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distortions. 129 
In addition, it can be said that the political instabilities caused by the outbreak of the 
Korean War and the subsequent military coup d'etat made it impossible to expect the 
development of external control devices over bureaucrats, and this can be considered to 
have worked as a further cause to induce corruption. 
3.2.2 Cost of political structures 
The high cost nature of political structures is a phenomenon that can be frequently seen 
in developing countries where political developments have not yet been made. It can be 
said that, in a state where political developments have not been fully made, the ones 
who hold the power try not to release it, and the parties without power struggle to get 
it. 130 In this scenario, huge amounts of money are consumed in money based elections 
or the operations of political party organizations and this brings about political 
corruption. It is impossible by its very secretive nature to calculate the amount of money 
spent on managing unfair elections. 
In the case of Korea, the national subsidies paid by National Election Management 
Committee in the past were a mere trifle compared to the political funds spent by 
political parties. Up until the time of the Kim Young-Sam government, when national 
subsidies were increased greatly with the enactment of the law regarding political 
129 ehun, Soo II, A study on bureaucratic corruption: socio-cultural perspective, Korea 
Public administration science journal, 1984, Vol 18, No 1, p.162 
130 Kim Hae-Dong, A study on the relation between corruption control and 
modernisation, The Journal of Administration, (Seoul: Graduate School of Public 
Republic, Seoul National University, 1993), Vol.31, N02, pp. 14-16 
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funding, presidential candidates and members of the National Assembly made every 
effort to fill their personal political funds as well as those political funds for their 
political parties with no regard for measures and methods. 131 
With the enactment of the law regarding political funds in 1994 under the Kim Young-
Sam government, the procurements of political funds were legalized and the incoming 
and outgoing of donations and expenditure became open to be public scrutiny. This 
obviously increased the transparency related to political funds. The measures to ensure 
transparency were prepared by, first, increasing the opportunities to collect political 
funds and then by substantially increasing national budget subsidies and by demanding 
supporters' associations give receipts provided by the Central National Election 
Management Committee against the money received. 132 
Also, public office election law was amended to mandate the disclosures of properties 
owned by candidates for public offices and to guarantee freedom in election campaigns. 
Furthermore, the costs for election campaigns were reduced by the Government by 
facilitating the election campaigns being executed by unpaid voluntary service providers, 
and the provision of election advertising through an expanded system of public 
broadcasters. The authority to investigate into election costs was given to the National 
Election Management Committee and the punitive sentences to election law violators 
131 Kim, Taek, Corruption of structure and adhesion in Korean Society. Korean 
Corruption Studies Review, 1998, Vol. 2, p.lll 
132 1m Sunghan, Influence of political Political Reform Law initiated by Kim Yong-
Sam Government upon Korean Politics, Social Science Research(Kang-Won 
University), 1998, Vol 37, pp. 41-42 
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were increased by about double. 133 
In spite of these institutional reforms, the provincial elections that took place in 1996 
were again governed by money. The will for political reformation regressed, anyhow 
and the phenomenon of political corruptions was an undeniable fact in this situation. 134 
The details of political corruption related to political funding in Korea are not well 
known due to their obvious secretive nature, but the major procurement channels for 
political funding that is known so far, for each of the political dynasties are as 
follows. 13S 
First, President Lee Seung-Man, the 1 st president of Korea procured his political funds 
mainly through the Korea Democratic Party until he took the reigns of government. He 
recognized the importance of political funds much earlier than other politicians thus he 
was able to procure funds through diverse channels. In the days after Liberation, this 
recognition by Lee Seung-Man, and his active pursuit of funds compared with his rival 
contender, the relatively passive, political idealist Kim Gu gave him the upper hand in 
the elections and can be considered to have been one of the major reasons why he won. 
During the reigns of government by the Liberal Party, the biggest sources of political 
funds were the disposals of so called 'enemy's properties' left by Japanese and the 
interests in relation to the allocations of the assistances from USA. At that time when 
the scale of companies, the level of industrialization or the extent of the formation of 
national capital was very low, politicians or political parties colluded with businessmen 
133 1m Sunghan, ibid, pp.40-41 
134 1m Sunghan, ibid, p.52 
13S Kim, Young -Rae, A study on political corruption and political funds in Korea, 
Korean Corruption Studies Review, 1997, Vol. 1, No.1, pp.19-23 
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by disposing enemy's properties at low prices in the course of nationalizing a small part 
of them in return for political funds. 136 
During the short period of reigns of the Chang Myeon government of the 2nd Republic, 
there was very little time for suspicious fund raising to happen, and anyway all political 
processes were disclosed and maximum freedom of speech was guaranteed due to the 
April 19th students' revolution, There is thus no case of political corruption to be 
discussed here. l37 
President Park Jung-Hee, who took control of the country through the May 16th coup 
d'etat, maintained power for the relatively long period of 18 years, and thus he needed a 
lot of political funds and accordingly, he carried out a lot of misconducts. During this 
period, a lot of foreign capital was introduced in the course of economic 
industrialization and domestic industries also developed considerably. During this 
period the tie-ups between politicians or political parties and the increasingly powerful 
businessmen become more pronounced than during any other government. Many 
examples of misconduct related to political funds have now been revealed including 
various financial preferences, coercive requests for commissions when introducing 
foreign capital, and preferences in the disposal of national land. 138 
During the 5th republic presided over by Chun Doo-Hwan or the 6th republic of 
President Roh Tae-Woo, the Blue House (presidential office) managed political funds 
firsthand, providing political funds to the governing party. These huge amounts of 
136 Kim, Young -Rae, ibid, pp.19-20 
137 Kim, Young -Rae, ibid, pp.20-21 
138 Kim, Young -Rae, ibid, pp.21-22 
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money were collected from companies under the titles of various donations and the title 
of 'reigning fund of president'. Investigations by the Prosecutors revealed that President 
Chun Doo-Hwan procured 950 billion won during his reign. 250 billion won out of the 
money were donations made under various names and the balance, 700 billion won, was 
his personal slush fund. The public prosecutors office revealed that President Chun , 
Doo-Hwan saved 160 billion won from the money when he retired. 139 
In addition, President Roh Tae-Woo himself announced that he had procured 500 
billion won. However, the procedures to collect the money for political activities were 
different from those of the immediately preceding government - the Chun, Doo-Hwan 
government. The Chun, Doo-Hwan government collected the money for political 
activities directly into the Blue House through outright demands, and no business that 
disobeyed the order to contribute money for that purpose could easily continue doing 
business. Accordingly, both of the governing parties and the National Assembly had to 
receive the money for political activities from the president. But under the Roh, Tae-
Woo government, the coercive collection of money for political activities became 
impossible due to the rapid development of democratization, and so the governing 
group held itself back from making unreasonable collections of money for political 
activities, learning a lesson from past adverse effects. 140 
President Kim Young-Sam avowed openly that the Blue House would receive no 
political funding after his inauguration and showed different political behavioural 
139 Han -Gook Newspaper, 27. Aug. 1996, page 1; lang, Sang-Hwan, 'Politics-Big 
Business Tie Ups and Korean Capitalism' in Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy in 
Korea, The social science research centre in KyungSang University in Korea, 2,000, 
pp.l24-132 
140 lang, San g-Hwan, op. cit., p.127 
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patterns from preceding presidents through various institutional improvements. From 
then on, it can be considered that the behavioural patterns changed, and the Blue House 
no longer received political funds to distribute, and this was the case for the subsequent 
premier President Kim Dae-Jung. Political parties tried to operate their organizations 
with official political funds such as national budget subsidies or support money. 141 
It can be seen that in the past, in Korea, huge amounts of political funds were required 
to maintain high cost political structures. Fortunately, the reality is that the systems for 
the public operation of elections have continuously being expanded and improved since 
then and thereby have reduced greatly the political funds required. It is obvious that the 
high cost nature of political structures in Korea is diminishing gradually. 
3.2.3 Democratization. 
The extent of the democratization of the government is directly related to corruption. 
There is, of course, some argument whether corruption takes place more in authoritarian 
setting than a democratic one. If we define corruption politically as the non-democratic 
involvement in political decision-making, and not make the definition purely criminal, it 
would be wrong to say that corruption take place less often as a society goes through 
d .. 142 emocratlzatlon. 
However if the definition of corruption is limited to the way that this research has 
defined it (in terms of criminal behaviour), generally, it is understood that dictatorial 
141 Kim, Young -Rae, ibid, p.23 
142 John C. H. Oh and Bruc e Wiegand, Democracy, Development, and Corruption: The 
case of Korea, Korea Observer(Seoul: The Institute of Korean Studies), Vol. 27, No.4. 
Winter 1996, pp.497 -498 
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regImes are apt to be corrupt. 143 Such dictatorial regimes are generally faced with 
controversy over their legitimacy. Hence, in order to widen their support base, they 
often attempt to buy supporters. The necessary funds for such a political aim are usually 
provided by big business conglomerates, which naturally, in turn, expect the ruling 
elites to give them special financial benefits. Here develops a collusive relationship 
between political leaders and big businesses. 
There is no disagreement from the opinion that the past Korean Republics from the First 
Republic to the Fifth Republic (with the exception of the Second Republic), that is, the 
Lee Seung-Man, Chang Myeon, Park Jung-Hee(the third and the fourth) and Chun Doo-
Hwan regimes, are authoritarian regimes. But, the authoritarian character of the regimes 
from the Sixth, Roh Tae-Woo regime, rapidly changed. The June 29th declaration of 
Roh Tae-Woo led to an amendment to the constitution based on the mutual consent of 
the Government party and the Opposition party and resulted in direct Presidential 
elections voted for by public. From this time, the Korean governments gradually 
d . d 144 emocratlze . 
Past governments in Korea contained dictatorial factors and this may be considered to 
have been a contributing factor that induced corruption. Fortunately, the 
democratization of government is progressing fast and from that dimension, the 
environments of corruptions may be considered as being improved rapidly. 
Apart from the attributes of the democratization of the regime seen from such normative 
aspects, another measure of democratization is the existence of the institutionalization to 
143 Chun, Soo II, Bureaucratic Corruption, (Seoul: Sunhak Publishing Co., 19?4),. p.6? 
144 Bae, Sun g-In, A research for the process of industrialization and democrahzatlOn III 
Korea, (Seoul: PhD thesis in Dan-Kook University, 1997), pp. 123-190 
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realize democracy. In terms of institutionalization, Korea has been preparing various 
institutional devices that can realize political democracy. Through the amendment of the 
constitution in 1987, equitable participation and competitive elections were ensured. 
Under the government of Roh, Tae-Woo, who was elected based on the new constitution , 
the freedoms of speech, publishing and association were expanded. 145 The Kim Young-
Sam government disclosed the properties of public officials, executed the system for 
real names in financing making the receiving of bribes related to public offices more 
difficult to hide. By amending election law and enacting political fund law, the 
institutional framework for the operations of political parties and fair elections were 
prepared. The Kim, Dae-Jung government developed democratization one stage further 
by dint of the simple fact that it took the reign of government through a replacement of 
political power between a government party and an opposing party and this achieved an 
outcome important for the political neutralization of the bureaucratic system and the 
prevention of corruptions. 
Such institutionalizations of democracy are essential in preventing political corruption. 
Of course, the preparation of such institutional devices does not necessarily guarantee 
the realization of the institutionalization of democracy. If public officials continue the 
practices of the time of authoritarianism, the institutions of democracy will not be able 
to put down roots. 
President Roh Tae-Woo carried out the merger of 3 parties with 2 opposing parties in 
145 Lim Su Hwan, Corruption in the Korean New Democracy, Korean corruption 
studies review, (Seoul: The Korean Association for corruption studies, 2002), Vo1.6, 
No.1, 2002, pp.129-132 
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order to break the structure of a small governing party and large opposing parties in the 
National Assembly and to restore the dominant position of governing party. This merger 
of 3 parties was an action that recovered the dominance of the executive branch and the 
dominance of the president at the time of authoritarianism. 146 
During the period of Kim-Young-Sam government, popularity and power were 
concentrated on the individual of president thanks to the outcome of the reformation 
accomplished in the early part of his tenure resulting in the phenomenon where politics 
relied upon the leadership of personality rather than institutions. The Kim, Dae-Jung 
government also maintained a grasp over National Assembly members and political 
parties, taking advantage of the movement for defeats in election fueled by popularism. 
147 In front of such the overwhelming authority of a president, the functions of the 
National Assembly and court shrink and regresses horizontal responsibility distribution, 
which is an important factor of democratic institutionalization. The three governments 
that emerged after the democratization externally look like as having shown institutional 
approaches to corruption controls by arranging the laws and institutions necessary for 
corruption controls but in contents, but in some aspects they can be evaluated as having 
operated legal systems in a fashion that retrogressed democratic institutionalization. 
146 Lim Su Hwan, ibid, p.131 
147 Lim Su Hwan, ibid, p.131 
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3-3. Relations between corruption and economy in Korea 
Corruption can be approached from different directions. The approaches from an 
economic aspect can be considered to be as important as from political, social and 
cultural aspects. This approach from the economic aspect can be studied in terms of 
diverse aspects such as a government's market intervention, economic inequality within 
societies, relations between capitalistic economic systems and corruption, correlations 
between bureaucratic corruption and economic growth, other economic effects that can 
be caused by bureaucratic corruptions, distorted distribution of resources or economic 
policies. 
Among these diverse approaches from economic aspects, this section will focus on the 
structure of the tie-up between politics and business as being at the core of misconducts 
and corruption and its own evolution during the course of economic developments. 
3.3.1 Politics-business tie ups 
Politics-Big business tie-ups are one of the basic characteristics of Korean society 
that have steadily continued in the development of Korean capitalism after Liberation. 
These corruptions of politics-big business tie ups are based on the market economy 
intervention of government and the economic value possessed by public authorities. In 
other words, a government must have the public authority that can exert discretionary 
. . f k' .c. t' 148 authonty In the state 0 mar et Imperlec lOn. 
In Korea, up to now political powers have received a considerable part of the money 
148 Lee Jong-Won, The economy of corruption, an article in the 3rd Academic 
Conference of International Korean Economists, Korean Society of Economy. 1988, 
p.3 
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needed to create and maintain power from companies and in return they have provided 
~ t· ltd f: 149 Th preleren la reatment an avors e strong growth seen in the Korean economy 
has lead thus to a parallel growth in this sort of business-political tie in and the 
entrenchment of the corruption associated with it as both sides mutually benefited. 
The economy grew and the corruption spread with a wide range and broad depth of 
influence on bureaucratic organizations and the private sector. This has become one of 
the fundamental corruption activities in Korea. 
The sticky relationship between financial conglomerates and political powers that has 
formed the tie up between politics and business in Korea has, at its core, been mediated 
by bureaucratic organizations and financial institutions. Political powers provided a 
variety of preferences and interests in relation to instructions or mediations for bank 
loans, the allocations of foreign loans, business selections, the ordering of works and 
purchase tenders related to government and in return took monetary compensations 
from beneficiaries that were in most cases large companies, and used them for political 
funds or the accumulations of personal fortunes. 
The 1950s was the time for Korean capitalism to form comprador capital through 
preferential sales of properties restored from the defeated Japan, preferential tax and 
financial support etc. The obliquity and corruption facilitated by politics-big business tie 
ups played the role of promoting the accumulation of capital at the beginning of the 
development of capitalism. This period can be said to be the period of primitive 
accumulation of native capital. Politics-Big business tie ups had a decisive significance 
in the formation and growth of native capital that was especially feeble because Korea 
was a late starter capitalist country after passing through a colonial reign for the first 
149 Lee Yun-Ho, Korean structure of corruption and anti-corruption policies in 
economic perspectives, Korean Corruption Studies Review, Vol.2, No.1, 1998, p.60 
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half of the 20th Century. The primary methods for the Lee, Seung-Man government in 
1950s in giving special favours to those businesses friendly with the Liberal Party were 
preferential allocations of import quota and import permits, preferential sales of restored 
properties, preferential allocations of aid fund and goods, special favours for bank loans 
and special favours in the course of implementing the restoration projects of the 
government and of the US army after the war. 
During the period of rapid development from the 1960s to late 1980s, the Park, Jung-
Hee Government managed on its own initiative not only macroscopic economy 
operations but also microscopic industrial structural reorganizations. Oh, Won-Cheol, 
the Chief Presidential Secretary for Economy at that time called it, an 'engineering 
approach to economic construction' or a nationally planned economic system. The 
Government presented objectives, selected the methodologies to accomplish the 
objectives and enforced businesses practice to follow the economic plans. To oblige 
entrepreneurs to practice the plans made by the government, the government had to 
guarantee profits to the entrepreneurs and thus the Park, Jung-Hee Government 
elaborated support measures to foster the chaeb ols(financial conglomerates) including 
the provisions of industrial complexes, payment guarantees for foreign capital 
introductions, preferential financing under the conditions of low interest rates and long 
term repayments, reductions of and exemptions from custom duties and national taxes, 
policies facilitating monopoly and prohibiting imports, constructions of industrial 
infrastructures, the cultivation of engineers and technicians and the enhancement of 
the morale of entrepreneurs and workers. ISO 
150 Oh, Won -Cheol, Korean Style Economy construction 1-6, (Seoul: Kia economy 
research center), 1995-1997, Vol. 3 
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Table 3.1 The ten largest business groups (chaebols) in Korea 
Ranking Year 1965 Year 1975 Year 1985 
1 SamSung SamSung LG 
2 Lucky Lucky HyunDai 
3 SsangYong HyunDai SamSung 
4 P anB on HanJin SunKyung 
5 SamHo HyoSung DaeWoo 
6 SamYamSa SsangYong SsangYong 
7 DongYang DaeWoo HanJin 
8 DaeHan DooSan HanKookHwa Yark 
9 GaePoong DongA construction DaeRimSanUp 
10 PoongHan SinDongA HyoSung 
*Source: KIm, Jeong-Ryeom, 30 Years HIstory of Korean Economic Policies, 
(Seoul: Jung-Ang Newspaper Co.), 1990, pp. 20-73 
Under such conditions, being close to the political power was a critical factor for the 
growth of businesses. Businesses commonly provided the political power with funds 
expecting direct profits and received special favours in exchange for the funds. Such a 
customary practice could cause great changes in the superiority structure and rankings 
between chaebols, and so those chaebols that could intimate relationships with those in 
power kept growing, but other chaebols that could not do so deteriorated. 
To review changes in the 10 largest chaebols between 1965 and 1985, among the 10 
largest chaebols in 1965, not more than 3 remained in 1975 and of those 10 largest 
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chaebols in 1975, 8 remained until 1985 as shown in Table 3.1. 151 
The politics-big business tie ups during the period of Chun, Doo-Hwan Government 
were basically the same as those during the period of Park, Jung-Hee Government. 
Right after the commencement of the 5th Republic, the Chun, Doo-Hwan government 
executed unconventional business policies to force chaebol businesses to liquidate their 
subsidiary companies in doing so consolidating 66 marine transport companies into 20, 
dissolving 78 companies and the 5 largest chaebol businesses as the subjects of credit 
controls and in the course it abruptly dissolved the Kukje group that was ranked as the 
10th largest business at that time. 152 Under the revolutionary political situation as 
described above, businesses could not but to grope their way to maintain friendly 
relations with the President in order to survive and consequently they had to 
unavoidably provide the President with money and other valuables every time an 
opportunity was given to them. 
After the Roh, Tae-Woo Government was established following the June Resistance, the 
conditions surrounding Korean capitalism were fundamentally changed. The 
relationships between the political powers and the chaebols began to change 
beginning from the period of the Roh, Tae-Woo government. 
In the 1988 New Year Press Interview, Gu, Ja-Gyeong, the chairman of the Federation 
of Korean Industry emphasized that 'the free market economy system based on the 
151 Kim, Jeong -Ryeom, 30 Years History of Korean Economic Policies, (Seoul: Jung-
Ang Newspaper Co.), 1990, pp. 20-73 
152 Jang, San g-Hwan, 'Politics-big Business Tie ups and Korean Capitali~m' in 
Corruption and Anti-corruption Policy, The social science research centre In 
KyungSang University in korea, 2,000, p.121 
114 
harmony between autonomy and competition and the harmony between equity and 
efficiency is the only way to ensure the advancement of our economic society' and that 
we have to form 'an enterprising social climate where creations and entrepreneurship 
d' 153 E h .. are respecte. mp aSlzmg autonomy and entrepreneurship meant the exclusion of 
government's interventions and the enhancement of the perception of entrepreneurs 
requesting the conversion of the government-led economy into a civilian-led economy. 
Of course, the civilian led economy referred to by the Federation of Korean Industry 
was a chaebol-led economy. 
Accordingly, unlike the preceding government, the government did not give apparent 
special favours in exchange for the money provided to it for political activities, and also 
the provisions of such money for political activities decreased remarkably. The chaebols 
would not have been reluctant to provide the money for political activities if they could 
have received what they wanted in exchange for donations but the compensations for 
the money became much more uncertain compared to the past. The expected rate of 
return from political investments went down and the risk in giving went up to be much 
higher than before. 
By the 1990s, businesses began to refuse to be controlled by the Government. The 
political power represented by the governing power and the Administration attempted to 
maintain the governing system of old. The conflict between the political power and the 
businesses kept growing. Meanwhile, Jeong, Joo-Young, the chairman of Hyundai 
group came forward as a candidate for the 1992 presidential election to be defeated and 
subsequently the conflict between the political power and chaebols became severe. In 
153 Don gA newspaper, 3, Jan., 1988 
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this circumstance, President Kim, Young-Sam could not continue the behaviour of 
collecting the money for political activities firsthand and declared that he would not 
collect the money for political activities during his term. But, even during the period of 
the Kim, Young-Sam government, close aides to the president such as Hong, In-Gil, a 
general affairs secretary collected some money for political activities under the control 
of Kim, Hyeon-Cheol a son of the President. I54 
During the period of the Kim, Dae-Jung government, politics-big business tie ups were 
attempted by the businesses aiming at obtaining special favours in the course of 
overcoming the 'Foreign Exchange Crisis' and relieving businesses led by the 
government. Major cases of the politics-big businesses include the case of the lobbying 
of 1m, Chang-Yeol the governor of Gyeonggi province by the Gyeonggi Bank aimed at 
preventing itself from being liquidated and the case of the slush fund money held by the 
Donga Construction Company Limited. I55 Since the Government had the right to 
decide in relation to resuscitations of and support to businesses and financing institutes 
in the process of structural reorganizations during the 'Foreign Exchange Crisis', those 
organizations or individuals having practical authority were subject to lobbying 
activities. In this regard, it can be said that the collections of the money in large amounts 
for political activities were reduced during the period of the Kim, Dae-Jung government 
because the special favours that could be obtained by chaebols in exchange of the 
provisions of the money for political activities were reduced compared to the past and 
the government controlled financing was subject to intense criticisms. 
154 Jang, San g-Hwan, ibid, pp.126- 139 
155 Jang, San g-Hwan, ibid, pp.138- 139 
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In conclusion, before the period of the Park Jung-Hee government, the Korean economy 
was facing structural restrictions such as lack of capital, a shortage of entrepreneurial 
abilities, inferior technology levels and shortage of information. When they took the 
reigns of government in this situation, the Park Jung-Hee republic adopted growth 
strategies and initiatives centered on large companies and export industries to drive 
economic growth. Based on a growth strategy to take on the world market with a system 
for mass production of a small number of items, the government intensively supported 
certain industries and certain companies judged as being promising but with insufficient 
capital. The government secured control over financial organizations through ownership 
and by taking the authority for personnel management and exercised the material right 
of decision making on the supplies of policy funds at low interest rates to these 
companies. In addition, preferences and supports were granted to companies throughout 
the processes of investments, productions and sales by the means such as domestic 
market protection, by the prohibition of imports and the installation of tariff barriers, the 
formation and maintenance of domestic monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures 
and the provisions of export financing with advantageous conditions. 
The establishments and execution of economic growth strategies were also led by 
bureaucratic organizations. Having the right of decision making over the operations of 
economy, the bureaucratic organizations found themselves standing in the advantageous 
position whereby they could manipulate companies by the means of the allocations and 
uses of resources. Also, every time an economic crisis came, the government granted 
. c. h .. 156 
abnormal preferences to large companies to rescue the companIes lrom t e CrISIS. 
156 Lee Yun-Ho, ibid, pp.61-63 
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In Korea, it is not difficult to find the cases which show the improper relationship 
between regime and a business conglomerate. The example of Korean Air is just one 
" h 157 I 96 . case III pOInt among tern. n 1 9, an obscure pnvate firm known as The Hanjin 
Group, headed by Cho Choong-Hoon) was handpicked by President Park, to take over 
the unprofitable state airline. Cho then turned all of his energy to keeping the airline 
flying and to making sure that it would become profitable. With generous state-
sponsored funds, and with a monopoly guaranteed by the government, it eventually 
became profitable in spite of the fact that its position of monopoly ended in 1988 when 
the rival Asiana Airline was given permission to fly as the second domestic carrier. 
David C. Kang contends that business conglomerates in Korea, called chaebol, were 
powerful enough to construct and maintain a relationship of "mutual hostages" with the 
ruling politicians: "Even at the beginning of the Park regime, capitalists realized that 
they were not entirely vulnerable to the state but that both had a certain ability to 
sanction the other". 158 
However, we can see how a business conglomerate was weak against government from 
this following case. When Lee Kun-Hee, a chairman of Sam-Sung Group which is the 
biggest business conglomerate in Korea, visited Beijing in March 1995, he publicly 
ridiculed President Kim Young Sam's administration as "second class" and the 
country's local politics as "fourth class". Soon after this so-called "Beijing incident" the 
157 John C.H.Oh and Bruce Wiegand, Democracy, Development and Corruption: The 
Case of Korea, Korea Observer(Seoul: The Institute of Korean Studies), Vol.27, No.4, 
Winter 1996, p. 518 
158 David C. Kan g, Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and 
the Philippines, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2002, p.119 
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powerful Samsung fortunes began to deteriorate, because the government began to take 
actions harmful to it, such as cutting off loan programs and delaying governmental 
approvals for major projects. 159 
Intensively supported by economic preferences and with opportunities from political 
powers, the conglomerates made efforts to maintain the political forces that nurtured 
them through the tie-up with the powers and exercised the economic controls obtained 
as such over other private sectors to take economic advantage. Those conglomerates 
took monopolistic or oligopolistic profits from people within the ring-fence of non-
competitive markets. As such, the tie up between politics and business played a critical 
role in giving birth to the comprehensive corruption structure of Korean societies. 
3.3.2 Correlations between corruption and economic growth 
The concept of 'economics of corruption' became prominent during the 1990s, with the 
widespread analysis and publication of corruption indexes by international organisations 
such as Transparency International and reports of economic growth. Studies of the two 
produced two opposing arguments, one that corruption was an obstacle to economic 
growth and the other, that on the contrary, corruption exerts positive influences on the 
economy and promotes growth. 
F or instance, Mauro argues that corruption slows down the economic growth of a nation 
by reducing the ratio of investments to GDP. Mauro suggests that if Bangladesh is able 
to reduce corruption levels to those comparable to Uruguay, Bangladesh's ratio of 
159 John C.H.Oh and Bruce Wiegand, ibid, pp.521-522 
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investments to its GDP will increase by as much as 5%.160 
But the argument that corruption slows down economic growths runs counter to the fact 
that high economic growths have been made in some Asian countries including South 
Korea. Such a reality in Asia breaks up the common idea that corruption slows down 
economic growth. 
With regards to the relationship between corruption and economic growth, Treisman 
argues both that it could be established that corruption slows down economic growth, 
but it could also be established that economic growth reduces corruption. 161 This 
argument, that two-way causal relations could be established between corruption and 
low economic growths indicates that the one sided stipulation of corruption as a cause 
of low economic growths and giving a privilege to anti-corruption as a strategy for 
economic growths can not be justified. As pointed out by Treisman, corruption will not 
inevitably slow down economic growth if other factors act favourably to economic 
development. 
Wedeman argues that although correlations between corruption and the ratio of 
investments to GDP may exist in those countries where corruption is not severe, such 
correlations are not necessarily established in those countries where corruption is severe. 
Wedeman pointed out that what hindered economic growth was not corruption per se, 
but certain types of corruption. Wedeman divided the types of corruption into looters, 
rent-scrapers, divided-collectors and suggests that Korea can be classed as being among 
160 Mauro, Corruption and Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995, Vol. 1 I O. 
No.3, pp.681-711 
161 Treisman, D., Th e Causes of corruption: a cross-national study, Journal of public 
economics, 2000, Vo1.76, pp.400-401 
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the divided-collectors. 162 
David C. Kang contends that money politics can reduce transaction costs and help 
mobilise capital for development if a small set of governmental and business elites feels 
politically secure. 163 
That corruption in Korea was centred on large businesses can be said to have exerted 
positive influences on economic growth, at least until the middle class was formed in 
the Korean society. 164 
The process of industrialization during the late 1960s and early 1970s (that can be said 
to be the early stage of economic growth in Korea) can also be regarded as having 
accomplished rapid growth in terms of of the illicit unions and improper transactions 
between the business groups that had grown up based on the support of the political 
power, and that very same political power that nurtured them. It can be said that the 
process whereby certain businesses that were granted a lot of special favours by the 
early autocratic leaders and then paid bribes corresponding to those favours, was 
repeated by the later less autocratic rulers when they provided intensive government 
support to some businesses in order to elicit bribes in larger volumes. 
At that time, the middle class had not yet been formed socially and economically and 
thus the government could be free of pressures from that class, so it could concentrate 
162 Wedeman, A., Looters, Rent-Scrapers and Divided-Collectors: Corruption and 
Growth in Zaire, South Korea and the Philippines, The Journal of Developing Areas, 
1997, Vol.31, Summer 
163 David C. Kang, ibid, pp.96-121 
164 Chung Yeong-Ill, Correlativity of corruption and economic development in Korea, 
Theses of social sciences(KwangJu: Dongkang college), 2002, Vol. 2, pp.193-209 
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vanous special favours and support to certain businesses. 165 In the process, the 
businesses had to achieve maximum growth in order to be continuously supported by 
the government. It was the process where productive businesses could be continuously 
supported by the government while the businesses with a low productivity were 
excluded from special favours given by the government. Such an environment can be 
said to have been the background of the rapid growth along with the cycling of 
enormous improper activities and corruptionl66 . 
According to David Kang, political considerations were the motive force behind 
economic policy in Korea and corruption reduced transaction costs and promoted 
growth. 167 Moran argues that corruption coexisted with economic developments and 
corruption was productive because special favours were given based on economic 
outcomes as well as political connections. 168 
But, after 1980s, the relative power of businesses increased along with rising waves of 
political and economic democratization and this liberation did not suppress improper 
activities and corruption, but rather hardened the institutional foundation of improper 
activities and corruption. 169 Also, the middle class emerged and the government could 
not be free from its pressure. 170 Therefo re, the democratization in procedures was 
165 Khan, Mushtaq, 'Patron-Client Networks and the Economic Effects of Corruption 
in Asia' in Mark Robinson, ed., Corruption and development, (London: Frank Cass), 
1998, pp.15-39 
166 Robins on, Mark, 'Corruption and development: an introduction' in Mark Robinson, 
ed., Corruption and development, (London: Frank Cass), 1998, pp.1-14 
167 David C. Kang, ibid, pp.5-11 
168 Moran, Patterns of Cor ruption and Development in East Asia, Third World 
Quarterly, 1999, Vol.20, No.3, p.570 
169 Robinson, ibid, pp.1-14 
170 Khan, ibid, pp.15-39 
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emphasized. It can be said that as the resources distributed amongst the business groups 
were relatively reduced and consequently competition between businesses surrounding 
special favours became intense. The governmental special favours that had been 
distributed on the basis of contributions to economic developments were transformed 
into measures to ensure the legitimacy of the political power. Regardless of 
contributions to productivity or growth, businesses could receive special favours by just 
paying the highest rents. In this circumstance, eventually the businesses, bureaucrats 
and the political power became devoted to the activities of pursuing rents on their own 
without any connection with growth. 
This pattern of corruption that has continued since 1980s just resulted in distortions in 
resource distributions and it can be said to be different from the distorted resource 
distributions aimed to support economic growths. Consequently, the corruption after 
1980s can be said to have been strengthened in the negative aspect in that it impaired 
the reliability of Korean economy rather than contributing to economic growth. 
3-4. Conclusion 
The sections above reviewed, the political, economic and cultural aspects that have, up 
until now, been affecting the corruption in Korea. John C.H.Oh and Bruce Wiegand 
insisted that, in a traditional society, incidences of corruption are generally petty bribery 
such as small gift taking, customs' officials taking bribes, and border patrols' taking 
bribes, etc. Moreover they insisted that such corruptive behaviours are not widely 
publicized in such a pre-democratic society, largely due to the lack of free press and the 
absence of mass news enterprises. The circumstances of 1960-70s Korea corresponded 
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to such a situation. 171 
However, according to the above two scholars, as society goes through the process of 
democratization and modernization, as well as the quickening process of 
industrialization, the quantity of individuals and organizations engaged in mass media 
increases sharply, but also the quality of the media coverage begins to improve very 
rapidly. Under such circumstances, the media begins to engage more aggressively in 
investigative reporting, particularly on the wrong doings of public officials. Under such 
circumstance, more accountability of public officials is demanded by the public. Now it 
seems that Korea arrived at this stage. 172 
Fortunately, recently the economic and political environments in Korea are changing 
substantially and accordingly the environments with the potential to induce corruptions 
. . 
are ImprovIng. 
In the past, the economic growth of Korea relied greatly on the external method of the 
expansion of production by the expansion of production factor inputs, but now the 
enhancement of productivity through efficient uses of given resources is what is 
necessary, not the external expansions. This productivity enhancement will become 
active through creativity and spontaneities of individual economic entities, not under the 
external instructions and interventions of the past. As the economy grows, the subj ect of 
economic problems is changing from mobilization of resources to efficient uses of 
resources and economic structures are becoming more complex and sophisticated and 
171 John C.H.Oh and Bruce Wiegand, ibid, pp.525-526 
172 John C.H.Oh and Bruce Wiegand, ibid, pp.526-527 
124 
consequently, the system of comprehensive government initiative maintained up until 
now is revealing many problems. Overall societies also moved from oppressive 
authoritarianism to pluralistic democratic societies. Along with the democratization. 
various interest and lobby groups are freely and strongly expressing their intentions for 
their interests. 173 With the development of internationalization, markets are being 
opened and international criteria and obligations are being required to be observed. 
Responding to this, the Korean government is pursuing economic and social 
developments by the autonomy of the private sector and not by government initiative. 
Companies are becoming transparent through the expansion of the disclosures of 
company management statuses etc. Also, with the political democratization, the tie ups 
between politics and economy are being broken. 174 In conclusion, the peripheral 
environments inducing corruptions in Korea have not been favourable by now but they 
. . 
are ImprOVIng now. 
It can be said that actually these cultural, political and economic environmental factors 
are a double edged sword in terms of political will as to whether they induce or hinder 
the formation of political will to vigorously fight corruption. 
On one hand, a "corruption-friendly environment" (or at least one where corruption is 
not viewed unfavourably) reduces any external pressure for corruption control and, in 
this situation, policy makers find no profit politically to energetically conduct corruption 
control activities. In other words, if the voting public are ambivalent to corruption (or 
indeed feel that they profit from it as a whole) then an anti corruption ticket will not be a 
vote winner in elections and thus there will be no political will to implement such 
173 Lee Yun-Ho, ibid, pp.65-66 
174 Lee Yun-Ho, ibid, p.71 
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policies. On the contrary, usually in a rational and open culture, the people dislike 
corruption, and so there is value for policy makers be seenJo face up to corruption with 
a strong political will, because the public support corruption control and will support 
politicians seen to be promoting it. 
In that same environment where corruption is disliked by the populace, a government 
that is it self corrupt (or at least profits form corrupt activities) has no inducement to 
implement anti-corruption policies against itself and in fact actually the opposite. In 
order to keep control and maintain (the generally undemocratic) system, more corrupt 
activity and profitable tie ups with big business is required to oil the political machine. 
There is no political will to upset the status quo and shorten the life of the regime. 
Conversely, it could be said that a corruption-friendly environment actually increases 
the political will for corruption control in a democratic system. Regardless of whether 
the regime itself is corrupt, in a society where there is plenty of corruption it is easy for 
more corruption control efforts to be taken to appear strong willed politically and gain 
favour with the voters. Indeed the weaker the political foundations of the government, 
the stronger efforts that can be expected of them to get the support of the public through 
corruption control activities. 
In conclusion, the cultural, political and economic environment are only a factor that 
effects political will to tackle corruption if it is politically expedient for the politicians to 
do so. If there is no political profit to be had from tackling corruption, then there will 
be no political will to do so. 
Therefore, it can be said that the effects of the cultural, political and economIC 
environment on the political will for corruption control depend on other social situations, 
such as democratisation and mass media development. 
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In the case of Korea, as seen above, it can be said that the cultural, political and 
economic environment in the country contributed to the rampant corruption. However, it 
can not be said that the environment affected the political will for corruption control 
solely in a, negative or positive fashion. It can be said that, those environmental factors 
affected negatively on political will until the Roh Tae-Woo regime, because other social 
situations were not matured, but affected positively on the political will to curb 
corruption from the Kim Young-Sam regime. 
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Chapter 4. Institutionalization of anti-corruption 
policy in Korea 
It can be said that Korea has accomplished rapid economic growths through the process 
of modernization, but the highly centralized authoritarian regime resulted in the 
retrogression of democracy and the structuralization of improper activities and 
corruption. Thus, every newly formed government established the eradication of 
improper activities and corruption as one of its tasks for reformation, but it is likely that 
it was only a measure to liquidate opposing groups for a shift in the political power or to 
ensure the legitimacy of their political power through gaining public support. 
Therefore, it is quite meaningful to reVIew the anti-corruption systems of past 
governments if more efficient and sustainable anti-corruption systems are to be prepared. 
To eradicate corruption, a systematic and reasonable mechanism to control improper 
activities and corruption must be contrived through a comprehensive consideration. 
Unless the opportunities and benefits to engage in improper activities and corruption are 
reduced, the improper activities and corruption may not be suppressed. 
Anti-corruption activities must be combined with measures to control those corrupt 
activies that have already occurred, and the effort to change the culture along with 
powerful preventive institutions. Among them, the appropriate institutionalization of 
announced anti-corruption policies could be considered to be the motivating power for 
the eradication of corruption. 
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Samuel Huntington is one of the scholars advocating institutional approaches and 
according to his argument, corruption refers to the use of power by public officials for 
their personal purposes and it occurs from an absence of effective political 
institutionalisation.175 That is, it can be said that institutional approaches seek the cause 
of corruption from the absence of institutionalization. 
The lower the level of institutionalization, the more unstable is the behavioural pattern 
expected from public officials leading to larger possibilities for deviant behaviours to 
occur. The lower the level of institutionalization the larger becomes the possibility for 
corruption to occur. Therefore, institutionalization is a very important factor in 
suppressing corruption while it can be a representation of a political will. 
Before intensively reviewing the activities in Korea to eradicate corruption, in this 
chapter the development processes of major institutions will be reviewed and how the 
institutionalization for the eradication of corruption has grown up steadily over time in 
Korea will be examined. 
175 Samuel Hun gtington, political order in changing societies, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press), 1968, p.59 
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4-1. Institutionalization of anti-corruption policy in the First 
Republic of Korea 
As reviewed earlier in this study, the 15t Republic (the Lee, Seung-Man government) 
that commenced right after the ending of the Japanese colonial period maintained 
power for 12 years inducing various kinds of improper activities and corruption due to 
the charismatic leadership of President Lee, Seung-Man and the excessive loyalty and 
abuse of power of the Government officials blindly following him. In particular, they 
even ignored law and order and social norms to maintain their power. This made even 
the general people to perceive the power as the highest value, and the wealth and 
interests of the country were exclusively possessed by a small number of entrepreneurs 
resulting in uncountable numbers of unemployed persons and the poor to literally starve. 
The bureaucrats essentially concentrated on protecting their own interests rather than 
achieving national plans, and faithfully performed the role of a political tool of the 
president. Even the police acted as a private security force of the president in 
monitoring and threatening opposition parties rather than maintaining law and order. 176 
In this circumstance, it can be said that the 15t Republic failed in institutionalizing any 
anti-corruption policy to speak of. As a newly established government, only the 
establishment of major national organizations in charge of the eradication of corruption 
such as the Commission of Inspection and the Investigation Department of Special 
Affairs in the Police and Prosecutors Office may be considered to be the major content 
of the institutionalization in relation to corruption. 
176 Ahn Byung-Man, A theory for Korean Government,(Seoul: Da-San Publishing Co.), 
1993, p.158 
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The function and authority of the Commission of Inspection was to inspect and detect 
the error and wrongdoing of administrative branches. The Investigation Department of 
Special Affairs in the Police and Prosecutors Office took charge of the investigation for 
large scale criminal cases such as the corruption cases for high ranking politicians. 177 
Also, they took the merit system as a basic personnel management system, but, in 
practice, favouritism was widespread. However, no effort was devoted to correct the 
situation. In addition, it is hard to find any proper evidence that activities were 
committed to improve the responsibility and morality of government officials. Only the 
duty regulation, called Gwan Ri Joa U Myung, which included the rules concerning 
punctuality, obedience, fairness, and so on, was introduced in 1950. 178 
4-2. Institutionalization in the Second Republic of Korea 
As reviewed in Chapter2, the improper activities and disorder in the 1 st Republic 
brought about the extensive resistance of students and eventually gave birth to the 2nd 
Republic. But the 2nd Republic that was born as a result of the April Student Revolution 
not only did not have the ability to eradicate improper activities and corruption due to 
incompetence and fractional strife, but also collapsed in 6 months after it came into 
power due to its open practices of improper activities and corruption such as personnel 
management based on personal considerations, appropriations of the National Treasury 
177 The Board of Audit and Inspection, The history of 40 years Audit and Inspection, 
1988, pp.173-31 0 
178 Oh, Seok -Hong, The Reform of Republic(Hang Jung Gae Hyuk Lon),(Seoul: Pak 
Young Sa, 1997), pp.252-53 
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and tax evasions. 179 
The 2nd republic established the law regarding the punishment of the persons involved 
in unfair activities in an election in November 1960 in an attempt to punish those who 
provided large amounts of the money for political activities at the time of March 15th 
General Election. Another effort of the government was to establish the foundations of a 
retroactive law, called the Special Law against Immorally Acquired Fortune, in the 
constitution to punish persons who accumulated wealth through corrupt means. 180 
In addition the Second Republic reinstated the Commission of Inspection in 1961.181 
This commission was based on "The Law of the Commission of Inspection" which was 
enacted in 1961, differently to the previous commission. Furthermore, the size of 
organisation and the object of inspection were enlarged. The Commission could inspect 
government-operated enterprise as well as government organisations. 
Another particular effort was the trial to enact "The law of the registration of assets of 
government officials" for the establishment of ethics. The Ministry of Development 
drafted the law and sent it to the House in 1960. 182 However, the draft was discarded in 
the House on the grounds that existing laws were sufficient to control corruption. 183 
179 Kan g Ji-Joon, A study on the anti-corruption institution for government officials in 
Korea, (Dissertation in Kyung-Nam Univ. in Korea, 1995), p.46 
180 Kan g Ji-Joon, ibid, p. 46 
181 The Board of Audit and Inspection, The history of 50 years Audit and Inspection, 
2000, pp. 283-4 
182 An, Hae-Gyun, 'The analysis of administrative structure of the Second Republic: the 
administrative and political process under the Democratic Party, Hang Jung Ron 
Chong(The Journal of Republic), (Seoul: Graduate School of Public Republic, Seoul 
National University, 1980), Vol.18, No1, p.188 
183 Kang, Kyung-Kun, 'The reform of law and institutionfor corruption prevention', in 
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4-3. Institutionalization in the Third Republic of Korea 
The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), (established following May 
16th Revolution) enacted on June 6, 1961 the law regarding emergency actions to 
reconstruct the country and, based on this law, in an attempt to eradicate corruption, it 
established the Unjust Wealth Accumulation Treatment Act and the Special Law 
Regarding The Punishment Of Special Crimes. 184 
These laws stipulated the subjects of punishments as being; unjust public officials, 
unjust profiteers and unjust property accumulators in school. These were defined in 
the acts as follows: 185 
'Unjust public officials' - those public officials who fraudulently took any 
national properties, or those who (using their positions and power) acquired properties 
corresponding to a value of 50 million Won or more, or used other unjust methods to 
accumulate properties. 
'Unjust profiteers' those who acquired unjust benefits through lease contracts 
for National or public properties or those properties restored to the country from 
Japanese Imperial control. 
'Unjust property accumulators III school', people who acquired properties 
unjustly under the guise of school operations or establishments. 
Despite these institutional efforts, public officials' corruption continued in the process 
184 . J ·b·d 47 Kan g Jl- oon, 1 1 ,p. 
185 Park, Yon g-Ho, 'Controlling Corruption in Korea: Approach Style of Government' 
(PhD dissertation, Seoul: Seoul National University, 1999), p.114 
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of implementing modem policies including economic development plans and thus more 
comprehensive countermeasures began to be required and in doing so the 3rd Republic 
revealed the limitations in its own legitimacy and system maintenance and subsequently 
it executed Yusin(the Revitalizing Reforms) in October 1972 to launch the 4th 
Republic. 186 
As a matter of course, it is not to say that there were no institutional reform efforts 
which had the effect of preventing corruption, although reforms undertaken did not 
principally target corruption control. Institutional reforms that had the effect of 
preventing corruption are as follows. 
First of all, it can be said that the corruption related to the personnel management of 
government officials was serious. At that time, even abnormal methods were employed 
to recruit government officials at the request of powerful political figures. That method 
was to employ the requested persons as temporary employees on condition that they 
would be transferred to the post of regular employee. Because of this abnormal method, 
the number of temporary employees exceeded that of regular employees at the time. 187 
Accordingly, the military junta enacted the National Public Service Law as an 
institutional method to eradicate corruption related to the personal management of 
government officials. This law provided the initial framework of the merit system for 
the personal management of government officials. Until this time, each ministry had 
been allowed to employ its staff by itself. However, according to the enactment of this 
186 Kim Ho-Jin, The systems of Korean politics, (Seoul: Bak Young Sa Publishing Co.), 
1994, pp. 258-262 
187 Yoon, Woo-Gon, 'The realities of and measures against corruption in personnel 
management republic' , in The Realities of and Measures against Systematic Corruption, 
(Seoul: The Research Centre for Modem Society, 1982), pAl 
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law, an integrated employment system was adopted in which the central ministry for 
personal management integrally deals with the employment of each ministry's staff 
through a competitive entrance examination open to all. This new system prevented 
corruption in the employment practices of each ministry. 188 
Along with the revisions of the personal management system, the Public Official's 
Training Act was enacted in 1963, and various types of training for improving the 
professional ability and morality of government officials commenced. 189 The training 
programme addressed a number of subjects which included government officials' 
conduct whilst on duty and the integrity of officials in preventing corruption. Office 
regulations in those days consisted of the following personal requirements: sincerity, 
obedience, prohibition of deserting the work place, fairness, honesty, secrecy, integrity, 
dignity, a ban for holding more than public office, and a ban on participating in political 
movements and collective actions. 
In addition, the military junta established the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) 
belonging to the President on the 20th March 1963, which had the unified function of 
audit and inspection. Until then, those functions had been separated into the Board of 
Audit and the Commission for Inspection respectively. 190 
Despite of these various efforts to improve institutions, it can be said that most efforts 
for corruption control in Third Republic concentrated on the ex post facto control such 
as detection and punishment. 
188 Yo on, Woo Gon, ibid., p.48 
189 Park, Dong-Seo, The historical analysis of Korean republic, (Seoul: Seoul National 
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4-4. Institutionalization in the Fourth Republic of Korea 
Having held power for some ten years, Park's obsession with the presidency was still 
boundless when he won his second four-year Presidential term in 1967. Pro Park 
members of the National Assembly were pressured to initiate moves to eliminate the 
constitutional limitation on the presidency to two terms. Having removed the term 
limitation in 1969, Park was more determined than ever to overwhelm his civilian 
opposition in the 1971 Presidential election by whatever means necessary. In that 
election, Park defeated the opposition candidate of the New Democratic party, Kim, 
Dae-Jung who later became the President of Korea in 1998. However, the margin of 
victory was narrower than in the 1967 election against opposition candidate Yun. It was 
evident that there was a large and stubborn group of voters opposed to military-
dominated authoritarianism despite of the vaunted economic growth. Park himself 
initiated a series of moves to ensure that he would never again face a popular election in 
order to remain president. He apparently decided to use the sense of uncertainty in 
South Korea regarding national security for domestic political purposes. International 
development that contributed to the sense of uneasiness in Korea included the 1969 
Nixon Doctrine, which essentially advocated an Asia-for Asians policy, and particularly 
the notification a year later that a U.S. combat division, a third of the American troop 
strength there, would be withdrawn by 1971. 
Suddenly martial law was declared throughout the country on the 17th October 1972 
and the National Assembly was dissolved. Park stated that these moves were necessary 
to eliminate the conditions fostering "disorder and inefficiency .... and to develop the 
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free democratic institutions best suited for Korea".191 An amended constitution, the so 
called yusin (revitalising reform) constitution, was approved by a national referendum, 
making it possible for Park to prolong his presidency indefinitely through an indirect 
Presidential election by the newly created National Conference for Unification (NCFU). 
Following this Park was elected as President of the Fourth Republic in 1972. 
At the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1972, there were no extraordinary 
corruption control efforts. However, from 1975 till 1979 when Park was assassinated, 
the Fourth Republic coped with corruption through a nation-wide anti-corruption 
movement called Seo Jung Soai Sin (Government's Purification Campaign) which is 
different to the methods employed by the previous republic. 192 
According to the official definition, the Seo Jung Soai Sin purports ultimately to 
achieve a National Rejuvenation through the enhancement of administrative and 
political efficiency, elimination of corruption in officialdom, cleansing of social waste 
d ··· d hr h 1 1· 193 an mJustIce, an t oug menta revo utlOn. 
Its action programmes cover three domains: i.e. purification of officialdom; social 
purification; and mental revolution. 194 In an attempt to purge officialdom, public 
officials' misdeeds were continuously controlled, the movement to clean up the 
surroundings of public officials were actively implemented, institutions were improved 
to remove the opportunities for wrong doings to occur and meritorious services were 
191 Dong-A II Bo (Dong-A News Paper), 18 October 1972, p.1 
192 Cho, Young-Jae, Han Guk Ui Seo Jung Soai Sin Ron (Government's Purification 
Campaign in Korea), (Seoul: Yool Sung Publishing Co.), 1980 
193 Cho, Young -Jae, ibid, pp.10-11 
194 Cho, Young-Jae, ibid, pp.12-25 
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rewarded without fail and faults were punished equally without fail in order to protect 
good public officials. To clean up society at large, attempts were made to establish a 
healthy mind-set in the people and social organizations were expected to rid themselves 
of corrupt practices. Members of the public who attempted to solicit favours or request 
illegal actions of public officials, such as buying informations were serevely punished. 
The ordinary public involved in those behaviours were given criminal punishments and 
the public officials involved were prohibited from getting a job in related companies for 
certain periods. 
This movement IS characterised by its very broad coverage, initiation by the 
governing elites, and strong political support flowing down from the chief executive. 
The chief executive and his staff largely initiated this movement and its momentum was 
largely generated from the top.195 
It can be said that the government's plan is to carry out this national movement in 
three sequential stages. The first of the three stages concerns elimination of corruption 
and malfeasance in officialdom; the second relates to expanding the purification 
movement over the general public; and the third addresses internalising purified social 
norms into the mindset of the people. The movement was planned to start from within 
the government bureaucracy. The targets or problems for remedial action within the 
government include unjust, irrelevant or corrupt behaviour, all other elements of 
inefficiency which impede or deteriorate official discipline and administrative 
efficiency, a luxurious private life exceeding proper living standards of government 
officials, and other additional employment activities which are not compatible with 
professional ethics. The operational objectives of the movement in the government were 
195 Kim, Bun-woong and Rho, Wha-joon, Korean Public Bureaucracy, (Seoul: Kyobo 
Publishing Inc., 1982) pp. 324 
138 
as follows: firstly to change attitudes of officials, to eliminate corruption and 
improprieties related to task performance; second, to remove the built-in institutional 
improprieties by means of remedying inefficient and wasteful administrative 
arrangements and thirdly, to enhance the prestige of government personnel by cleaning 
up environmental conditions of their official and private life. 196 
The starting point of the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement is somewhat blurred, and it 
may be a subject of some controversy. However, it would be safe to assume that the 
temporal baseline of the movement was March 1975. At around this point, the chief 
executive's determination for the movement was succinctly stated and made public and 
his detailed directions on action programs were articulated to those in the upper 
echelons of government. There have been drastic changes in the degree and scope of the 
anti-corruption activities of the government since March 1975.The public relations 
material published by the pertinent authority of the government also pronounced March 
1975 as the starting point of the movement. 197 
Although the principle measures of the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement rests on 
punishment, we have to acknowledge that the Fourth Republic in comparison to 
previous republics placed more emphasis on reform of the political system. This means, 
as mentioned above, that the republic emphasised the prevention of corruption. 
Initially, the Fourth Republic established institutional reform as one of the instruments 
of social purification, and started to reform many provisions and processes, related to 
196 Administrative Coordination Office, Office of the Prime Minister, ROK, The Seo 
Jung Soai Sin Action Programs of 1977, and the Seo Jung Soai Sin Progress Report of 
1976 
197; Choi, Jae-Wook, 'The Seo Jung Soai Sin'(Seoul: Shindonga, 1977), pp. 106-119 
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public interest. This institutional reform programme was to revise irrational or unreal 
laws, regulations and custom. There was a big difference between this programme and 
the previous governments' efforts in so far as it emphasised the need to get rid of the 
causes of corruption and the programme was also executed on a large scale. 
The Fourth Republic established the Commission for Reforming Laws and Regulation 
that are related to the public interests in April 1975. The Commission searched 
significant elements to be reformed from central government to local governrnent, and 
executed reform in these areas. The commission undertook a total 1,583 cases from 
1975 to 1978, which included 231 laws, 467 Presidential decrees, 493 prime minister 
and ministers' decrees and 329 other regulations l98 . 
Along with the above institutional reform efforts which had indirect effects on 
corruption, more direct effective institutional reforms carried on. First of all, a collective 
responsibility system, which laid the responsibility on the person concerned as well as 
his or her superior, was introduced. This was for establishing official discipline through 
the activation of the supervision of a superior officer. This was intended to punish first 
and second line supervisors for their subordinates' wrongdoing and this consequently 
enlarged the scope of punishment. This system prescribes the scope of reprehension 
over the supervisors as well as their subordinates who committed wrongdoing whilst 
performing their official duties. Before the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement set about its 
task in earnest in 1975, there was a similar collective responsibility system but, in this 
case, light punishment was imposed upon the superior. 199 However, this collective 
responsibility system was amended during the Seo Jung Soai Sin Movement. The 
198 The Ministry of Government Republic, White Paper of Republic, 1979, p. 11 
199 Oh, Seok-Hong, op. cit., 1977, p.131 
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number of corrupt officials' superior officers punished from 1975 to 1978 totalled 
21,267 persons, which amounted to 15% of the total number of punished officials which 
reached a figure of some 155,336 persons?OO 
The role of the other institution was to record the names of punished and awarded 
officials, and to keep a permanent record of these details. Prior to this republic records 
would be destroyed after an allotted time period. However, by keeping permanent 
records, the republic gave greater responsibility to government officials. Another 
institution to raise the effect of punishment was to ban discharged government officials 
from being in the private sector for a given time period. Before this institution 
commenced, discharged officials could get a job in the company with which he or she 
conspired to corrupt during their time in office. This situation reduced the effect of 
punishment and provided another chance of corruption?01 
In conclusion, the Fourth Republic introduced various institutions to enhance the effect 
of corruption control efforts with a massive purge. These institutional reforms 
influenced corruption control through diminishing government officials' power and by 
making governmental processes transparent to public scrutiny. 
4-5. Institutionalization in the Fifth Republic of Korea 
Commenced in 1980, the Government of the 5th Republic established the embodiment 
of the society of justice as a national objective in order to solve the problems that had 
occurred in the course of rapid economic developments and modernization. To 
200 Cho, Y oung-Jae, op. cit., 1980, pp.1 03-1 05 
201 Oh, Seok-Hong, op. cit., 1977, p.l12 
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accomplish that, a clean government and honest public officials were required. For that, 
the Emergency Measure Commission for National Security was established in May of 
the same year to execute reformations in various areas such as politics, administration, 
society.202 The Sub Commission for Social Purification was installed in the permanent 
commission of the Emergency Measure Commission for National Security to hammer 
out the measures to eradicate unjust public officials abusing power and to clean up 
society.203 Thereby the Government of the 5th Republic announced the plan for 
Society's Purification Campaign in June 1980 and established the Society's Purification 
Commission in charge of government level supports for the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa 
(Society'S Purification Campaign) movement and the reformation movement.204 
The Society'S Purification Campaign was basically similar to the Civil Services 
Reformation Campaign of the 4th Republic. It is similar to the Civil Services 
Reformation Campaign of the 4th Republic in that it was focused on enhancing the sense 
of ethics amongst public officials and in that it attempted to clean up the entire society 
at large based on the purification of the public officials. 
But this campaign was a national mental reformation movement through the 
spontaneous participation of all people. It was a social reformation movement to form a 
social atmosphere based on honesty and trust by eradicating various irrationalities and 
social evils prevailing every in place in the society and reforming the impoverished 
climate of mental culture through spontaneous participations of all people.205 In other 
202 Kim Ho -Jin, The theory on Korean political structure, (Seoul: Bak Yeong Sa 
Publishing Co.), 1994, pp.264-267 
203 Kim Ho -Jin, ibid, pp. 265-267 
204 The histor y of Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement, (Seoul: The committee of Sa Hoe 
Jung Hwa movement) 1988 
205 Kore an Government, A white paper on Korean administration, 1984, p.622 
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words, it was showing a more advanced appearance in that it attempted to convert the 
principal body of implementation from the government to the ordinary people. 
Accordingly, it can be said that the Government of the Sth Republic strived to avoid the 
supervising activities focused on a number of cases or punishments and to strengthen 
long term preventive activities. Strategically, it attempted to first purify the key areas 
such as high ranked positions and power groups and then spread the result to low ranked 
positions or provincial public offices. Also, the strategy to intensively purify the key 
areas vulnerable to corruption to clean the society of public officials was established 
and implemented. 
For this, the republic established the code of government officials' ethics and instated 
an oath for new government officials, and stressed the self-enlightenment of 
government officials. In addition, the republic enacted the Government officials' Ethics 
Law, and tried to introduce a Real Name Financial System. 
First of all, the republic tried to set up a 'clean culture' in amongst government official 
and established a government officials' code of ethics in 1980. This code was to 
enshrine a basic code of conduct for all government officials. There had been a norm of 
ethics since the establishment of the first government, but those norms were too abstract 
to be actualised.206 However, the new code was more concrete than the old one. The 
new code stressed the social status of government officials and suggested a moral 
principle that government officials should practice. 
The republic obliged new government officials take an oath of office from 1981. This 
oath was institutionalised from the duty of government officials in the National Public 
206 Bae Sung-Dong, 'The philosophy and assignment of ethics norms', National 
philosophy and government officials' ethics, (The Central Governmental Officials 
Education Institute), 1982, pp.Sl-S2 
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Service Law. 
The republic stressed the importance of self-enlightenment of government officials in 
order to get rid of corruption in the public sector, and suggested nine practical points, 
for example, banning a gratuity for both congratulatory and mourning occasions, to go 
ahead with the plan207 • 
I t can be said that the enactment of the Government officials' Ethics Law in 1981 was 
the peak of the Fifth Republic corruption control efforts. The Government officials' 
Ethics Law consisted of three major institutions; opening the property of government 
officials to the public, reporting of gifts received and the restriction of employment in 
the field which was related to the government officials' past service. Those stipulations 
were, however, very abstract and had no device to change the historically existing 
unjust practices and the sense within the society as a whole that public officials were 
saturated in corruption, in practice these abstract stipulations did not help very much in 
sweeping away the deep rooted practices of improper activities and corruption. As a 
comparison, the Government Ethics Law of USA contains very concrete and detailed 
stipulations including the stipulation that a public official may not receive a gift 
corresponding to 20 dollars or more in value and the criteria for gifts and the procedures 
to treat illegal gifts etc.208 
The trial introduction the Real Name Financial System was another effort of the Fifth 
207 The history of Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement, (Seoul: The committee of Sa Hoe Jung 
Hwa movement) 1988, p.119 
208 http://www.ethicscommission.nc.gov/ethicsact.htm 
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Republic, even though the trial ended in failure. The Real Name Financial System had 
been operated before the coup in 1961. The military junta introduced the Law for 
Protection of Financial Security Information on the judgement that the Fictitious Name 
Financial System would be helpful for economic development. With the implementation 
of this system, it was possible to transact all kinds of financial assets under a fictitious 
name. However, as time passed, a side effect of the system, which made all kinds of 
economic contradiction began to be felt. Economic impropriety and corruption 
increased in this system.209 As the corruption grew and the ill effects of the Fictitious 
Name Financial System reached a peak, finally demand for a real name financial system 
increased. The republic announced the introduction of the Real Name Financial System 
in 1982. The announcement sent shock waves through the political and economic fields. 
However, the announcement was cancelled after just three months because of the 
objection of the people who had vested interests in old system remaining. 
Although the trial introduction of the Real Name Financial System had been a failure, 
the trial was an epoch-making change in terms of recognition about corruption. 
Along with the improvement of these major institutions, the republic performed the 
improvement of minor institutions, which had both inefficiencies and absurdities. The 
republic installed the Improvement Committee of the Obstruction for Development in 
May 1981 210; of which chairperson was the Prime Minister and its members were 
Ministers and representatives of every field. These works were scheduled to be finished 
209 Choi K wang, The study of underground economy of Korea, (Seoul : Korean 
Economy Institute), 1987, pp.115-116 
210 The histor y of Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement, (Seoul: The committee of Sa Hoe 
Jung Hwa movement) 1988, p.154 
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at the end of 1981, but were continued through until 1987. The number of institution 
improvements reached to 23,481 cases in eight years, as shown in Table 4.1. 
From these efforts, it can be said that the Fifth Republic put their weight behind 
institutional reform against corruption as well as ex post facto measures. 
Table 4. 1. The number of institutional improvement (cases) 
ields Irrational special delegation 
service for 
personnel public the others 
favour of power Tota management welfare 
23,481 2,717 1,079 2,764 7,919 9,002 
* source: The hIstOry of Sa Hoe lung Hwa movement, (Seoul: The committee of Sa 
Hoe lung Hwa movement) 1988, p.154 
4-6. Institutionalization in the Sixth Republic of Korea 
Along with its commencement, the 6th Republic announced that it would strengthen the 
foundation of democratization while defining the objective of national administration as 
'open the great age of common people'. Politically, the political situation of a small 
governing party and a large block of opposing parties to hold it in check (which is 
the main function of the National Assembly) became solid. Economically, the autonomy 
of the private sector was increased and the level of the political sense of the people was 
improved, but existing public order were disturbed?ll 
211 Ahn Byung-Man, A theory for Korean Govemment,(Seoul: Da-San Publishing Co.), 
1993, p.172 
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The New Spirit Movement of Government Officials had been launched to reform 
improper practices in 1990. This movement was composed of four sub-objectives, such 
as the fair management of public duty, democratic culture in public office, rigorous 
distinction between public matters and private matters, and taking initiative to make a 
sound society. In addition, this movement grew and developed into the life of the 
general public through the New Public Order and New Life Movement. The 
Government promulgated the war against crimes and emphasized the embodiment of a 
society in good order and a working society and implemented the New Public Order and 
New Life Movement. As a part of that movement, the republic executed a special 
training, which emphasised frugality, for all government officials and the people in the 
leadership class. In addition, the republic suggested a guiding principle of frugal living 
for government officials.212 
The anti-corruption policies strengthened with the New Public Order and New Life 
Movement were characterized by the fact that unlike the past, there were no attempts at 
large scaled cleanups, whereas edifying activities were increased and the issue of public 
officials' improper activities and corruption was approached in terms of tackling crime. 
The New Public Order and New Life Movement revealed its limitation in the aspects of 
outcomes and sustainability compared to the past government's Civil Services 
Reformation Campaign and the Society'S Purification Campaign which had (in parts) 
exerted long term effects. In spite of the institutional devices aimed to remove 
corruption inducing causes, no large effect was achieved because the improper activities 
212 A true record of the Sixth Republic: The five years ofRoh Tae-Woo republic,(Seoul: 
The Ministry of Information, 1992), Vol. 1, pp.262-266 
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and corruption became larger, were structuralized and organized.213 
Aside from the New Public Order and New Life Movement, there was no direct anti-
corruption institution and activity to speak of during the period of the 6th Republic. 
However, as a way to reform administration, strict operations of the Central 
Disciplinary Commission and thorough management and guidance of services were 
emphasized, and the Government's Collaborative Special Supervisory Team was 
established and operated in the office of the Prime Minister.214 But, most of the policies 
were just presented as temporary and these circumstance adaptive policies failed to 
develop into concrete institutions to suppress bureaucratic corruption. 
4-7. Institutionalization in the Seventh Republic of Korea 
The election of President Kim, Young-Sam in 1992 meant a birth of a civil government 
terminating the governing of Korea by the military that had been going on for more than 
30years. Unlike past governments, the Kim, Young-Sam government was characterized 
by the fact that it did not lack legitimacy. For the first time a civilian government had 
been directly elected by the people in a free vote and the opposition had acknowledged 
their defeat and accepted the result. 
Based on such a restoration of legitimacy, the Government of the Seventh republic gave 
a general name as a 'Korean disease' to the remnants left by past governments such as 
wrong practices, institutions and senses and exerted political efforts to remove them and 
213 Kim Ho -Jin, ibid, pp.275-277 
214 The Office for Government Policy Coordination, The history of thirty years of the 
Office for Government Policy Coordination, June 2003 
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especially. In particular, it implemented bold reformation policies under the flag of the 
creation of a new Korea. These reformation policies were implemented under three 
principles; first, the principle of consistency, second, powerful practices and third, the 
principle of the private sector's initiative. 
The Seventh Republic took decisive steps to institutionalise several systems in order 
to control corruption. 
First of all, the republic equipped organizations related to corruption control, in order 
to keep up daring and constant anti-corruption activities. As if to underscore his 
determination to eradicate misconduct and corruption, (the new President's top priority 
as stated in his inaugural address,) President Kim also made the widely praised 
appointment of Lee Hoi-Chang as chairman of the Board of Audits and Inspections, 
another Presidential agency. Lee, a former Supreme Court Justice, was well known for 
his integrity and courage, as well as his intelligence. Emphasising that the Board was an 
independent constitutional organ, Lee declared that it would not bow to any political 
pressures and that there would be no "sanctuary" from the board's work. 215 
Besides the aforementioned, in April 1993, the government had organized and 
operated the Committee for Corruption Prevention Policies, which was enlisted under 
the banner of the Board of Audit and Inspection and wholly responsible for prevention 
of the abuse of power and graft. The committee was a consultative body that aimed at 
gathering in-depth and professional opinions from notables representing various social 
circles in order to root out elements of irregularities and corruption in the public sector 
and report it to the chairman of the Board of Audit and Inspection. The committee 
215 The Board of Audit and Inspection, The history of 50 years Audit and Inspection, 
2000 
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mainly analyzed the ongln of irregularity and graft, and studied policies for its 
prevention. The committee also deliberated reform programs of the laws and institutions 
triggering corruption, improvements to the system and directions of governmental audit 
management to relieve corruption. In other words, the committee had three functions; 
research on the actual state of corruption, incessant recommendation of improvement to 
the system, and public relations on reformation of character? 16 
The Committee for Corruption Prevention Policies during President Kim, Y oung-
Sam's republic carried out deliberation on 23 vulnerable spheres for corruption and 
preventive measures, and proposed 497 cases of reform agendas. Moreover, it was 
active in various activities, such as open forums, campaigns and public lectures, in order 
for the reform of the public's spirit. Furthermore, a Special Investigation Agency for 
Corruption was installed in the Public Prosecutor's Office. 217 
Thus, the efforts of the Seventh republic on corruption control had shown a new aspect 
in comparison with the previous republics in terms of capacity and depth organisations. 
In addition, the Seventh Republic introduced numerous systems for corruption 
control, which had not been installed by previous republics. 
One institution was the disclosure of assets of high-ranking officials. President Kim 
had repeatedly stated that the "upstream must be clean" to keep the "downstream" of 
Korean government and society clean and free of corruption. As a lifelong politician he 
knew about collusive relations among politicians and businesses or any other favour 
seekers. He declared repeatedly that he himself would not accept a single won as 
political contribution during his presidency. This meant that he would stop the old 
pernicious practices under the Presidents with military backgrounds-Park, Chun, and 
216 The Committee for Corruption Prevention Policies, Annual report, 1994, p. 9-10 
217 The Ministry of Information, Annual report, 1997(b), p.28 
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Roh-of accepting political "slush funds," which they audaciously called "ruling 
funds," and whose existence was an open secret218. 
Kim, Young-Sam took the unprecedented step, only two days after his inauguration, of 
voluntarily disclosing not only his assets, but also those of his wife, his father, and his 
two grown sons-the total assets of his extended family?19 Coupled with this, Kim 
reiterated his pledge not to accept a single won as a political contribution during his 
presidency. 
This single anticorruption initiative by a duly elected civilian President snowballed 
into a moral imperative. Mass media daily highlighted the move and built palpable 
public expectations for others to follow suit. The prime minister, cabinet members and 
other senior administrators, members of the National Assembly, and higher-level 
members of the judiciary hurriedly disclosed their assets in quick succession?20 
The government drafted the Ethics Law for Government officials; the National 
Assembly promptly passed the legislation on May 20, 1993, requiring 1,063 high-
ranking public office holders to disclose their assets accurately and also stipulating that 
additional senior administrators register their assets. Furthermore, these high-ranking 
officials were obliged to report annually any change in financial status. 221 
Another significant reform executed about six months after Kim's inauguration was 
the imposition of the "real-name system" in financial transactions. By longstanding 
Korean practice, as in Japan, financial transactions under borrowed or false names had 
218 Yang Kun-man, et aI., The Records of the Heart of Corruption Structure in Korea, 
Wolgan Chos6u (March 1996), pp. 146-215 
219 Hankook Ilbo, 10 March 1993, p. 4. . ,.. 
220 Na Yang:-sin, Asset Disclosures of Government offiCials, (Seoul: P uibit Pubhshers, 
1993). pp. 279-319 
221 Korea News review, 11 March 1995, p. 13 
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been widespread. Such transactions made it possible for large amounts of untraceable 
monies to circulate, facilitating illicit collusion between politics and big business, and 
the funding of questionable real estate or stock transactions, among other matters. 
A bill to ban such transactions had been drawn up in 1982, during the Chun era, but 
was evidently quashed at the highest level. Again, in the first months of the Roh regime 
the real-name system was publicly discussed, but the idea quickly faded. It was said that 
the business sector feared a dampening impact on the economy. However, President 
Kim surprised the nation on August 12, 1993, by issuing Emergency Presidential Order 
No. 16 to implement the Real-Name Financial Transaction System?22 This clearly was 
designed to assure the transparency of monetary transactions and property ownership 
while stopping tax dodging and tax avoidance on interests and dividends 
The enforcement of the Real-Name Financial Transaction System in itself had a 
sensational response from the public, all the more so, because the system had played a 
critical role in the revealing of the former Presidents' slush funds and state-business 
collusion. Overall, it was public opinion that unlawful financial transaction, e.g. 
briberies, had been reduced right after the implementation of the sy stem. 223 
Other reform activity was the enactment of the Information Publicity Law and the 
Administrative Procedural Law, in December 1996, in order to foster a transparent and 
fair administrative environment.224 This was a typical example of administrative refonn 
activities for anti-corruption in the Seventh republic. 
222 Hankook !lbo, 13 August 1993, p. 1; "Real-Name Financial Transaction System," 
Korea Annual 1994, pp. 72-75 
223 Hankyoreh n ewpaper, 11. Feb. 1998 
224 The Ministry of Information, ibid, 1997 p.27 
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Owing to Administrative Procedural Law, the degree of openness and transparency 
of the republic could be increased through the opening of various kinds of 
administrative investigations lacking any clear legal grounds and institutionalization of 
preliminary discussion between stakeholders. 
Moreover, the Information Publicity Law guaranteed transparency and national 
participation on state affairs by proclaiming a fundamental rule that, generally, the 
information managed and held by administrative authority should be opened, and 
prescribing the responsibility of administrative authority for opening information. 
As a result, those laws raised responsibility of a group of high ranking officials 
headed by the President and increased the possibility of eliminating dishonorable 
government officials who abused public power. 
Three other political laws were enacted to make transparent and fair society. The intent 
of the first of the three laws was made explicit by its title, "The Election for Public 
Office and Election Malpractice Prevention Act.,,225 The length y law, with 277 articles, 
was evidently the centrepiece of the 'reform legislations'. Article 1 of the new law 
declared: "The purpose of this Act is to contribute to the development of the democratic 
politics by making elections under the Constitution and the Local Autonomy Act to be 
held fairly in accordance with the free will of the people and the democratic formalities 
and by preventing any malpractice related to the election." 
The second major piece of legislation, promulgated on the same day, was the Political 
Fund Law, which constituted amendments to the existing political fund law?26 These 
amendments were closely interrelated with the Election Malpractice Prevention Act. 
225 Republic of Korea government, K wanbo (The Official Gazette), 16 March 1994, 
pp.4-113. 
226 Kwanbo (The Official Gazette), 16 March 1994, pp. 113-20. 
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Expanding the principle of the "public management of elections," - which ideally would 
eliminate the need for an individual candidate's private money to run for public office, 
the law provided that subsidies from the state coffer to political parties were increased. 
The law also allowed an individual to contribute up to 150 million won (approximately 
$190,000) to political parties. Under the old political funds law, the limit had been 100 
million won. 
The third major piece of legislation adopted in March 1994, the Local Autonomy Act, 
was another landmark in the evolution of democratic politics in Korea.227 The revival 
of a local autonomy system as such was an important turning point in the evolution of 
Korean politics.228 
Along with the above, the Seventh republic was interested in regulatory reform on the 
recognition that too much regulation hinders a nation's competitive power and brings 
about corruption. The Seventh Republic established a special management law 
regarding the regulatory reform on enterprise activities in 1993. The republic also 
installed a special committee for regulatory reform in 1993. Furthermore, the republic 
enacted the Basic Law for Regulatory Reform in 1997 in order to prepare for a 
d . I ~ 229 permanent an systematIc regu atory relorm process. 
In conclusion, the Seventh republic put more weight on the institutional reform for 
corruption control than any other government that had been before. In other words, 
227 Kwanbo (The Official Gazette), 16 March 1994, pp. 113-20 
228 Chija chongch'i yonkuhwoe, ed., Hanguk hyong chibang chach'i ui ch 'ong sajin 
(The Blueprint for a Korean Style Local Autonomy) (Seoul: Kilb6t, 1995), p. 11. 
229 The Office for Government Policy Coordination, The history of thirty years of the 
Office for Government Policy Coordination, June 2003 
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under the slogan of 'inspection without sanctuaries', the Seventh Republic set up 
system-making to cut the chain of corruption and eradicating non-governmental 
corruption to make clean environment for government officials, as well as cutting off 
individual corruption, as the main part of corruption control. 
4-8. Institutionalization in the Eighth Republic of Korea 
As reviewed in Chapter 2, President Kim, Dae Jung was the first president from an 
opposing party in the history of Korean politics, thus, it can be said that he had no 
political burden to maintain past achievements and practices. 
Since it commenced at a difficult point in time, following the event of the IMF relief 
financing, the 8th Republic dedicated all its capabilities to the economic restoration of 
the country. Therefore, reformation works were implemented to remove structural 
inefficiencies in various areas including the economy but unlike past governments, there 
were no corruption clearing activities in the nature of a national campaign that had been 
ritually executed at the beginning of previous new governments. Instead, the works to 
reform the various institutions inducing corruption were diligently implemented. 
The core of the corruption control activities of the Eighth Republic was the First 
Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption Control that was published on 1 i h 
August 1999. 230 This countermeasure was based on the objective that the Republic 
would improve its ranking in the CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index), published 
annually by Transparency International since 1995. In 1998 South Korea had risen 
from 43 of 85 countries in 1998 to above 20 in 2003. The countermeasure adopted a 
230 The history of thirty years of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, The 
Office for Government Policy Coordination, June 2003, pp.522-523 
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preventive, comprehensive, practical and systemic approach. 
Furthermore, the countermeasure suggested comprehensive and radical prescription for 
various administrative institutions that were vulnerable to corruption after an analysis of 
past anti-corruption policies, and through the benchmarking of foreign countries' 
success cases. 
The Comprehensive Countermeasure consisted of various plans to pursue the reform of 
six most vulnerable areas prone to corruption; tax, construction, building, public health, 
environment, and police republic. Moreover, building infrastructure for corruption 
control, enlarging the participation of civil society, the creation of a friendly national 
atmosphere, and pursuing the project step by step were also adopted as a strategy for the 
success of corruption control. The infrastructure consisted of about thirty institutions 
such as establishing Special Committee for Anti-corruption, enacting Anti-Corruption 
Law, magnifying public information, etc. In addition, the countermeasure reformed 
seventy institutions in six vulnerable areas. 
The second Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption Control that was 
announced in July 2001 by the Office for Government Policy Coordination under the 
Prime Minister. The second countermeasure was announced at the meeting, chaired by 
the President, attended by about two hundreds people including Ministers, governors of 
local governments, and representatives of various fields. The second countermeasure 
consisted of institutional reforms of seven vulnerable areas, which were not included in 
the first countermeasure, such as education, supply, financial affairs, etc. 
For the execution of the announced countermeasures, the Special Committee for Anti-
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Corruption was installed in September 1999. This committee was an advisory 
committee to the President about corruption control such as continuous institutional 
reform and the creation of an 'anti-corruption mood'. The committee had specific tasks 
such as institutional reform for corruption control, the assessment of corruption control 
activities, education and publicity for corruption control, support for civil organisation's 
corruption control activities, and international cooperation for corruption control. 
The committee submitted the draft of the Anti-Corruption Law to the National 
Assembly in December 1999. The draft contained many new institutions for corruption 
control such as the assessment of each ministry'S corruption control activities, 
protecting whistleblowers, installing an organization exclusively for corruption control, 
etc. The draft was enacted in June 2001 after being revised many times through 
negotiation with civil organization and Opposition Parties. This was a basis of the birth 
of an independent corruption control organization and a turning point for corruption 
control in Korea. Finally, the Anti-Corruption Law was promulgated in July 2001 and 
the Korea Independent Commission against Corruption was founded under the direct 
control of the President. 
In addition, the republic needed a policy that could aid the recovery from economic 
difficulty, so the republic considered regulatory reforms as a very effective way to 
strengthen national competitiveness and control corruption. The republic instituted the 
Regulatory Reform Committee in 1998, and started massive regulatory reform III 
collaboration with the private sector. The Committee investigated all kinds of 
regulations of Ministries in 1998 and discovered a total 11,125 cases of regulation. 
Among them, in 1998,5,430(48.80/0) cases were abolished and 2,411(21.7%) cases were 
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improved. In 1999, 503(7.4%) cases among the remaining 6,811 cases were 
abolished.231 
In conclusion, it can be said that Institutional Reform was active m the Eighth 
Republic, although there is the minor critique that the institutional reform efforts of the 
republic could not satisfy the demand of the people?32 
4-9. Conclusion 
We have reviewed how the institutionalization of corruption eradication was done in 
Korea. It can be seen that like other countries that exemplarily eradicated corruption, 
there has been a lot of developments in terms of institutions in Korea too. 
It can be seen that such developments in terms of institutions have first developed 
toward the direction to enhance the sense of ethics and the official disciplines of 
individual public officials, and then over time they have developed toward the direction 
to improve social clarity, increase external participations in administration and reduce 
the exclusive authorities of the government. The infrastructures to monitor illegal 
behaviours of public officials including independent corruption preventing 
organizations and independent corruption preventing laws that are generally said to be 
essential institutions for the eradication of corruption by scholars were put in place. 
Especially, the Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption Control announced by 
the 8th Republic sets out as its main content the rationalizing of unreasonable 
231 The history of thirty years of the Office for Government Policy Coodination, The 
Office for Government Policy Coodination, June 2003, pp. 470-76 
232 Park, Won-Soon, The comprehensive assessment about the Comprehensive 
Countermeasure for Corruption Control, Working Paper, July 2000 
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government's authorities that are scattered in various administrative sectors. 
In conclusion, to remove the structures in Korea where public officials' corruptions 
occur, those institutions that would break the immoral connecting chains between 
various social activity bodies are necessary, rather than the institutionalization at the 
level of requiring ethical behaviours of individual public officials. 
The government-led economic policies must be converted into private-sector led 
economic policies and governmental regulations. This applies especially to the various 
regulations related to approval and permit works which must be removed or (given the 
unlikelihood of that happening), the equivocallity and complexity of regulations must 
be removed to reduce the room for the discretion of regulatory bodies to break in. Also, 
those institutions that can maintain the strictness of legal treatments of corruptive public 
officials must be completed and practices must be improved. 
These anti-corruption institutions may be said to be prerequisites for the eradication of 
corruption. Corruption will not be eradicated just by preparing the institutions. But it 
can be said that preparing rational institutions is indispensable to eradicate corruption. 
In this regard, basic preparations for the eradication of corruption have been achieved to 
some extent in Korea. 
In general, institutions gradually change over time, because a government will develop 
anti-corruption institutions based on those of previous governments. Therefore, it is not 
logical to compare the will of the past governments to eradicate corruption based on the 
contents of the anti-corruption institutions which was handed down from the 
predecessors and thus 'institutionalization' was excluded from the indicators established 
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in this study to measure political will. In conclusion, institutionalisation is another 
separate independent variable from political will, which also has an affect on the 
anticorruption activities. 
Of course, the political will that is immanent in the process of new institutionalisation 
can be assessed by the indicators which are suggested in Chapter 1. 
Therefore, it can not be said that institutionalisation does not have an effect on the 
political will for corruption control at all. The anti-corruption activities of the country 
which has enough well developed institutions will be only to detect corrupt officials 
who do not obey the regulations. It means that if a country has been institutionalised 
enough and the institutions are perfect, (so nothing needs to be changed) the chance for 
the country to show the political will for corruption control will be decreased. 
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Chapter 5: Corruption Control under the Lee 
and Chang regime (1948 - 1961) 
This research focuses on assessing the political will in the corruption control activities 
of past Korean governments. At the time of the first and Second Republic of Korea, 
from 1948 to 1961, there were not enough policies to measure the political will of 
corruption control activities as the country had just been liberated from Japanese 
totalitarianism. It had also only recently established its' first administrative system. The 
nation was extremely unstable due to the incomplete political structure and also as a 
result of the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. Therefore, it is impossible to fairly 
assess political will in the corruption control activities of Korean governments until the 
time of the Third Republic. Nevertheless, this chapter provides the basic elements of 
this research by introducing the corruption control activities. 
During the first two Korean republics corruption control efforts were only piece meal 
and as a result there was a proliferation of corruption activity. This chapter begins to 
outline the core analysis of Korean corruption control and specifically addresses the 
corruption control efforts of the first and second Korean republics. The analysis of these 
two republics is combined due to the similarity in measures adopted by the respective 
republics in tackling corruption. Furthermore, both of these republics were politically 
unstable in societies where democracy had not yet been established. The weakness of 
democratic society is addressed at greater length in chapter 2. The details of corruption 
control efforts and an assessment of their efforts are as follows. 
161 
5.1 Corruption Control of the First Republic of Korea (1948-1960) 
5.1.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 
As seen in chapter 2, corruption was one of the main causes for the demise of the First 
Republic. In particular, it is said that the First Republic collapsed primarily because of 
autocracy and corruption. Furthermore, the Second Republic's rise and fall was related 
to the First Republic's corruption and the way corruption control was handled by the 
Second Republic. 
Political leaders and high ranking policy makers need to recognise in advance in 
order to formulate appropriate policy. With regard to the First Republic's role in the 
management of corruption, we cannot find any evidence of political vision, especially 
with reference to President Lee. It is hard to find any passage mentioning the necessity 
for corruption control in the public speeches of President Lee. In addition, we cannot 
find any evidence that they dealt with the corruption issue as part of the main policy 
agenda. A lack of governmental concern regarding corruption is partly a result of the 
more pressing priority to build a new country. 
5.1.2 Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 
It is difficult to discover the targeted political rank of the first government's corruption 
control policies. It is also hard to assess political will due to the overall lack of 
corruption control policies. Therefore, the only way that we can construe the target of 
corruption control activities in this republic is to analyse the activities of governmental 
organisations. 
162 
Table 5.1: The Numbers of Officials Punished by The Commission of Inspection (1951-1954i33 
Punishment 
Reduction of 
Type Total Dismissal Suspension 
Grade234 
salary 
Total 241 122 18 101 
2nd and above 8 2 3 3 
3rd 83 30 9 3 
4th 91 48 6 37 
5th and below 54 39 - 15 
Special grade235 5 3 - 2 
* Source: The Board of Audit and Inspection, The history of 50 years Audit and 
Inspection, 2000, p.278 
The Commission of Inspection worked as a central organisation to control corruption 
during the First Republic. It was established on the basis of the first Korean Constitution 
founded in 1948. According to the Constitution, the focus of the Commission's scrutiny 
concerns those individuals liable to parliamentary impeachment. However, in 1949, the 
Commission of Inspection announced that the President and Vice President should be 
exempt from its inspection?36 In 1955, the Commission of Inspection was changed to 
233 Be cause of the lack of statistics of the number of officials by grade, it is impossible 
to compare the numbers of punished officials relatively by grade. 
234 In the First Republic, the structure of professional government officials' rank was 
classified into six grades, from 1 st to 5th regular employees and temporary employee. 
Most government officials started their rank from 5th, and received promotion up to 1 st. 
Therefore, in total, the rank of government officials in a certain ministry consisted of 
minister, deputy minister and six grades of professional government officials. 
235 In spite of the above professional government officials, there were few special grade 
employees such as 'assistants'. 
236 The Board of Audit and Inspection, The history of 50 years Audit and Inspection, 
2000, pp.264-265 
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the Commission of Assessment237 . However, the main function of two commissions 
remained the same. 
In addition, the activity records of the Commission of Inspection show that the target 
of inspection was not high ranking officials, as shown in Table 5.1. The grade of just 8 
of 241 punished officials is 2nd and above. This means that most of the punished 
officials were low rank officials, and the commission focused on detecting low rank 
officials. 
Table 5.2: The Numbers of Officials Punished by The Commission of Assessment (1956-1960) 
~ Number Totat238 Grade 
Total 372 
2 nd and above 4 
3rd 51 
4th 135 
5th and below 81 
Police and other 83 
Special grade 18 
* Source: The Board of Audit and Inspection, The 50 years History of Audit and 
Inspection, 2000, p.309 
The Commission of Assessment, as the successor to the Commission of Inspection, 
targeted even lower rank officials than the Commission of Inspection. As seen in table 
237 Ibid, p.300 
238 Be cause of the lack of statistics of the number of officials by grade, it is impossible 
to compare the numbers of punished officials relatively by grade. 
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5.2, the commission punished three hundred and seventy two officials from 1956 to 
1960. Amongst these officials, just four were graded 2nd and above. Both commissions' 
efforts are focused on low rank officials, which is less effective in controlling corruption. 
It is possible, in part, to assess the political will of the First Republic through an 
examination of how the republic dealt with the corruption scandals of two ministers239 . 
In January 1949, the Commission of Inspection discovered the abuse of Agriculture and 
Forestry minister's authority. The minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Bong-Am Jo 
misappropriated huge sums of money, so the Commission decided to take disciplinary 
action. However, President Lee did not accept the commission's decision and persuaded 
the minister to resign. Two months later, the Commission investigated Young-Shin Lim 
from the Department of Commerce and Industry under grounds of suspected corruption. 
It was alleged that he received bribes and misappropriated government funds. This case 
concluded with the resignation of the minister in question, even though the Commission 
contended dismissal and criminal penalty. These cases are instructive in assessing the 
political will of the first Korean republic in addressing corruption. 
However, this republic punished low rank officials relatively severely. According to 
Table 5.1, over 50% of officials among 241 officials who were punished by the 
Commission of Inspection were punished with the highest penalty of dismissal. Taking 
into account that the most punished officials were of low rank, we can conclude that the 
First Republic punished low rank officials relatively severely. 
To convince the public that contemporary corruption control efforts are serious and to 
obtain public support it is necessary to identify and punish high ranking officials guilty 
239 The Board of Audit and Inspection, ibid, pp.268-277 
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of corruption. However, the First Republic was generous to the high rank corrupt 
officials. In this sense the First Republic was weak willed with regard to corruption 
control. 
5.1.3 Long-Term Strategy 
As seen in chapter 4, the First Republic did not suggest any special strategies and 
counter measures for corruption control. The only thing they did for corruption control 
was to establish organisations with corruption control duties. Of these organisations, 
The Commission of Inspection, The Investigation Department of Special Affairs in the 
Police and Prosecutors Office, became the basis of the government corruption control 
system. 
It is possible to see similar organisations in existence in other countries however in 
Korea these organisations in reality did not offer specialised corruption control 
measures. Therefore, the establishment of these organisations without any other long-
term plans effectively acting to control corruption signifies a lack of political will to 
tackle corruption. 
Their corruption control strategy was not to arrange systematic long-term measures, 
with the stress both on the prevention phase and the ex post facto phase at the same time, 
but to detect and punish individual corrupt officials. 
In conclusion, the corruption control activities of the First Republic were, in a word, 
symbolic and did not incorporate a long term strategy. 
5.1.4 Frequency of Corruption Control Efforts 
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There are insufficient examples to fairly establish the corruption control efforts of the 
First Republic. Furthermore, even the above organisations applied insufficient effort to 
detect corrupt officials. Some parts of the activity records of the Commission of 
Inspection show that the number of punished officials was very small, as shown in Table 
5.1. During four years, from 1951 to 1954, the Commission of Inspection punished just 
two hundred and forty one government officials. This number was too small when 
taking into consideration the pervasiveness of corruption at that time24o. 
The efforts against corruption committed by the prosecutors' office and police in the 
First Republic can not be fairly established due to a lack of data as seen in chapter two. 
In conclusion, it can be considered that the corruption control efforts of the First 
Republic were not frequent. 
5.1.5 Mobilisation of Support 
During the First Republic, criticism by the opposition party was limited by the 
autocratic ruling party, and civil society was not sufficiently established to mobilise 
effective opposition against the government. Therefore, there was no group in a suitable 
position of power to hold the government's corruption control policies to account. 
It is hard to assess whether the republic tried to mobilise the support of stakeholders 
because the activities for corruption control of the republic were not clear. During this 
republic the salaries of government were raised in an attempt to gain their support as 
key stakeholders and subsequently reduce corruption241 . However, government anti 
240 Many scholars mention that the First Republic was corrupt. For the details, see the 
followings: Cho, Young Jae, Han Guk Ui Seo Jung Soai Sin Ron (Government's 
Purification Campaign in Korea), (Seoul: Yool Sung Sa, 1980), p.75; 
241 The average salary level of 4th grade government official was raised from 12,500 
Won per month in 1956 to 20,000 Won in 1957, and 40,000 Won in 1958. The 
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corruption measures failed in part due to the insufficient nature of other welfare policies. 
At that time the salary level of government officials was very low, and the fact that low 
level salary was one of the causes of corruption was generally accepted. At last, the First 
Republic took decisive action to raise salary levels. However, despite this action, 
government officials' salaries did not meet the actual cost of living. 
The government was also doing little to gain public support for corruption control 
policies and failed to involve the public in the policy formulation process. The 
concentration of power in the executive branch made interest-promoting activities more 
rule-application-oriented than rule-making-oriented. Widespread corruption in the 
government bureaucracy discouraged normal pressure tactics whilst encouraging 
bribery and other abnormal practices.242 In other words, the possibility to participate in 
the process of government policy making, including corruption control policies, was not 
high. This can be elicited from the fact that there were not only useful anti-corruption 
policies but the fact that the general policy making process was closed.243 
Wright described the contemporary interest articulation as follows: 
Political activities in general were mobilised and directed by the government. 
They were only very infrequently self-asserting expressions of political demands by 
ordinary people. Opposition activities were usually suppressed and largely without 
effect on policy. Under Lee, there was something of a separation of policy from 
minimum living expense was 40,000 Won in 1958. For the reference, the grade of 
government official was classified from 1 st to 5th then. From Lee, Han-Bin(ed.), The 
Historical Analysis of Korean Republic(Han Guk Hang Jung Ui Yuk Sa Juk Boon 
Suk),(Seoul: Han Guk Hang Jung Mun Je Yun Gu So, 1969), p.505 
242 Wright, Edward R.(ed.), Korean politics in transition, (Seattle and London: 
University of Washington Press, 1975), p.23 
243 Yoon, Woo-Kon, Korean Public Bureaucracy: A Behavioural Perspective, (Seoul: 
Sung Kyun Kwan University Press, 1982), pp.86-94 
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politics in the sense that government policy failed to reflect to any significant 
extent the freely expressed demands of the people. Popular demand-making 
activities and parliamentary debates had limited influence on government 
policy. 244 
5.1.6 Conclusion 
As outlined above, the first Korean republic had insufficient political will to eradicate 
corruption. They did not recognise the serious realities of corruption. The target of their 
efforts was not high rank officials. They did not place much devotion on long-term plan 
to prevent corruption. Their efforts were infrequent with very limited mobilisation of 
public and political support. 
In conclusion, we cannot see any evidence for the seriousness of the First Republic's 
corruption control efforts. In addition, it is hard to assess the sustainability of efforts 
made as the First Republic did not enforce any substantive corruption control measures. 
As described above the efforts of the First Republic could be described as fragmentary 
and not sustainable. 
Placing the assessment on these indicators together, the type of corruption control 
activities of the First Republic corresponds to Type 1, which is the type that has no 
serious intention to eradicate corruption and is not sustainable in its actions to combat 
corruption, in the matrix mentioned in the section 4 of chapter 1. 
244 Wright, Edward R.(ed.), op.cit., 1975, p.24 
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5.2 Corruption Control of the Second Republic of Korea (1960-1961) 
The Second Republic was established by the Democratic Party on August 23rd, 1960, 
and marked the beginning of Chang's republic. The Democratic Party established a 
parliamentary-cabinet style political system similar to the British model as outlined in 
the amended Constitution of 1960. Reacting against Lee's abuse of office the 
administrative power of the Korean State was drastically reduced and its powers 
relatively decentralised. The power of the President was to be strictly symbolic or of a 
ceremonial nature. Executive power was vested in the Cabinet, which was headed by a 
Prime Minister with a Cabinet collectively responsible to the Lower House. Chang's 
regime was ideally based upon the goal of achieving a positive, more democratic and 
decentralised republic. However, the system was not very effective in ensuring political 
stability and governmental efficiency due to the prevailing societal constraints which 
included the socio-political turmoil and unrest created after the April student uprising, 
factional strife among the political elite, the explosion of rising mass expectations, 
pressure for radical change and inexperienced politicians lacking skills for planning 
implementation and evaluation of public policy.245 Corruption in the government 
continued with some cases involving members of Chang's cabinet. In the free political 
environment that existed at the time, corruption and inefficiency, amongst other things, 
made the Democratic government's position untenable. 246 
Within this situation, the Second Republic tried to root out corruption using a variety 
245 Kim, Bun-Woong and Rho, Wha-Joon, Korean Public Bureaucracy, (Seoul: Kyobo 
Publishing, Inc., 1982), p.60 
246 Wright, Edward R., Korean Politics in Transition, (Seattle and London: University 
of Washington Press, 1975), p.29 
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of measures. However, these measures could not achieve the intended goal because the 
Second Republic was only in office for a short period leading up to the military coup of 
May 1961. 
5.2.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages and Frequency of Efforts 
In the beginning, the attitudes of the Second Republic towards corruption control were 
stricter than those held by the First Republic. The leaders of Second Republic 
emphasised the importance of corruption control. 
President Y oon promised in his inaugural address, "the republic will get rid of 
corruption as soon as possible and conduct administrative reform boldly". Prime 
Minister Chang said "The Second Republic will punish the persons who accumulated 
wealth through the corrupt way in the previous regime. The republic will withdraw 
d d d ·· . ~ . ,,247 corrupt money an con uct a mmlstratIve relorm to prevent new corruptIOn. 
The leaders asserted that the corruption of the First Republic was the product of 
autocracy and the autocratic political system was the other cause of corruption?48. Thus, 
first of all, the Second Republic removed the autocratic component of the President's 
right through revising the constitution. The 1948 constitution was drastically amended 
on the 15th June 1960. The amended constitution provided for an elaborate 
parliamentary system of government. The ceremonial head of the government would be 
a President elected by a two-thirds majority of the legislature. The National Assembly 
247 Lee, Jung-Sik, 30 years history after liberation, (Seoul: Sung Moon Gak, 1976), Vol. 
3, pp.247-51 
248 Park, Yong-Ho, 'Controlling Corruption in Korea: Approach Style of Government' 
(PhD dissertation, Seoul: Seoul National University, 1999), p.80 
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became a bicameral body, whereas it had been unicameral in the First Republic. The 
President would name a Prime Minister, who would be confirmed by a simple majority 
vote of the Lower House, the House of Representatives. The Prime Minister was the 
chief executive and would head the cabinet and the cabinet was collectively responsible 
to the Lower House. 
The attitude of the leaders of the Second Republic toward corruption had changed in 
comparison with that of the leaders of the First Republic, but record of actual conduct 
and the sincerity of attitudes is not enough. This is because on one hand, the period in 
office of the Second Republic was too much short and, on the other hand, they can not 
drive policies forward strongly due to the split of the ruling party. The Democratic Party 
had over a two-thirds majority, but was united only in opposition against President Lee. 
This coalition disintegrated into factions. 249 
As mentioned above, the Second Republic enacted the Special Law for Punishing 
Corrupt Persons in April 1961 which concerned those people who accumulated wealth 
in a corrupt way taking advantage of position and power since the establishment of 
Korean Government in 1948 until 1960. However, only two-months later a military 
coup occurred and subsequently this policy trial ended without significant 
achievement. 250 
In addition, the Commission of Inspection (reinstated by the Second Republic) could 
not achieve its desired goals as the coup occurred one month later after it had 
249 Bedeski, Robert E., The transformation of South Korea, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994), p.22 
250 Cho, Young-Jae, Government's Purification Campaign in Korea,(Seoul: Yool Sung 
Sa, 1980), pp.76-80 
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commenced its duties. 
As seen in the chapter 4, the law of the registration of government official's assets 
which was drafted by The Ministry of Development was also discarded in the House on 
the grounds that existing laws were sufficient to control corruption. 
In conclusion, the Second Republic planned various anti-corruption activities despite 
their short term in office. However, these efforts were not brought to fruition. 
5.2.2 Other Indicators: 
Other indicators to assess the political will of the Second Republic, for example Target 
Rank and Credibility of Sanctions, type of strategy, Mobilisation of Support can not be 
assessed because of the brevity of the republic. 
5.2.3 Conclusion 
Although the leaders' attitudes were more committed than those of First Republic, 
there was not enough evidence that shows a strong political will of political leaders. 
Furthermore, there was a possibility that even the leaders' progressive attitude against 
corruption control was not based on their real intension. but on the influence of the 
social climate of the Second Republic, which was founded on the grounds of resistance 
against the First Republic's autocracy and corruption.2SI On the whole the Second 
Republic passively dealt with the corruption of First Republic. Accordingly the Second 
RepUblic lost the backing of its supporting group and also the support of the people. 
This sequence of events provided the grounds for a military coup. 
251 Han, Syung-Joo, The Second Republic and Democracy of Korea, (Seoul: Jong Ro 
Book Co., 1983), p.141 
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In other words, it can be said that the political will of the Second Republic against 
corruption did not exceed that of the First Republic even though its political leaders 
recognised the serious realities of corruption and had several institutional reform plans. 
Placing the assessment on these indicators together, the type of corruption control 
activities of the Second Republic comes under Type 1 close to Type 3 in the matrix 
mentioned in the section 4 of chapter 1. 
174 
Chapter 6: Corruption Control under the Park 
Regime (1961 - 1979) 
The military coup led by General Park Jung-Hee on the 16th May 1961 toppled the 
civilian government. The military junta banned political parties and demonstrations, and 
planned for a transition back to civilian rule by mid-1963. During this time, Park Jung-
Hee emerged as the dominant general. He retired from his military position, and relied 
on the Democratic Republican Party to carry out authoritarian rule. Park was elected as 
the new President of the Third Republic in 1963. 
In the following paragraphs, the political will of the third and Fourth Republic for 
corruption control will be diagnosed through the analysis of their activities to address 
this issue. 
6.1 Conuption Control of the Military Jootaand llirdRepublic (1961-1971) 
The political will and efforts in corruption control of the military junta and Third 
Republic were much more vigorous than those of previous republics as their activities 
were based on the spirit of military coup which adopted corruption control as a primary 
focus. 
However they did not present obvious and comprehensive plans which covered the 
whole range of corruption control activities adopted by previous republics. Hence, the 
fragmentary activities in those days need to be scrutinised to assess their political will. 
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6.1.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 
The military junta and Third Republic were founded on the basis of the coup's motto 
of 'corruption control'. Therefore, it may be said that the initiative of corruption control 
was far more at the heart of this regime in comparison to previous republics. 
Major General Park, the leader of the coup, was elected as President, so the Third 
Republic was able to continue corruption control measures utilising the same motto as 
the military junta. It can be assumed that this provided orthodoxy for the regime. 
President Park, as a top political leader in the Third Republic, had an extraordinary 
attachment to corruption control and strong leadership qualities. 
First of all, it can be said that President Park had a systematic comprehension of the 
need for corruption control. He defined corruption as a deep-rooted evil and pointed out 
that the reason for this concerned the degradation of government officials and stressed 
the need for certain penalties and rewards. 252. 
On the grounds of his systematic recognition, he emphasised corruption control 
whenever the opportunity arose. President Park emphasised, in the 5th Presidential 
inaugurational address that the people have to get rid of the cause of corruption 
themselves by rejecting injustice and compromise. He also prescribed in the 6th 
Presidential Inaugurational address, that poverty, corruption and communism were the 
three public enemies which should be eradicated for the restoration of the nation. In 
particular he emphasised that corruption was a vicious habit which paralyses the 
conscience of human beings. According to President Park's address collection book, he 
intensively mentioned the necessity of corruption control over thirty times from 1963 to 
1971. 
252 Park, Yong-Ho, 'Controlling Corruption in Korea: Approach Style of Government' 
(PhD dissertation, Seoul: Seoul National University, 1999), p.122 
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In reflection of the fact that prevlOUS Presidents had not particularly stressed the 
necessity of corruption control, he proceeded to mention corruption control more 
frequently. President Park tried to modernise the country on the basis of economic and 
spiritual modernisation, and he emphasised that the purification of government officials 
was the first task to achieve spiritual modernisation.253 
From this fact we can say that President Park's will for corruption control was 
particularly strong. Indeed, most corruption control activities were undertaken on the 
instruction of President Park254• 
This indicated that his political will for corruption control was stronger than that of 
previous leaders and much more conscious to the necessity for corruption control 
measures than previous republics. 
As the President's political will for corruption control was strong, the Third Republic 
presented corruption control as one of the important agendas at the launch of the new 
republic. 
However, even the Third Republic did not place corruption control among the 
principal subjects of state affairs. The primary subjects of state affairs in the Third 
Republic were economic development and national security. However, corruption 
control seemed to be considered as a requirement in order to achieve these major goals. 
In addition, corruption control seems to be understood as subordinate work to that of 
economic development. President Park's 6th Presidential inauguration address 
emphasised that it was impossible to get rid of corruption without economic 
253 Secretary's Office of The President, A collection of the President Park Jung-Hee's 
sEeech, 1973, 
2 4 Park, Yong-Ho, op.cit., p.122 
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development and in this sense it could be assumed that corruption control was 
subordinate to economic development. This meant that President Park had a 
functionalistic position with regard to corruption control. 
6.1.2 Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 
A distinctive feature of the corruption control activities of the military junta and the 
Third Republic concerned a lack of any identifiable boundaries to the object of 
punishment. President Park stressed several times that he would punish corrupt officials 
however high their position.255 It may be said that the republic had the political will to 
punish all corrupt officials without consideration of rank. Actually, for the first time in 
Korean administrative history, two ministers were detained in custody in 1964.256 It is 
not clear whether the republic targeted high-ranking officials because the punishment 
records that classified by rank have yet to be discovered. However, we can say that the 
republic targeted high-ranking officials, from the President's conduct. He ordered that 
corruption control should commence from high-ranking officials at the meeting of 
provincial ministers257. 
6.1.3 Long-Term Strategy 
As we have seen in chapter one, corruption control needs to include long-term 
strategy in order to eradicate corruption completely. Long-term strategy can improve the 
255 The President Park's new year's press interview in 1966, The President's secretariat, 
Vol 2, 1973, p.590; ibid, Vol 3, 1973, p.931 
256 Park, Moon-Ok, 'Republic Development and Republic Ethics' in Han-Bin Lee(ed), 
The historical analysis of Korean republic (Han Guk Hang Jung Ui Ryuk Sa Juk Bun 
Suk), The research institute of the problem of Korean republic, 1969, p.507 
257 Cho-Sun newspaper, 14 November 1969, page 1. 
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environment which is vulnerable to corruption by enacting related laws and establishing 
institutions. This can involve making working conditions transparent and impartial 
which may be achieved by removing particular regulations and reducing discretion. 
It can be said that the methods of corruption control of the military junta and the Third 
Republic did not have enough long-term strategy. The focus of corruption control was 
placed on ex post facto control in that the republic put weight on detection and 
punishment of the corruption which has already occurred. 
6.1.4 Frequency of Efforts 
The First Republic focused on constructing basic government organisation without even 
pledging corruption control policies publicly. The Second Republic could not enact 
their plan due to the brevity of time in power although the republic pledged corruption 
control, as already mentioned. The Third Republic not only pledged corruption control 
but also put it into practise. 
It is a fact that efforts toward corruption control in the Third Republic were more 
extensive in comparison with those of previous republics although the Third Republic 
did not deal with corruption control within the principal objectives of state affairs. 
First of all, it may be said that the extent of punishment against corrupt officials was 
severe. The military junta presented corruption control as a coup pledge.258 For the 
practice of this pledge, an extraordinary act for the reconstruction of the country had 
been enacted in June 1961. In addition, the act relating to the handling of corruption and 
258 A public pledge of military junta was as follows: establishing anti-communism 
system, observing U.N. Charter, Coalition with alliance countries, eradication of 
corruption, settling economical problem, early transferring to civilian government. (The 
ministry of public information, The achievements of military junta for seven months, 
1961.1) 
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illicit fortunes had been enacted on the basis of the above act in July 1961. As a result of 
this act, the military junta detected 1,474 persons who had been involved in corruption 
or election malpractice and punished 713 of the 1,474 before the act expired in 
September 1962. 
In addition, the Board of Audit and Inspection detected 38,141 illegal cases from the 
establishment in 1963 to 1969. Among these cases, 31,068 cases were related to the 
audit of accounts, and 7,073 cases were the result of the inspection on service attitude. 
The average number of detected cases reached to about 5,500 cases per year. This 
means the Board of Audit and Inspection acted more vigorously in comparison with 
other organisations in the past. 
Besides the punishment by special acts and the regular activities of the Board of Audit 
and Inspection, the republic detected and punished corrupt officials of its own accord. 
For example, the military junta released 325 corrupt officials from office in 1962 and 
General Park, who was the leader of the military junta, published special instructions 
urging the 'awakening' of government officials. 259 Furthermore, a special decree 
punishing 5,500 corrupt officials had been carried out in 1964?60 
It may be said that corruption control activities were practised far more often by the 
military junta and the Third Republic and in far greater numbers and intensity in 
comparison to the previous republics. 
6.1.5 Mobilisation of Support 
It can be said that the initiative for corruption control activities in those days came 
from within the government because the activities of non-governmental organisations in 
259 Cho-Sun III Bo,(Cho-Sun Newspaper), 02, Oct, 1962 
260 Cho-Sun III Bo,(Cho-Sun Newspaper), 14, May, 1964 
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the military junta and Third Republic were not active. 
In the above paragraphs, it has been considered that most activities for corruption 
control in the military junta and Third Republic were a reflection of Presidential 
instruction. In addition, the efforts of the Government stayed at the level of government 
alone. In other words, the efforts to install a systematic anti-corruption network 
involving the whole society were not achieved. 
However, it is worth noting that the republic strove to raise the salary of government 
officials to make for an anti-corruption atmosphere and to give rise to support for the 
anti corruption policy. The Third Republic was relatively positive in raising the salary 
of government officials. Firstly, the salary of every official was raised by 8,997 Hwan 
(the unit of Korean money) each as a fixed amount in 1961. In addition, the salary of 
general government officials was raised by 30% in 1966 and 1967 respectively.261 
In spite of these efforts, it is hard to say whether this activity had generated the 
support of the community and non-governmental organisations. 
6.1.6 Conclusion 
Putting these various indictors together, it can be said that the corruption control 
efforts of the military junta and Third Republic were serious in so far as they recognised 
the serious realities of corruption and punished corruption cases severely. However, 
their efforts were not particularly sustainable in that long-term strategy and Mobilisation 
of Support were not enough to tackle corruption effectively. 
In other words, although the efforts of the military junta and Third Republic were 
261 Park, Moon-Ok, op.cit., 1969, p.506 
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remarkable, it is hard to say that the intensity of efforts seen at the beginning of the 
republic continued to the end of its term. 
First of all, it can be said that President Park's concern about corruption control 
diminished as time passed. According to the statistics of the Presidential addresses 
which mentioned corruption control, most addresses were made at about the time of the 
new regime's launch, and these gradually diminished from the middle of 1960's.z62. 
This is evidence that Presidential regard for corruption control had been decreasing. 
In addition, the efforts of government for corruption control were not systematic as 
they consisted of fragmentary activities which used an ex post facto method. Due to 
these characteristics, it is possible to say that corruption control measures in the round 
had failed. 
Table 6.1 Government Officials' Criminal Cases 
Duty-related General Total Total Number of 
criminal cases Year corruption corruption criminal number per 1000 
(cases) (cases) cases of officials officials 
1962 - - 5,148 253,186 20 
1963 - - 5,674 271,725 20 
1964 - - 4,990 288,234 17 
1965 2,662 3,600 6,262 305,316 20 
1966 2,953 3,673 6,626 332,688 19 
1967 3,416 5,007 8,423 359,955 23 
1968 3,317 5,143 8,460 381,918 22 
6th Source: Dong-A II Bo (Dong-A News paper), 25 Jan 1969, page 
262 Park, Yong-Ho, op.cit., p.122 
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We can say through many statistics and materials that administrative corruption in the 
Third Republic had continuously spread. Looking into the statistics, in table 6.1, of 
government officials' criminal cases in the Third Republic, the number of criminal 
cases per 1,000 government officials did not decrease when comparing the number in 
1968 with the number in 1962. 
In addition, the President himself acknowledged the limitation of corruption control 
efforts which is realised in his moves to amend the constitution in 1969. 
"The thing that I lament is that our society is still sufferingfrom corruption. Although 
we tried our best to eradicate corruption so jar, it is reality that it needs more time to 
achieve that. ,,263 
In conclusion, it is possible to say that the political will against corruption in the 
military junta and Third Republic was serious, but not highly sustainable. Therefore, 
this belongs to 'type 3' of the classification of political will referred to in chapter 1. 
263 Secretary's Office of The President, A collection of the President Park Jung-Hee's 
speeches, 1973, vol. 3, p.586 
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6.2 Corruption Control of the Fourth Republic (1972 - 1979) 
As reviewed in Chapter 4, the corruption preventing activities during the period of 
the 4th Republic that were implemented centred on Seo Jung Soai Sin movement. The 
time point where the 4th Republic was established, following the promulgation of the 
Yusin constitution in 1972, was the time point where people's standard of living began 
to be stabilized following the successes of 3 economic development plans by then. But, 
along with the economic stabilization, the Mammonish values and the consumption 
oriented view of living appeared. Also, in the course of government-led economic 
developments, public officials' corruption did not decrease. Externally, the defeat of the 
US backed government in Viet Nam and the communization of Khmer occurred. 
Stimulated by these internal and external circumstances, the Government of the 4th 
Republic began the Civil Services Refonnation Campaign. Practically all activities 
including the Government's firsthand corruption controlling activities were made based 
on the Civil Services Refonnation Campaign and all resources were dedicated to this 
campaign. 
Focusing on this movement, political will against corruption will be analysed in the 
following paragraphs. 
6.2.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 
It may be said that the activities for corruption control of the Fourth Republic had 
become more systematic than before because the anti-corruption movement called Seo 
Jung Soai Sin was a comprehensive countenneasure against corruption. 
The meaning of corruption in this movement included not only a conventional 
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definition such as bribery but also the undesirable attitudes of government officials 
which include inefficiency and offences against the public norm.264 In other words, the 
Fourth Republic pursued to reform all aspects of public office through this movement. 
Government recognition of the harm caused by corruption was no longer vague, unlike 
the views expressed by previous governments. The Fourth Republic stressed the harm 
of corruption using the following logic. The republic thought that corruption hindered 
the unity of the people thus weakening national strength. and furthermore threatening 
national security. Finally it determined that corruption dominates the existence of the 
country. President Park emphasised why the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement should be 
initiated on the basis of this logic at the New Year news conference in 1976. 
"The most important thing that hinders nation building and unity is a social evil 
like corruption. We need to eradicate this evil in order to progress nation building 
and establish unity. . ....... The reason why Vietnam and Khmer were ruined is the 
corruption of government offiCials. Thus, I mentioned that the Seo Jung Soai Sin 
movement should be commenced on the same level of national security. Because 
this issue is very important factor directly related to the existence of a country 
across the ages and countries of the worlcf65. 
In short, it can be said that President Park during the Fourth Republic had a relatively 
clear understanding that corruption is the key factor which influences the economic and 
264 Cho, Young-lae, Han Guk Ui Seo lung Soai Sin Ron (Government's Purification 
Campaign in Korea), (Seoul: Yool Sung Publishing Co. 1980), pp.91-95 
265 The Ministry of Culture and Public Information of Korea, Seo lung Soai Sin 
(Government's Purification Campaign), 1976, pp.65-72 
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social fortunes of a country. 
Concerning the causes of corruption, the Fourth Republic recognised that the reckless 
pursuit of western style liberal democracy as well as the corrupt mind of government 
officials resulted in extreme egoism, and this egoism made government officials 
corrupe66. 
It may be said that the exclusive possession of power and excessive authority of 
government officials has not been adequately assessed in determining the reasons for 
corruption. 
Not only had political leaders' personal recognition of the Fourth Republic changed 
but so had the official opinion of government itself with regard to corruption. As we can 
see in the above press conference of the President, the Fourth Republic placed 
corruption at the top of the list in terms of political importance. 
Corruption control, of course, was not the major work of the government from the 
beginning of the Fourth Republic. For a few years after the beginning of the Fourth 
Republic, corruption was controlled in the same way as the previous government, and 
not the way envisaged by the national movement. However, views about corruption 
control totally changed after the beginning of the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement in 1975. 
Furthermore, corruption control was treated as a matter of national security. 
6.2.2 Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 
The Fourth Republic dismissed 331 public officials by February 1975 which signified 
the beginning of the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement. Among the 331 public officials, 46 
were high rank officials, ranking above Director General, including two Deputy 
266 The Ministry of Culture and Public Information of Korea, ibid., pp.75-76 
186 
Ministers. This illustrates that high rank government officials were not an exception in 
the attentions of the movement. 267 
However, the republic received criticism from opposition parties regarding a poorly 
managed corruption case concerning smuggling in October 1974. This particular case 
involved many high rank officials and these individuals were exonerated under 
questionable reasoning. Despite the opposition party's criticism, it seems the Fourth 
Republic treated corruption more strictly than the previous republic. This is in part 
because the Fourth Republic dismissed the Minister of Construction who was found 
guilty of corruption.268 
Although it is not clear due to a lack of punishment statistics by rank, it seems the 
Fourth Republic targeted high rank and punished corrupt government officials fairly 
strictly. 
6.2.3 Long-Term Strategy 
Anti-corruption measures aimed at government personnel included such programmes 
as disciplinary punishments, training, rewards, compensation and benefits and job 
security. Among these programmes, the most dominant and high impact programme 
concerned strengthened disciplinary actions. This typifies the Seo Jung Soai Sin 
movement at the early stages. It tells us that the overall program orientation up to now 
had been largely punitive and negative. 
With the inauguration of the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement and thereafter, drastic 
increases in the number of the punished and qualitative changes in punishment have 
267 Cho-sun newspaper, 3 April 1974, page 1 
268 Cho-Sun newspaper, 18 September 1974, page 1 
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clearly been observed. The fact, that vast numbers, that is, in comparison with past 
years, of personnel have been removed from the service through disciplinary and non-
disciplinary actions, also bears witness to the qualitative change of punitive measures.269 
There was a big difference between this movement and the previous governments' 
efforts, in so far as it was sustained until the end of the regime. In this aspect, it can be 
said that the Fourth Republic took a long-term strategy, but it is not enough because the 
Fourth Republic did not publish a synthetic long-term plan. 
In conclusion, the Republic launched the nation-wide movement, which can not be 
stopped in a short time. However, the Republic did not publish an arranged long-term 
plan to control corruption. In this aspect, the political will of the Republic in terms of 
long-term strategy was not so strong. 
6.2.4 Frequency of Corruption Control Efforts 
The Fourth Republic took stronger action than the previous republic in terms of the 
frequency and intensity of corruption control measures on the basis of the evidence set 
out above. 
There was no distinctive punishment against corrupt officials before the initiation of 
the Sea Jung Saai Sin Movement in 1975. There were only regular operations of 
organisations whose duty was to control corruption, such as the Board of Audit and the 
Inspection and the Public Prosecutors Office. 
However the republic undertook a massive purge of corrupt government officials after 
269 Oh, Seok-Hong, The counter-corruption campaign of the Korean Government in 
1975-1977 in Korean Public Bureaucracy edited by Bun-Woong Kim and Wha-Joon 
Rho(Seoul: Kyobo Publishing Inc., 1982) p.326 
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the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement got fully underway. Punishment through established 
disciplinary procedures had been vigorously carried out. Severity of punishment had 
been an unmistakable tendency in disciplinary actions. To maintain consistency and 
fairness in the severity of punishment, the government enacted standards for 
determining the kind and degree of punitive actions. 
Table 6.2 The operation results of the Board of Audit and Inspection 
Year Detected Number of Number of Restituted Disciplinary 
number govemme- detected cases amount Punished or 
(cases) nt officials per 1000 (1,000 Prosecuted 
officials Won270) (persons) 
Total 80,879 128,935,764 8,042 
1970 10,532 417,348 25 6,008,671 606 
1971 7,017 436,636 16 4,077,420 426 
1972 7,207 438,573 16 5,479,156 1,239 
1973 10,010 452,054 22 6,731,557 643 
1974 8,220 466,444 17 9,075,088 434 
1975 8,551 478,562 17 21,512,877 1,020 
1976 6,691 502,702 13 28,713,766 1,559 
1977 8,626 519,110 16 25,550,552 459 
1978 9,158 540,658 16 9,366,266 934 
1979 4,867 564,058 8 12,420,411 722 
Source) The Board of Audit and Inspection, The history of 50 years AudIt and 
Inspection, 2000 
270 Won is the unit of Korean currency. 
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The Board of Audit and Inspection detected 80,879 cases of illegal execution of public 
services from 1970 to 1979. As a result of the above detection, 8,042 officials were 
subject to disciplinary action or prosecution. As seen in table 6.2, the number of 
detected cases fluctuated severely in the 1970's because of the Sea Jung Saai Sin 
Movement. 
Table 6.3 The Results of the Purge by Ministries. 
Year 
Kind of 1975 1976 1977 1978 Total 
Punishment 
Dismissal 2,056 8,194 5,117 2,118 17,485 
Pay Cut 5,650 11,421 7,667 6,819 31,557 
Warning 4,950 29,086 31,097 34,397 99,530 
Position Suspension 1,165 2,767 1,730 1,102 6,764 
Total 13,821 51,468 45,611 44,436 155,336 
Number of officials 478,562 502,702 519,110 540,658 2,041,032 
Proportion to whole 
officials 
2.90/0 10.2% 8.8% 8.2% 7.6% 
Source) The Ministry of Government Republic, An republic white paper, 1979, p.12 
The massive purge during the Sea Jung Saai Sin Movement was usually conducted by 
each ministry itself rather than contemporary corruption control organisation such as the 
Board of Audit and Inspection and Public Prosecutors Office. This purge was actually 
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forced although in many cases officers voluntarily elected to leave public office.271 
The Fourth Republic, as seen in table 6.3, disclosed 155,336 corrupt persons from 
1975, when the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement commenced, to 1978. Among them, 
17,485 persons were ousted from public office and 31,557 persons' salaries were 
reduced. Compared to the previous republic, relatively many government officials, an 
average 7.6% during four years, were purged, when the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement 
was activated. 
Along with this massive purge, many kinds of institutions had been reformed as seen 
in the above section 6.2.3. 
In addition to the negative method of punishing officials a positive method was also 
used to tackle corruption which involved awarding exemplary officials. President Park 
emphasised several times that sure penalties and certain rewards should form the basic 
method of corruption control. 
The Fourth Republic gave several prizes to 225,000 officials from 1976 to 1978. This 
number is almost twice that of the number of punished officials which totalled 127,000, 
during this period.272 This signifies that the republic pursued corruption by utilising 
punitive and rewarding methods. The republic also strengthened the moral education of 
officials. 
The number of officials who completed moral education courses increased to 80,000 in 
271 Oh, Seok-Hong, 'A Study on the Seo-Jung-Soai-Sin (Government's Purification 
Campaign) of Korean Government', Hang-Jung-Ron-Chong (The Journal of Republic), 
(Seoul: Graduate School of Public Republic, Seoul National University, 1977), Vol.15, 
Nol,p.130 
272 The Ministry of Culture and Public Information of Korea, Seo Jung Soai Sin 
(Government's Purification Campaign), 1976, p.97 
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1979 from 160 in 1972?73 However, there is some argument about the background for 
strengthening moral education. This argument relates to the issue that the real intention 
of strengthening moral education was not just to control corruption but to maintain the 
governmental regime which had a weak legitimacy.274 
In conclusion, certain penalty and certain reward can be seen as one of the most 
important operating goals of the Sea Jung Saai Sin movement. From the very start of 
the Sea Jung Saai Sin movement, strict punishment of corrupt officials was highly 
emphasised. Equally emphasised was the sure reward of merit which helped to establish 
the sincere, honest and incorruptible image of the public servant. The government 
instituted large scale programmes to search out and reward model employees of ethical 
probity. 
In short, the corruption control efforts of the Fourth Republic were very active and 
frequent with the assistance of the Sea Jung Saai Sin movement. 
6.2.5 Mobilisation of Support 
It can be said that the Sea Jung Saai Sin movement as the main axis of the corruption 
control activities in the Fourth Republic originated from the personal will of President 
Park. He instructed every minister to make countermeasures against corruption in a 
month and implement them at the cabinet meeting on the 7th March 1975. This was the 
start of the Sea Jung Saai Sin movement. 275 
273 Annual Report of the ministry of Government Republic, 1980, p.147 
274 Park, Dong-Seo, The Historical Analysis of Korean Republic, (Seoul: Seoul 
National University Press, 1987), p.566 
275 Oh, Seok-Hong, op. cit., 1977, p.l18-9 
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In addition, most institutions and efforts, for example, periodical purge, the collective 
responsibility system, permanent record keeping, were introduced not by the suggestion 
of officials in charge but under the instruction of President Park during the Seo Jung 
Soai Sin movement276. 
As the above, the corruption control efforts of the Fourth Republic were driven 
forward by the political will of the President as was the case for the Third Republic. 
Therefore, it may be said that the government's corruption control policies were 
undertaken as a result of the president's political will and were not initiated by the 
government on a collective basis. 
In other words, the Fourth Republic was not able to progress corruption control 
measures through due process and with the support of the people. 
As a matter of course, as with the Third Republic, the Fourth Republic raised salaries 
and other welfare benefits for government officials to obtain their support for corruption 
control. Although the rate of salary increase was not so much as in the Third Republic, a 
quarter-end allowance277 was raised from 200% to 300% in 1975, and it was raised to 
400% in 1976. In addition, a recuperation allowance had been included in the pension 
of retired government officials, and a long-service allowance was also introduced.278 
In conclusion, it may be said that the efforts of the republic had its limitations in that 
the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement had not yet progressed to the stage where the people 
actively participated in the movement, despite the fact that the republic had intensified 
276 Song, Jin-Hyuk, Seo Jung Soai Sin: the limit of sympathy(Gong Gam Ui Han Gyu), 
The monthly Joong-Ang, April 1976, p.172 
277 Quarter -end allowance was paid at the end of each quarter of a year. 
278 Oh, Seok-Hong, 'A Study on the Seo-Jung-Soai-Sin (Government's Purification 
Campaign) of Korean Government', Hang-Jung-Ron-Chong (The Journal of Republic), 
(Seoul: Graduate School of Public Republic, Seoul National University, 1977), Vol. 15, 
No1,p.137 
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its propaganda programme in order to gain the support of the people. 
6.2.6 Conclusion 
As discussed above, the Fourth Republic, at the start of the republic, began corruption 
control in the same way as the previous republic. However, the republic changed its 
viewpoint after the initiation of the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement in 1975. Also, the 
republic treated corruption control as primary issue to address within its agenda. It is not 
clear from available evidence but is implied that the republic targeted high rank 
government officials and punished them severely. The Fourth Republic also undertook 
to reform various institutions. 
In Consideration of all these factors, the corruption control efforts of the Fourth 
Republic were somewhat serious. However, we cannot say that the efforts of the Fourth 
Republic were wholly sustainable. 
The corruption control measures of the Fourth Republic, as analysed above, were 
executed on the basis of the President's political will, but these measures did not 
continue throughout his 7 years in office. First of all, there were no particular efforts to 
control corruption in the first few years of the republic. The Seo Jung Soai Sin 
movement that was started in 1975 progressed actively until 1978, but by this time, its 
efforts had considerably diminished.279• 
In addition, most measures for corruption control in the Fourth Republic were 
temporary and based on fragmentary prescriptions. In other words, there were not clear 
and accurate laws that supported the activities for corruption control. For example, the 
collective responsibility system had no basis in law. According to the collective 
279 Park, Yong-Ho, op.cit., 1999, p.l65 
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responsibility system, some government officials, who had no actual legal responsibility, 
left public office on unlawful grounds during the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement. 280 The 
Supreme Court of Korea decided some years later that in some cases the purge had been 
illegal.. 281 The measure to Prevent re-employment, which took effect from 1977, was 
also not legally enacted.282 The end of the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement shows that it is 
hard to prevent corruption if corruption control activities are executed on the temporary 
basis without long-term strategy and Mobilisation of Support. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the corruption control efforts of the Fourth 
Republic was serious but unsustainable. Therefore, the political will of the Fourth 
Republic was not particularly strong. Placing the assessment on these indicators 
collectively, the corruption control activities of the Fourth Republic belong to Type 3 in 
the matrix referred to in section 4, chapter 1. 
Furthermore, considering the contemporary political situation, there is some doubt 
concerning the governmental approach to drastically alter the method of corruption 
control midway through the republic. President Park was taking power on the basis of 
the yusin (revitalising reform) constitution which had many dictatorial factors. In this 
situation, it appears that he required a particular approach to maintain power which 
included emphasising national security and corruption control.283 
280 Cho, Young- Jae, op.cit., 1980, pp.100-108 
281 A judicial precedent of the Supreme Court of Korea(77 Nu 187), 28 September 
1977 
282 Oh, Seok-Hong, The counter-corruption campaign of the Korean Government in 
1975-1977 in Korean Public Bureaucracy edited by Bun-Woong Kim and Wha-Joon 
Rho(Seoul: Kyobo Publishing Inc., 1982) p.336 
283 Park, Yong-Ho, op.cit., 1999, p.147 
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Chapter 7: Corruption Control under the Chun 
Doo-Hwan Regime (1979-1987) 
The Chun regime, the Fifth Republic, emerged as a result of the collapse of the yusin 
regime. That is to say, Chun could not have taken power had not President Park been 
assassinated. As seen in chapter two, the Chun regime emerged in the middle of 
coping with political chaos, through a kind of military coup. Accordingly, the regime 
did not have democratic legitimacy in that the regime had not been founded on 
democratic procedure. It may be said that the lack of legitimacy had an influence on the 
corruption control of this regime. 
Along with the end of the Fourth Republic, the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement 
(Government's Purification Campaign) disappeared. The corruption control policy of 
the Fifth Republic had the same characteristic, in that it dealt with corruption by way of 
a massive social reform movement. As seen in chapter four, the Fifth Republic started a 
social reform movement called the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa (Society'S Purification Campaign) 
from the outset of the republic. Corruption control was the main agenda of the 
movement. Therefore, one needs to analyse the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement in order to 
study the corruption control of the Fifth Republic. 
7.1 Degree of Seriousness on the Initial Stages 
The Fifth Republic defined the meaning of government officials' corruption very 
extensively. All acts against public office standards were defined as corruption. The 
Fifth Republic presented the following seven types of corruption in a cabinet meeting 
held in June 1980; an unjust intervention and request for interests, disclosure of 
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confidential information, graft in the civil affairs office, graft in the taxation, graft in 
criminal investigation, indolence in the official's job and an anonymous notice. 
This means that cognition of corruption in the Fifth Republic was wide, but contents 
and standards were vague. 
There was not a difference in cognition about the cause of corruption between the 
fourth and the Fifth Republics. That is, corruption was considered as a historic 
inheritance. It was considered that the most basic cause of corruption was the degraded 
ethics of government officials and the national institutions lagged behind. 
However, the Fifth Republic thought that corruption was a product of fast economic 
development, while the Fourth Republic regarded corruption as the result of a reckless 
chase for Western style freedom and democracy284. The viewpoint which regarded the 
cause of corruption as coming from human nature was same. We can see this viewpoint 
in the following address of President ehun. 
We accomplished the wonder of national development in spite of the challenge 
and ordeals that we had during the 60 sand 70 s. However, the fast development 
process led to the emergence of contradictions. Corruption of authorities and 
indolence in amongst offiCials are representative examples. 285 
I am convinced that a true banishment of corruption must be performed from the 
spirit of all people. As long as the psychology to be corrupt remains in each 
parts of society and the mind of each member of society, inherent corruption can 
284 Park, Yong-Ho, op.cit., 1999, p.171 
285 The secretary's office for the President, Inauguration address of the 11 th President 
1983, p.46 
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recur at any time286, 
The Fifth Republic's understanding about the harm of corruption was similar to that of 
the Fourth Republic. The Fifth Republic emphasised that corruption was a dangerous 
element which threatened the Nation's and the people's safety. President Chun 
emphasised, at the national assembly for the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement in 1981, that 
the reason why the Fifth Republic placed 'righteous social construction' on the main 
agenda was that because the republic comprehended the fact that a society collapsed in 
spite of external growth so long as corruption existed.287 
The relative importance of the corruption control assignment in the Fifth Republic 
was increased in comparison with that of the Fourth Republic. The Fourth Republic 
treated the task of corruption control as a means of national security which was part of 
the government's agenda, but the Fifth Republic directly put the task of corruption 
control on the government's main agenda as an item in its own right. 
The republic presented two assignments that were the eradication of corruption and an 
innovation in the spirit of the people in order to construct a righteous society, This is 
proof that the Fifth Republic took very seriously the necessity of corruption control. 
7.2 Target Rank and credibility of sanctions 
The Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement was an epoch-making event in Korean history. 
Above all, the target for the purification of the Fifth Republic focused on high ranking 
286 The secr etary's office for the President, The New Year's address of the President, 
1983, p.358 
287 The secretary's office for the President, The collection of President's address, 1983. 
p.310 
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officials whose rank was above 2ndgrade288 including ministers and deputy ministers?89 
The republic made 4,992 government officials leave their office when they launched the 
Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement in July 1980. Among them, 232 officials above the second 
rank. The following Table 7.1 shows this distinction. 
Table 7. 1. The results of purification of government officials in the Sa Hoe Jung 
Hwa movement in July 1980. 
< High ranking officials: above 2nd > 
~ 1 st Minister Deputy 2nd rank Total numbers Minister rank 
232 persons 1 37 34 160 
Ratio to total government 
officials of same rank 
3.40/0 19.30/0 13% 11.3% 
< Low ranking officials: below 3rd > 
~Total 3rd A 3rd B Below 4th 
4,760 persons 373 891 3,496 
Ratio to total government 
8.6% 4.7% 1.4% 
officials of same rank 
* Source: Park Moon Song, 'Sae Sa Hoe Gun SuI Gwa Gong Moo Won Sook Jung 
(The construction of new society and purification)', The National Assembly bulletin, 
October 1980, PP.31-32 
288 The ranks of government officials except minister and deEuty minister in Korea 
consisted of nine ranks: 1 S\ 2nd A, 2nd B, 3r A, 3rd B, 4th A, 4 B, 5th A, 5th B. The top 
rank was the first rank, but on the other hand, the bottom rank was the 5th Brank. 
289 . , P . fi . C .) Dunng the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement (Government s urllcatIOn ampatgn 
which was launched in the Fourth Republic, from 1975 to 1979, the punished high 
ranking officials whose rank was above 2nd were only 0.50/0 of the total numbers of 
same rank. 
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However, it is impossible to confirm that the republic deliberately targeted high-
ranking officials, through the statistics of disciplinary punishment. As seen in Table 7.2, 
the ratio of those above the 5th rank was approximately 9% in 1983 to 1987, but the 
ratio of disciplined government officials above 5th did not exceed 9%. It means that we 
cannot say the republic actively targeted high rank officials. 
Table 7. 2. The number of government officials disciplined from 1983 to 1987 
Year Total numbers of Numbers of Ratio of the Numbers of 
disciplined officials disciplined of rank above disciplined of the 
the rank 5th rank below 6th 
above 5th29O 
1983 5,361 243 (4.5%) 9.45 % 5,118 
1984 4,528 138 (3.0%) 9.34% 4,390 
1985 3,580 173 (4.8%) 9.32 % 3,407 
1986 4,094 178 (4.3%) 9.08% 3,916 
1987 2,991 132 (4.4%) 9.040/0 2,859 
* Source: The annual reports of the Ministry of Government Republic, 1984-1988 
7.3 Long-Term Strategy 
The Fifth Republic instigated a more comprehensive and systematic corruption control 
strategy than any other past governments, even if a law enforcement strategy was the 
main measure in this period. 
As described in Chapter Four, the Fifth Republic focused on activities to improve 
290 The rank of government officials in Korea changed from 8 grade, which was 
1,2,3a,3b,4a,4b,5a,5b, to 9 grade, which was 1,2,,,.9, in 1981. 
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responsibility and morality of Government officials. 
However, the Fifth Republic still had not instituted a long-term corruption control 
measure. The Republic solely relied on the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement (which was 
similar to the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement in the previous Republic) and piecemeal 
measures. 
7.4 Frequency of efforts 
The Fifth Republic controlled corruption in three ways through physical elimination, 
institutional improvement and innovations aimed at improving the Nation's moral fibre. 
Physical elimination is a method that uses compelling forces to remove a negative 
element. In other words, at its core was to punish corrupt public employees. 
The Legislative Commission for National Security291, which was installed in May 
1980, enforced an unprecedented massive clean up operation.292 
The commission installed civil affairs offices in June 1980 to collect suggestions and 
ideas from the general public thus suggesting that they had already finished the basic 
investigation into the clean up. Finally, as can be seen in table 7.1, the commission 
announced on 9 July that they had expunged a total of 232 high-ranking government 
officials, whose rank were above the 2nd grade, and further announced on 15 July 
another 4,760 persons whose rank was below 3rd rank officials that were to be purged. 
After the expulsions in July, the republic continued efforts to get rid of the remaining 
corruption. This second round of purification was executed mainly under each 
291 The commission was installed as a substitute for the National Assembly by the 
military junta after the 12.12 coup. 
292 Park Moon Song, 'Sae Sa Hoe Gun SuI Gwa Gong Moo Won Sook Jung (The 
construction of new society and purification)" The National Assembly bulletin, October 
1980, P.33 
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administrative organisation's own accord. In October 1980, these reforms put the onus 
on re-education of individual inspectors in that ministry who were likely to be corrupt 
or incompetent emphasising personal integrity. 
During this period, corruption control efforts of each republic focused on both 
particularly vulnerable periods of the year and specifically vulnerable professions prone 
to corruption. In Korea, there is a custom to exchange gifts on some national holidays 
such as Thanksgiving Day and at Lunar New Year. In some cases, too much money, 
which can be called bribes, are offered in this period as a type of present. In addition, 
there were weak departments and professions where corruption was particularly deeply 
rooted such as in the issuing of fire safety certification, tax assessment and health, 
safety and hygiene certification. 
Table. 7. 3. The number ofgovemment officials detected in vulnerable period (1982-1988) 
~ Total Total 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Number of 
detected 44,591 9,722 9,957 8,850 6,885 4,790 4,387 
officials 
Total number 647,851 650,914 657,214 670,637 691,670 705,053 
of officials -
Ratio to total 1.5% 1.5% 1.3% 1.0% 0.60/0 0.6% 
officials -
* source: The history of Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement, (Seoul: The commIttee of Sa 
Hoe Jung Hwa movement) 1988, p.174 
The number of the corrupt government officials who were detected during those 
vulnerable periods of time during the Fifth Republic reached to 44,591 persons, as 
shown in table. 7.3?93 The detected ratio to total officials reached to 0.6% to 1.5%. 
293 The number 0 f detected officials is not the same as the number of disciplined 
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This means detection activities during those vulnerable period were active judging from 
that the number of finally disciplined officials during those years was a range of 40 to 
100 per 10,000 officials, as shown in table 2.3. 
At the same time, the number of the corrupt government officials who were detected 
during the investigation into vulnerable areas and professions during the Fifth Republic 
reached 58,241 persons, as shown in Table 7.4. 
Table. 7. 4. The number of government officials detected and punished in vulnerable 
fields (1981-1988) 
Vulnerable Fields Ranks 
Municipal The Above Below 
Police Tax Finance 4,5th 
Total republic others 3rd 6th 
58,241 17,585 11,681 1,959 2,635 24,381 1,127 7,497 49,617 
* Source: The history of Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement, (Seoul: The committee of Sa 
Hoe Jung Hwa movement) 1988, pp.174-75 
The above two statistics means that the detection activities in the Fifth Republic was 
very effective in that the vulnerable period and that vulnerable areas were focused on. 
Along with the above law enforcement, the Fifth Republic enforced an improvement in 
institutions to eliminate corruption. 
officials because some of detected officials can be excused on the degree of offence. , 
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As described in the above 7.3, the republic continued to improve institutions, such as 
establishing the code of government officials' ethics and an oath for new government 
officials, the Government officials' Ethics Law, and the trial introduction of the Real 
Name Financial System. 
7.5 Mobilisation of support 
Just as with the Fourth Republic, it was the imposing power and authority of the 
President of the Fifth Republic that was the most important foundation for the anti-
corruption campaign. Most of the initiative such as the commencement, contents and 
procedure of the anti-corruption campaign started from the order of the President.294 
The Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement was launched on the orders of President Chun 
Doo-Hwan. He instructed the launch of the Emergency Committee for the Protection of 
Country after the coup which he led on 12 December 1980. Also, he ordered the 
purification drive which was announced on 9 July 1981. 
In contrast, the power of civil society during the Fifth Republic was not strong. There 
were not any non-governmental organisations whose activities focused on the issue of 
corruption. 
As described in the above, the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement was the main body of 
corruption control efforts of the Fifth Republic. For this movement, the republic 
installed the Committee of Sa Hoe Jung Hwa Movement in October 1980. 
According to the statistics in 1988, this committee had one central organisation and 
294 Park, Yong-Ho, 'Controlling Corruption in Korea: Approach Style of Government' 
(PhD dissertation, Seoul: Seoul National University, 1999). P.193 
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44,032 local branches which were supported by government.295 
This means that many people took part in this movement, and the republic strove for 
the support of the people, even though people took a sceptical view on the conduct of 
the government given that the government had installed such a widespread temporary 
organisation, endowing it with power without legal grounding296. 
It can be said that the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement received strong public support at 
least initially when it started in 1980. According to a public opinion poll taken by Han-
Gook Ilbo newspaper in September 1980,68.8% of the people agreed with the anti-
corruption drive executed by the government, 21.1 % of the people were undecided, and 
only 3% of the people disagreed with the drive.297 
Even though there was strong support amongst the general public, there was not a 
spontaneous civil organisation which supported the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement. 
Furthermore, the Fifth Republic did not try to mobilise such a spontaneous civil 
organisation. 
7.6 Conclusion 
As seen in the above, the Fifth Republic developed the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement to 
control corruption from the outset of the republic. 
The republic treated corruption control as part of the main agenda of the government, 
but the manifestation of corruption was wide, so the meaning of corruption in the 
295 The recommendation for republic reform, (The Republic Reform Commission, 
1989), pp.157-9 
296 Yoon Jae-Gul, The organisation to be purified - The committee of Sa Hoe Jung Hwa 
movement, Sin-Dong-A, April 1988, p.235, 244 
297 The history of Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement, (Seoul: The committee of Sa Hoe Jung 
Hwa movement) 1988, p.19 
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republic was vague. Besides, it is not clear whether the republic targeted high-ranking 
government officials. It is possible to suggest that the regime and top leader dealt with 
corruption control in a hypocritical manner. They strongly rooted out the corruption 
cases which were related to the previous republic and amongst the low ranking 
government officials. On the other hand, the republic tried to protect the cases which 
occurred amongst their republic.298 
An important factor to consider is the circumstances that the republic took control. It 
lacked a legitimate mandate and thus an anti-corruption drive such as it undertook can 
be seen both in terms of an effort to gain legitimacy amongst the public through popular 
support, a smoke screen as well as a method to purge those that did not support them. 
It is therefore not easy to assess exactly how serious was the republic in its motivation 
and desire to actually do anything substantial to solve the problem of corruption. 
In addition, little effort was put in to sustain or to maintain the longevity of the anti-
corruption drive, again calling into question the true intentions of the republic. 
In the early years of the Fifth Republic, various institutions and measures were 
introduced, and strong law enforcement was in place. The institutions which were 
introduced in the early years were relatively well maintained until the end of the Fifth 
Republic, but law enforcement slowly weakened as time passed. The number of 
detected government officials diminished as the republic progressed as shown in Table 
7.4. In addition, the republic made limited attempts to mobilise support for their 
program. Even though, there was strong support amongst the general public, the 
republic did not mobilise a groundswell of support from civil organisations, interest 
298 Park, Yong-Ho, 'Controlling Corruption in Korea: Approach Style of Government' 
(PhD dissertation, Seoul: Seoul National University, 1999), p.194 
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groups, etc. 
In conclusion, the corruption control efforts of Fifth Republic had not enough 
political will. Putting together an assessment of these indicators, the type of corruption 
control activities of the Fifth Republic belongs to the Type 3 in the matrix mentioned in 
the section 4 of chapter 1. 
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Chapter 8: Corruption Control under the Roh Tae-
Woo Regime (1988-1992) 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, there had been an increasing demand for democratisation 
since the beginning of the fifth republic, but the scale and nature of demonstrations in 
the summer of 1987 were unprecedented. Roh Tae-Woo, the ruling party's Presidential 
candidate, finally accepted the people's demand with 'the Declaration of 
Democratization and Reforms', which in essence included a direct Presidential election 
system under a drastically amended and democratic constitution. 
The Sixth Republic was born on 25 February 1988 after the Fifth Republic had been in 
power for seven years. The people's demand for democratisation and the response of 
Roh were the background to the birth of Sixth Republic. Therefore, on the one hand, the 
Sixth Republic had to clear the legacy of the Fifth Republic. However, on the other hand, 
the Sixth Republic was the successor of the previous republic because the power group 
of the both republics was still same. The double character of the Sixth Republic had an 
influence on the corruption control activities of this regime. 
In order to meet the circumstances of the times the Sixth Republic took it upon itself 
to impose democratic changes and self-imposed anti-corruption measures. However, as 
the social situation fell into disorder from 1989, the republic began to stress the 
establishment of governmental authority and commenced relatively strong corruption 
control activities. The republic restored the centralized corruption control system from 
1990. The republic reinstalled an anti-corruption secretariat of the President in 1990. In 
addition, from 1991, the republic focused on an educational movement that was called 
'new spirit movement of government officials'. At the end stage of the republic, the 
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republic again commenced law enforcement to apprehend perceived slack discipline?99 
In other words, the approach to corruption control by the Sixth Republic was not 
consistent. 
8.1 Degree of seriousness on the initial stages 
The Sixth Republic's viewpoint about corruption was not systematically arranged, like 
the previous republics. So, we need to look into the instructions and addresses of the 
President, and the background of anti-corruption policies of the Sixth Republic in order 
to find out how seriously the Sixth Republic recognised contemporary corruption. 
It can be said that the Sixth Republic defined bureaucratic corruption as wide-ranging 
behaviour that was unsuitable for government officials. 300 The corruption in the Sixth 
Republic included not only general misbehaviours, like bribery, extortion, forgery and 
alteration of an official document, misfeasance, dereliction of one's duty and 
embezzlement, but also the behaviours which lost government officials' dignity. In 
addition, the Sixth Republic perceived corruption as a social phenomenon which 
occurred in the process of conversion from an authoritarian society to a democratic 
one. 301 However, the republic judged that the cause of corruption was in each 
government official, and that it existed, because of a lack of a sense of duty. This 
recognition by the Sixth Republic can be detected in the following sentences in the 
299 A true record of the Sixth RepublicSixth Republic: The five years of Roh Tae-Woo 
republic,(Seoul: The Ministry of Information, 1992), Vol 1, pp.216-220 
300 A true record of the Sixth Republic: The five years ofRoh Tae-Woo 
republic,(Seoul: The Ministry of Information, 1992), Vol. 1, p.229 
30 Park, Yong-Ho, 'Controlling Corruption in Korea: Approach Style of Government' 
(PhD dissertation, Seoul: Seoul National University, 1999), p.219 
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record of the Sixth Republic. 
The process of democratisation after the launch of the Sixth Republic has blown in 
selfish desires followed by the collapse of social discipline. The law abiding spirit of 
the people has been weakened and a pathological phenomenon amongst government 
officials is appearing. 302 
A similar standpoint of the Sixth Republic is illustrated in the following New Year's 
address by President Roh. 
It can be said that the situation which we experienced over the last two or three years 
was an upheaval. A rapid change like a revolution was realized. ..... In these changing 
times, government officials along with the general people can be agitated and feel 
unrest. It is true that some government offiCials who have not enough nationalist spirit 
and sense of duty lived in idleness.303 
Like the previous Republics, President Roh promised to firmly eradicate corruption in 
his inauguration address and stressed the importance of corruption control at every 
opportunity. However, the Sixth Republic did not put corruption control as the one of 
the objectives of the republic. The objectives of the Sixth Republic were self-respect of 
the nation, harmony within the nation, balanced development, unification and prosperity. 
302 A true record of the Sixth Republic: The five years ofRoh Tae-Woo 
republic,(Seoul: The Ministry of Information, 1992), Vol. 1, p.212 
30 A collection of President Roh's address, (Seoul: The secretary's office for the 
President, 1990). P.630 
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The republic emphasised corruption control in order to establish law and social order 
for democracy. President Roh insisted that the establishment of law and social order was 
needed to accomplish democracy, and furthermore, the discipline of government 
officials was needed to establish law and social order. This means, in other words, that 
corruption control in the Sixth Republic was treated as one of the means for democracy. 
8.2 Target Rank and credibility of sanctions 
The statistics of those detected government officials in the Sixth Republic, which is 
sorted by rank, reflected the change in focus of corruption control activities. That is to 
say, the focus of corruption control at the beginning stage of the Sixth Republic targeted 
middle and low rank officials. 
As shown in table 8.1, by 1989 the number of detected government officials whose 
rank is below 4th grade increased. On the other hand, the number of high rank 
government officials, above 3rd grade, decreased. 
However, after the President declared that there should be no boundaries to eradicating 
corruption and that no-one was to be exempt, the republic instituted a special inspection 
unit under the Presidential office for detecting high rank officials in 1990, and the 
number of detected government officials increased. 
In 1991, the number of detected government officials below 4th grade decreased, while 
on the other hand, those above 3 rd grade increased. 
This means that the Sixth Republic strengthened corruption control activities on the 
high rank officials as the republic came to the latter half of the regime. 
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Table 8. 1. The number of detected government officials per 1,000, and increase rate 
~ Rank 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Total 25,887 
36,561 48,374 42,213 
(41.2) (32.2) (-12.7) 
Above 3rd grade 166 
94 297 366 
(-43.4) (216.0) (23.2) 
4th and 5th grade 2,449 
3,801 4,776 4,449 
(55.2) (25.7) (-6.8) 
Below 6th grade 23,272 
32,666 43,301 37,398 
(40.4) (32.6) ( -13.6) 
*( ): Rate of the increase of detected government officials in comparison to last year. 
* Source: A true record of the Sixth Republic: The five years of Roh Tae-Woo 
republic,(Seoul: The Ministry of Information, 1992), Vol. 1, p.226 
8.3 Long-Term Strategy 
As seen before, the Sixth Republic thought that disorders during a transitional period 
provided the opportunity for corruption, and, furthermore, some government officials 
who lacked in morality and ethics took advantage of these chances. This means that the 
Sixth Republic understood corruption to be a passing phenomenon in some aspects. It 
can be said that this type of recognition does not stress on the necessity of sustainable 
institutions. 
In addition, in the Sixth Republic, democratic and self-imposed corruption control by 
government officials was moved forward, and other measures to raise the morale of the 
government officials were taken, instead of building up sustainable systems. 
As time passed, the republic moved the focus of its corruption control to detection and 
punishment as well. The number of detected government officials increased from 1989. 
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In conclusion, the Sixth Republic lacked a long-term strategy. It can be said that the 
Sixth Republic put an emphasis on a prevention-centred corruption control policy 
through improving morality in the beginning of the republic, but, as the republic drew to 
a close, the republic set more importance on ex post facto-centred policy. 
8.4 Frequency of efforts 
In the beginning of the Sixth Republic, the republic suggested democratic and self-
imposed control of corruption by government officials in order to root out corruption 
radically. Therefore, it was natural that there were not enough measures in this relatively 
passive standpoint. In this period, the republic focused on policies not to enforce the 
detection of corruption but to lessen the opportunity for corruption. It can be said that 
this position came from the evaluation of the previous republics' corruption control 
policies. The Sixth Republic judged the causes of failure of the previous republics' 
efforts to eradicate corruption to be that the corruption control effort itself had the 
following shortcomings304. 
First, the political will of high rank officials for corruption control was not strong. 
Second, the authoritarian agencies, that is, corruption control agencies, were frequently 
contaminated with corruption themselves. 
Third, the republic lost the confidence of the public because of its authoritarian 
character and slogan-centred efforts. 
Fourth, corruption control efforts were commenced on an individual case by case basis. 
Fifth, corruption control efforts were law enforcement-centred. 
Sixth, corruption control efforts were criticised because of the utilization of it for the 
304 A true record of the Sixth Republic: The five years ofRoh Tae-Woo 
republic,(Seoul: The Ministry of Information, 1992), Vol. 1, p.212 
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maintenance of the regime. 
With this recognition, the Sixth Republic intended to divert the direction of corruption 
control efforts to democratic and self-imposed control. President Roh emphasised the 
need for efforts to get the morality and responsibility of government officials 
themselves at the New Year's Press Conference in 1990.305 
As democracy can not be achieved by force, the discipline of government 
offiCials should be established autonomously. ...... Not only democratising but 
also making a new atmosphere not heteronomously but autonomously amongst 
government officials to fulfil their responsibilities 
The Sixth Republic established a new objective for corruption control, which was the 
construction of a democratic, ethical and responsible government. For this objective, the 
Sixth Republic set four practicable sub-objectives, which were democratic corruption 
control, responsible corruption control, preventative corruption control and helpful 
corruption control. 306 
Democratic corruption control meant that corruption control activities should be 
carried out by democratic means. In other words, the public and government officials' 
opinion about how the republic should control corruption was reflected in the control 
efforts. 
305 A collection of President Roh's address, (Seoul: The secretary's office for the 
President, 1990), pp.630-1 
306 A true record of the Sixth Republic: The five years of Roh Tae-Woo republic,(Seoul: 
The Ministry of Information, 1992), Vol. 1, pp.215-16 
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Responsible corruption control meant that the chief of each governmental organisation 
should be responsible on his own for corruption control. Until the Sixth Republic, 
corruption control efforts of the previous republic had been promoted mainly by special 
agencies, like the committee of the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement, not by each 
individual ministry itself. This system had brought about many kinds of side effects, for 
example, the resistance to organised inspections at each ministry, and the demoralisation 
of government officials. Therefore, the Sixth Republic made sure special agencies' 
corruption control kept pace with each ministry's self-efforts. 
Preventative corruption control implied efforts in taking preventative measures before 
corruption could take place rather than correcting misbehaviours after the fact. 
It is essential to punish and discipline corrupt officials, but punishment-centred 
corruption control was limited in that it could not prevent the social cost after the fact. 
Helpful corruption control implied that the republic focused on improving working 
conditions to protect government officials' integrity. The republic raised the morale of 
government officials with the measures, such as increasing the salary levels of 
government officials, and awarding a prize to exemplary government officials. 
F or this new direction of corruption control, the Sixth Republic set up a new 
organisational system. The republic installed an anti-corruption policy coordinator in the 
prime minister's office after abolishing the committee of the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa 
movement and anti-corruption secretariat of the President which were the main body of 
the corruption control system of the Fifth Republic. 
As seen in the above, the Sixth Republic emphasised democratic and self-imposed 
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corruption control in the beginning. As a result, there were not frequent efforts those 
days. However, two years into the republic, it restarted a stricter method of control 
corruption, but it was not even handed. The republic occasionally punished corrupt 
officials according to the political and social situation. It can be assumed that the 
intensity of the law enforcement in the Sixth Republic fluctuated according to the 
situation. 
As shown in table 8.2, the total numbers of government officials detected by various 
disciplinary agencies from 1988 to 1991 were 153,035. The number of detected 
government officials by year end was 25,887 in 1988,36,561 in 1989,48,374 in 1990 
and 42,213 in 1991. These numbers of detected government officials by year show that 
the intensity of law enforcement by year was widely disparate. Comparing the ratio of 
detected officials to total officials of previous Republic's (such as Fourth Republic's in 
table 6.3), the ratio of detected officials to total officials in the Sixth Republic is not 
high. 
Table 8. 2. The number of government officials detected in the Sixth Republic 
~ Total Total 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Number of 153,035 
36,561 48,374 42,213 25,887 
detected officials 
Total number of 
781,346 818,121 854,082 
-
737,225 
officials 
Ratio to total 
-
officials 
3.5% 4.60/0 5.9% 4.9% 
Source: A true record of the Sixth Republic: The five years of Roh Tae-Woo 
republic,(Seoul: The Ministry of Information, 1992), Vol 1, p.225 
216 
According to table 8.3, the number of detected government officials in 1989 rapidly 
increased by 41.2% compared to the previous year. However it increased just by 32.30/0 
in 1990 and decreased by 12.7% in 1991. 
Table 8. 3. The rate of the increase of detected government officials 
~ 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Rate of the 
increase of detected - 41.2% 32.3% -12.7% 
government officials 
Source: A true record of the Sixth Republic: The five years of Roh Tae-Woo 
republic,(Seoul: The Ministry of Information, 1992), Vol 1, p.226 
This trend shows that the corruption control activities of the Sixth Republic were 
intensified from 1989. The social situation of Korea at the inception of the Sixth 
Republic was somewhat disordered. However, the new born republic considered the 
disorder as a temporary upset at a time when society was democratising. Thus, the Sixth 
Republic expected that the disorder would disappear gradually, and did not take 
particular measures. 
However, the republic changed its position from 1989, and suggested a firm 
governmental authority to overcome contemporary social disorder. The reason why the 
number of detected government officials rapidly increased from 1989 can be understood 
in this context. The intensity of corruption control activities of the Sixth Republic was 
accelerated as the republic declared war against criminals in 1990. Therefore the 
number of detected government officials further increased. 
Although the republic showed its strong political will against corruption through 
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intensifying law enforcement in the end, it did not keep its several promises about 
corruption control. President Roh pledged himself to adopt the Real Name Financial 
System, to the reform of the election system to combat the corrupt political culture, to 
the reform of the Act of Political Funding, and to the reform of the National Assembly 
Law in his term of office. However these promises were not realised.307 
Putting together these entire situations, it can be said that the position on corruption 
control of President Roh was not consistent and that the corruption control efforts were 
not frequent. 
8.S Mobilisation of support 
Like the previous republic, the intention of the regime was the main source of support 
for corruption control activities in the Sixth Republic. At the beginning of the Sixth 
Republic, the President stressed democratic and self-imposed corruption control. In that 
position, there was not enough commitment by law enforcement to detect corrupt 
officials. However, after the republic changed its position, the activities to detect corrupt 
officials were strengthened. The republic installed the Special Presidential Assistant on 
Audit and Inspection. Therefore, corruption control was once again on the top of the 
agenda of the President in the Sixth Republic. 
Besides, the civil society had not been organised enough yet to demand a control to 
corruption. There was not a non-governmental organisation that dealt with the 
corruption control agenda. These situations mean that the locus of the initiative of the 
corruption control activities was in the republic. 
As had the previous republic, the Sixth Republic tried to mobilise the support of 
307 Gwak, Sang-Kyung, 'The postponement of Real Name Financial System: the 
collapse of legitimacy of the regime', Monthly Chosun, May 1990, p.304 
218 
government officials for corruption control by improving working conditions, welfare 
institutes and morale308. First, the republic reformed the personnel management system 
of government officials. The government officials who were working in remote areas, 
such as out on islands, were given preferential treatment in promotion. The opportunity 
for promotion was also increased generally. The republic installed new a promotion 
procedure which made the government officials who had served certain periods 
automatically eligible for promotion. 
Salary was increased by a considerably higher rate than the consumer price index. The 
Sixth Republic increased wages by an average of 12.24% throughout its five year term. 
The increased rate of the salary of government officials year on year is as shown in table 
8.4. 
Table 8. 4. The increase rate of the salary of government officials in the Sixth Republic 
Year 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Increase e 
Salary 11.0 13.8 13.9 12.7 9.8 
Consumer Price 
Index 
7.1 5.7 8.6 9.3 6.2 
*Source: The annual report of the Ministry of Government Republic. 1993, p.199 
There is not enough evidence to say that the Sixth Republic tried to mobilise the 
support of civil society in same way as the previous republic. There still were not any 
308 A true record of the Sixth RepublicSixth Republic: The five years ofRoh Tae-Woo 
republic,(Seoul: The Ministry of Information, 1992), Vol 1, pp.232-237 
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Non-Governmental Organisations in the Sixth Republic that dealt with corruption issues 
as the target of their activities. However, the republic developed the New Spirit 
Movement of Government Officials into the New Public Order and New Life 
Movement for the general public. This means the Sixth Republic extended their 
objective to get the support in that the movement targeted the public, even though the 
support was not spontaneous. 
8.7 Conclusion 
The most distinctive characteristic of the Sixth Republic's corruption control was that 
the republic started with democratic and self-imposed corruption control by government 
officials themselves in the beginning, but then changed its position on corruption 
control from the democratic and self-imposed control to detection-centred control. 
As explained above, the Sixth Republic understood corruption to be a social 
phenomenon and emphasised corruption control in order to establish law and social 
order. Also, the target of corruption control in the Sixth Republic was high rank officials 
(although it was not consistent). The republic strengthened corruption control activities 
on the high rank officials as the republic came to the latter half of the regime. 
Furthermore, the Sixth Republic had no long-term strategy. The Sixth Republic did not 
manage the corruption control agenda as a long-term assignment. 
As examined before, the Sixth Republic emphasised democratic and self-imposed 
control of corruption from 1988, (the beginning stage of the Sixth Republic,) to 1989. 
However, the Sixth Republic later changed its position on corruption control from the 
democratic and self-imposed control to more draconian law enforcement methods as 
society was plunged into confusion. 
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From the above efforts of the Sixth Republic, it can be said that the Sixth Republic did 
not treat its corruption control agenda as an important objective or long-tenn 
assignment of the government. 
I n conclusion, it can be said that the Sixth Republic had weak political will to control 
corruption under the justification of democratic and self-imposed corruption control in 
the beginning and was inconsistent with its law enforcement. In other words, the 
corruption control in the Sixth Republic was serious but it was low sustainability. 
Therefore, the type of corruption control activities of the Sixth Republic belongs to 
Type 3 in the matrix mentioned in the section 4 of chapter 1, the same as the Fifth 
Republic. 
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Chapter 9: Corruption Control under the Kim 
Young-Sam Regime (1992-1997) 
The Kim Young-Sam republic, called the MunMinJungBu (,Civilian Origin 
Government'), was (in stark contrast to the previous republics) expected by the general 
populace to be a clean government. These expectations were not fully lived up to 
however, because during this republic there were several grand corruption scandals, 
involving high ranking officials. 309 For all that, it is said (relatively) that the Seventh 
Republic took actions in order to get rid of corruption. 
The Seventh Republic had hardly started its term of office when it launched a series of 
reform programs, known collectively as the New Korea Creation Movement. These 
reform programs ranged across almost all spheres of State affairs, for example, the re-
interpretation of history, and the strengthening of both competitive state power and 
corruption control. Among these reform programs, corruption control was top of the 
agenda. 310 In the following pages, we are going to analyse the political will for 
corruption control of the Seventh Republic on the basis of the analysis of the various 
corruption control efforts of the republic. 
9.1 Degree of seriousness on the initial stages 
It can be said that the definition of corruption in the Seventh Republic was the same as 
the previous republic. The Seventh Republic interpreted corruption very widely 
309 For example, the Minister of Labour, a director-general of the Fair Trade Committee 
and a director-general of the Finance and Economy Service were arrested on the 
suspicion of bribery in 1995 and 1996. 
310 The Ministry of Information of Korea, Change and Reform, 1997, pp.15-30 
222 
including irrationality in service as well as the standard meaning of corruption like 
bribery and extortion?ll The implications of such a wide definition is that it is not easy 
to specify a target to be eradicated. 
However, President Kim Young-Sam had a strong desire to root out corruption. In his 
twenty-minute inaugural address, Kim Young-Sam declared that rooting out corruption 
was the most urgent task in his regime: 
We are gathered here today to open a civilian and democratic era. . . . This 
government was made possible by the people S burning desire and noble sacrifices 
for democracy .... Deep in my heart, I have a dream of creating a new Korea. A new 
Korea shall be a freer and more mature democratic society in which . . . human 
dignity is upheld..... Today, however, we are suffering from a disease, a Korean 
disease ...... We must change and reform... Our reforms must start with three urgent 
tasks: First, misconduct and corruption must be rooted out. Second, the economy 
must be revitalized. Third, national discipline must be re-established. 312 
In addition, it can be said that there was a bit change in the recognition of the Seventh 
Republic about the cause of corruption in comparison with that of the previous republic. 
The Seventh Republic considered the cosy relations between politics and economics as 
the most important source of corruption. This recognition had been already widely 
generalised in the private sector including the academic world and the economic world, 
but it had not been officially recognised before that time by any government officials to 
say nothing of President. The change of recognition meant that the government 
officially noted impropriety in a relationship between the power-holding elite and the 
311 The Committee for Corruption Prevention Policies, Annual report, 1997, p.5 
312 Hankook Ilbo, 26 February 1993, pA 
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economic world. 
In addition, the Seventh Republic had a clear understanding that the opacity of politics 
and government officials' society provided the opportunity for government officials to 
be corrupt. Along with these reasons, President Kim recognised Gust as the previous 
republic had313) that the old style practices of government officials and those in public 
life as another important cause of corruption. This recognition requires different 
countermeasures to eradicate corruption in comparison with former two reasons; the 
cosy relations between politics and business and the opacity of politics and government 
officials' society. The former two reasons necessitated institutionalised measures, but on 
the other hand, this latter reason necessitated cultural reform. 
Along with the Seventh Republic's recognition of the reasons for and causes of 
corruption, it clearly recognised the harmfulness of corruption. President Kim Young-
Sam described corruption as 'the most fearful enemy which gnawed at the country', 
while the previous Presidents described corruption as the enemy which obstructed 'the 
unity of the people' (Park Jung-Hee), 'the construction of the society of justice' (Chun 
Doo-Hwan) and 'the realisation of democracy' (Roh Tae_Woo).314 It can be said that 
many kinds of corruption control efforts in the Seventh Republic were based on this 
strong recognition about the harmfulness of corruption. 
The Seventh Republic managed corruption control task as the most urgent and 
important affair of the country, in contrast to the previous repUblics. The 5th and Sixth 
RepUblics dealt with corruption control tasks not as the most urgent problem to be 
313 The Ministry of Information, A reform white paper for Five years of Mun-Min-
Jung-Bu(Kim Young-Sam's republic), 1997, p.241 
314 Inaugural address of 14th President of Korea, The secretary's office for the President, 
1988 
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solved and an independent goal in itself, but only as one of many subtasks to meet other 
goals. In other words, the Fifth Republic pushed corruption control as an aspect of 
tackling the task of national security, on the other hand, the Sixth Republic conducted 
control corruption as an embodiment of justice in the country. 
In conclusion, the Seventh republic had the clear recognition of the phenomenon of 
corruption and its causes, that corruption related to power, and the coalition between 
politicians and business leaders were the source of corruption and most government 
officials' misconduct. Therefore, the government clearly indicated that the focus of its 
corruption control policies was on severing state-business collusion. In addition, anti-
corruption policies were set up as the top priority matter of government's affairs. 
9.2 Target Rank and credibility of sanctions 
The Seventh Republic instituted a broader range of corruption control efforts over 
wider target of culprits in comparison with those of the previous republic. Under the 
banner of so called 'corruption control without sanctuary', all kinds of government 
organisations and their members were targeted. Especially, high-ranking officials, 
leading figures in politics and those close to the President, who had previously been the 
exceptions in the course of corruption control, were included in the scope of 
investigations.315 
The Seventh republic had strongly coped with so called 'power corruption' by 
exercising governmental power without any sanctuaries. Every previous republic had 
been criticized due to their insufficiency of measures in fighting corruption and their 
covering up of scandals. 
315 Park, Young-Ho, 'Controlling Corruption in Korea: Approach Style of Government' 
(PhD dissertation, Seoul: Seoul National University, 1999), p.253 
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However, the Seventh republic fought corruption by disclosing the assets of high-
ranking officials including President himself. 
With the powerful support of the President, the government had proceeded with 
investigations extensively for the very first time at the core of power i.e. Office Of The 
President, Presidential Security Service, the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and the 
military. This investigation reached so far as to expose illegal accounts of the two 
former Presidents. 316 I n the end, both Roh Tae-Woo and Chun Doo-Hwan were 
prosecuted for illegal fund raising of 283 billion won (approximately USD 245 million) 
and 215 billion won (approximately USD 186) respectively. 
In addition, 160 other persons of former and present cabinet members, lawmakers, 
judiciaries, and so on, were arrested in relation to corruption scandals. 
Furthermore, the military, which had been one of the sanctuaries in Korea, was no 
longer exempted from corruption control. 620/0 of Army Corps Commanders and 39% of 
Divisional Commanders were dismissed because of scandals related to big arms deals, 
and two former Ministers of National Defence were sent to court.317 
The numbers of high rank318 government officials who were prosecuted reached the 
record level of 36 in 1993 contrasting sharply with the figures of earlier regimes as it 
. 319 F h . .. h H b was no more than 3 in 1991 and 2 In 1992. urt er more, In connectIOn WIt an 0 
Steel Corp. 's corruption case, Kim Hyun Chul, a son of President Kim Young-Sam, was 
arrested on the suspicion of bribery in 1996. 
These statistics underline that the activities of the anti-corruption campaign m 
316 The Ministry of Information, Annual report, 1997(b): 24 
317 The Ministry of Information, Annual report, 1997(b): 74 
318 Whose rank was above 3rd grade out of 9th. 
319 The almanac of the Ministry of General Affairs, 1997, p.192 
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Seventh republic proceeded without any limits. Also, it means that the campaign 
targeted higher rank figures in comparison with the previous government. 
9.3 Long-Term Strategy 
The Seventh republic implemented two kinds of corruption control efforts at the same 
time in order to achieve the goal of eradicating corruption. One was to decrease the 
opportunities for corruption through such measures as institution reform. The other was 
to increase the penalties of corruption through such measures as detection and 
punishment. 
As seen in Chapter 4, the Kim, Young-Sam government founded very powerful anti-
corruption institutions and took many other actions. Although these actions were 
continued, however, like in past governments, no comprehensive long-term program 
was prepared and no reformation that was powerful enough as to overcome resistances 
from the existing power with vested rights could be implemented, thus the attempt to 
cure Korean disease eventually failed. 
Eventually, although the efforts to eradicate corruption made by the Seventh republic 
can not be said to have adopted a long-term strategy, consequently, the efforts to 
eradicate corruption through establishing numerous institutions were very strong and it 
can be said that there were considerable effects corresponding to a long-term strategy. 
9.4 Frequency of efforts 
The Seventh republic strived to equip the corruption prevention system. In addition, 
just as the previous republic, the Seventh republic continued to prosecute corrupt 
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government officials. However, this was done with far more demonstrable vigor and 
resolution by the new republic in comparison to those which came before it. 
Above all, through the Special Investigation Agency for Corruption, a subordinate 
unit of the Public Prosecutor's Office, powerful detecting activities had been 
implemented in the areas of tax affairs and public health republic that had been pointed 
out previously as areas rife with structural weakness, chronic abuse of power and graft. 
As a result, 16,934 corrupt government officials were detected and 7,511 among 
them were arrested.32o In addition, 3,397 cases and 837 government officials had been 
disclosed because of violations of the law on construction work related to unfair dealing, 
and had disciplinary measures taken against them. Also, over 13 billion Korean Won 
(approximately USD 12 million) in 15,853 cases of local tax related embezzlement was 
exposed. 
Table9.1 The state of disciplinary punishment in the Seventh republic 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Number of officials 7,116 6,223 5,061 5,308 5,689 disciplined 
Total number of 899,826 907,598 905,390 925,794 935,759 
officials 
Ratio to total officials 0.79% 0.68% 0.55% 0.57% 0.60% 
*Source: The annual report of the Ministry of General Affairs, 1997, p.l92 
During the Seventh republic, the degree of intensity of punishment on corrupt 
officials was much higher than that of the previous ones. According to the statistics 
from the government, as seen in table 9.1, the government officials who were submitted 
320 The Ministry of Information, op.cit., 1997, p24 
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to a disciplinary measure exceeded a 5,500 yearly mean from 1993 to 1997. That means 
a 1,500 person increase on the Sixth Republic's yearly average, (4,000), as seen in table 
2.3 in Chapter Two. The ratio to total officials in the Seventh Republic, about 0.6%, 
also increased from that of the Sixth Republic's yearly average, 0.5%, as seen in table 
2.3. In addition, the number of detected officials was sustained with a considerable 
regularly. 
In addition, it can be perceived from the results of the investigations of the 
Prosecutor's Office that the Seventh republic pushed tougher measures than the 
previous republic. As seen in table 9.2, the number of criminal prosecutions of corrupt 
Government officials in the Seventh Republic had increased explosively as follows, it 
was an average of 2,000 in the Sixth Republic, but had risen to 7,091 in 1993,7,938 in 
1994, 8,446 in 1995, 9,389 in 1996 and 10,121 in 1997 respectively. The ratio to total 
officials in the Seventh Republic, about 0.9%, also increased from that of the Sixth 
Republic's yearly average, 0.2%, as seen in table 2.3. 
Table9.2 The number of criminal prosecutions of corrupt government officials 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Number of officials 7,091 7,938 8,446 9,389 10,121 prosecuted 
Total number of 899,826 907,598 905,390 925,794 935,759 
officials 
Ratio to total officials 0.78% 0.87% 0.93% 1.01% 1.08% 
*Source: The annual report of Public Prosecutors Office, 2003, p.132 
Along with law enforcement activities, the Seventh Republic determined the 
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construction of rules and institutions as being one of the important concepts of 
corruption control efforts, and actually committed itself to make them. As seen in the 
above, the assets of high-ranking officials were made public as a result of the 
introduction of the Assets Disclosure System. The Real-Name Financial Transaction 
System was implemented to achieve transparency in financial trade and detect corrupt 
dealings. Other institutions were installed in order to prevent corruption. 
In conclusion, the frequency and actualization of corruption control efforts of the 
Seventh republic had been reinforced significantly compared with that of the previous 
republic. 
9.5 Mobilisation of support 
During the Seventh republic, the activities of civil organizations were started, but it is 
hard to say that these activities were strong enough to be a watchdog to the 
government's anti-corruption campaign. Therefore, the President's will was regarded as 
the main factor to decide direction or contents of corruption control activities much the 
same as it was with the previous republic. 
However, what had been utterly unprecedented were the activities of civil societies, 
notably the Citizens' Coalition for Fair Elections, initiated by Son Pong-ho, a Seoul 
National University professor. This was initially a loose coalition of citizen activists 
from fifty-six voluntary religious, women's, labour, and farmers' organizations; the 
number grew to 250 organizations as others, such as the influential Economic and 
Business Association and student organizations, joined the movement. The coalition 
organized fifty local centres and some ten thousand citizen volunteers, in many cases, 
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college students, and established local watchdog groups to expose any corrupt or 
coercive practices in electioneering such as the distribution of gifts and money or the 
application of pressure by local officials, including the police. There had never existed 
such a large network of grass-roots citizens' volunteer coalitions in the entire history of 
the Republic of Korea. In the past when activists-usually college students-protested 
against corrupt practices, they were often brutally attacked by hired thugs or, worse still 
by "patriotic" youth group members or even the police. There were no reported 
incidents of such attacks on citizen volunteers in 1992. 
Another civil-organisation was the Headquarters of the Campaign for Corruption 
Expulsion that was established in 1993 under the Citizens' Coalition for Economic 
Justice. This was the first professional civil organisation organised by civic groups to 
mainly deal with corruption. This organisation focused on protecting whistle-blowers 
and disclosing complaints against administrative corruption. 
One more civil organisation for anti-corruption activities was the Headquarters of the 
Campaign for Making A Clean Society established in 1996 under the People's Solidarity 
for Participatory Democracy. The organisation was founded with the purpose of setting 
up a clean and transparent society by reforming irregularities and grafts. It also 
implemented a campaign aimed at eliminating corruption and getting into law an anti-
corruption bill. In the mean time, the support and protection of whistle-blowers were 
added to its duties. 
The main activity of this organisation during Kim's republic was the campaign for the 
legislation of an 'anti-corruption law'. With 30,000 signatures of citizens, the 
organisation made a petition to the National Assembly for legislation of an anti-
corruption law in November 1996. However, the petition was not acted on under the 
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Kim republic.321 
It should be noted that the government did not disturb or make attempts to stop civil 
organisations' activities. Therefore civil organisations campaigning for corruption 
control could be established freely and were not discouraged. 
However, there was no clear evidence yet that the government made any corruption 
control activities due to the pressure from civil organisations' activities. Most anti-
corruption campaigns of the government still came out of the President's ideas and 
initiatives. After taking office on 23rd of February 1993, President Kim Young-Sam 
firstly, opened the assets of his family to the public and declared not to accept any 
political funds during his term of office and he himself practiced diligence and 
frugality. 322 
Moreover, most of the above activities from the government for corruption control, 
i.e. inspection without exception, disclosure of assets of high-ranking officers, and the 
Real Name Financial Transaction System, were the results of President Kim's firm 
decision.323 
Especially, the arrest of Kim Hyun Chul, a son of President Kim, in charge of Hanbo 
Steel Corp. 's illegal advance was regarded as an exemplary conduct of the President's 
initiative until his last years in office. From the aspects of President Kim's 
accomplishments, his will on corruption control was more powerful than any other 
previous President. 
321 Kim, Byoung-Jin and Kwon, Hae-Su, The state and assignments of Korean NGO 
anti-corruption activities, the Korean Institute of Public Republic, June, 2002, p.18 
322 Oh, Suk-Hong, 1996, p.337 
323 Park, Yong-Ho, 'Controlling Corruption in Korea: Approach Style of Government' 
(PhD dissertation, Seoul: Seoul National University, 1999), p.270 
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The Seventh republic also made efforts in order to raise supports from inside of the 
government, that is, government officials, for administrative reform and corruption 
control. 
Firstly, a 4-year plan for the increase of government officials' salary was made and all 
sorts of expenses in office were increased to a realistic level. Another plan, which 
provided capital to government officials who did not have their own house, also was 
proposed. 
However, generally, the betterment of labour conditions of government officials 
during the Seventh republic was not as strong as the 6th one. During the Sixth 
Republic, the wages of government officials usually recorded an annual average of a 
two-digit increase, this in contrast to only a 4% average annual increase in payments 
during the Seventh republic. 324 
Overall, it is obvious that the endeavours to obtain support from outside of the 
government, e.g. civil groups, were not enough, in that the government did not accept 
the request for legislation of an anti-corruption law from the civil groups. Also, it can be 
assumed that the Government did not get sufficient support off the government officials 
in that only 12% of the government officials answered affirmatively about the 
Republic's welfare program for government officials.325 
9.6 Conclusion 
After considering all the above analysis, even though the approach for corruption 
control in the Seventh republic was not systematic, and had some commonality with the 
324 The almanac of the Ministry of General Affairs, 1988-1997 
325 Cho-Sun Newspaper, 28 December 1996, page 3 
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previous republic, it can be considered that the corruption control of Seventh republic 
advanced one more step. 
In other words, the approach of corruption control in the Seventh republic had made 
progress in the following aspects: First, the republic clearly pointed out that the issue of 
state-business coalitions, uncertainty in the government service, and the systematic 
defects in process of administrative control were the fundamental sources of 
irregularities and graft in Korean society. Second, the republic declared that corruption 
control should be managed as a comprehensive reform from various fields of society 
including governmental agencies. Third, for the first time in Korean history, corruption 
control had been treated as a top priority of National affairs. 
Moreover, corruption control had been led by the governmental power authorities and 
temporarily organized agencies in the previous republic. However, during the Kim 
Young-Sam republic, more systematically advanced organizations, like the Committee 
for Corruption Prevention Policies, took an initiative to control corruption. It was also a 
critical fact that the chance for civil organisation to participate in corruption control was 
gradually increased from the period of the Seventh republic. 
In addition, the activities of the anti-corruption campaign III Seventh republic 
proceeded without any limits and targeted higher ranking figures in comparison with the 
previous government. Corruption control efforts in the Seventh republic were instituted 
frequently, however, there was no long-term plan to eradicate corruption and the 
republic did not actively mobilize to get the support from inside and outside of 
government. As a result, there was a big corruption scandal, which brought about the 
arrest of the President's son, in the latter half of the republic. 
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In conclusion, it can be said that the Seventh Republic had stronger political will to 
control corruption rather than the previous republic. Corruption control in the Seventh 
Republic was undertaken seriously, but was not sustained highly enough. 
Therefore, the type of corruption control activities of the Seventh Republic belongs to 
Type 3 in the matrix mentioned in the section 4 of chapter 1. 
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Chapter 10: Corruption Control under the Kim 
Dae-Jung Regime (1998-2002) 
It can be said that the corruption control efforts of Kim Dae-Jung's Republic, the Eighth 
Republic, differed somewhat between the early and the latter parts of the republic. 
The Eighth Republic was launched in the circumstances of an IMF bailout. The IMF 
provided the bailout in December 1997 on the conditions that Korean Government 
should adopt a belt-tightening economic policy and several systemic reformations. The 
belt-tightening economic policy included a tight money policy, maintaining a high 
interest rate, and slow economic growth. The system reforms included a structural 
reform of financial institutions through developing sound finance, the reform of 
corporate governance, a free trade policy, an open-capital market policy and a flexible 
labour market. 326 
Under these circumstances, the Eighth Republic advocated parallel developments 
between democracy and market economy, and put its heart and soul into the structural 
reform of major four areas; the public sector, finance, the labour market, and 
conglomerates. 
In the public sector reform, the republic intended a small but effective government. To 
this end, government reform work in the initial stages was focused on efficiency rather 
than transparency and impartiality. Therefore, transparency and impartiality, which are 
the core values for corruption control, were relatively neglected. 
The corruption control efforts of the initial stage of the Eighth Republic stressed 
326 Jung, Moon-Gun, 'The evaluation of the efficiency of IMF program' in The 
evaluation and task one year after IMF bail out, (Seoul: Korea Economic Research 
Institute, 1999), pp.4 7 -61 
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weeding out incompetent and corrupt government officials. Especially, it focused on 
middle and low rank officials. Institutional reform was not more than what was required 
of the moment to deal with an occasional corruption scandal. It was not synthetic and 
systematic but sporadic. 
However, the republic announced the Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption 
Control in August 1999. It was the turning point of corruption control of Eighth 
Republic. The Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption Control was based on the 
results of the researches of nine private research teams and became the framework for 
corruption control of the Eighth Republic. 
10 .1 Degree of Seriousness in the Initial Stages 
As seen in the above, it can be said that the Eighth Republic did not recognise the 
serious realities of corruption in the early years of its tenure. In contrast to the previous 
President, whose inauguration speech had laid great stress on corruption control, Kim 
Dae-Jung did not suggest corruption control as a direct task of new government during 
his inauguration speech. 
Kim Dae -Jung had a recognition that corruption occurs because of structural reasons in 
a society. This can be shown from his words at the inauguration speech. He mentioned 
that corruption could be eradicated if democracy and market economy become 
harmonised. Also, he mentioned that corruption can be eradicated if participative 
democracy is realised from political reform, and, accordingly, the government becomes 
transparent. 327 
327 A collection of President Kim Dae-Jung's address, Vol. 1, The secretary's office for 
the President, 1999. pp.61-62 
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However, it can be said that the harmful influence of corruption and the difficulty of 
corruption control had been recognised properly. President Kim Dae-Jung emphasized 
the harmful influence of corruption and the difficulty of corruption control at the 
promulgation ceremony of Corruption Prevention Law on 20 July 2001 as following. 328 
...... Corruption control can succeed only when the government officials and all public 
commit exhaustively together. ............ Also, if corruption has not been eradicated, 
economic and social development and restoration of humanity cannot be 
achieved. ......... . 
In addition, judging from the process of the establishment of the Comprehensive 
Countermeasure for Corruption Control, it can be said that the republic investigated 
corruption control methods more deeply and widely than any other previous republic. 
The republic made the countermeasure through extensive research consigned to private 
research companies. Moreover, the republic made the comprehensive countermeasure 
twice, in contrast to the previous republics that did not take countermeasures even once. 
However, judging from the many kinds of government materials published, (like the 
White Papers of the Eighth Republic), it cannot be said that the Republic dealt with 
corruption control as a major task of the Government although the Republic made 
'Comprehensive Countermeasure' that had not been made by any other previous 
republic. 'Corruption Control' was not included in the objectives of the Eighth 
328 A collection of President Kim Dae-Jung's address, Vol. 1, The secretary's office for 
the President, 1999. pp.349-350 
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Republic. 329 Furthermore, judging from the motive of the Comprehensive 
Countermeasure, it can be said that the republic did not start to make the 
Comprehensive Countermeasure by itself. The Comprehensive Countermeasure was 
instigated by World Bank with 845,000 dollars?30 Therefore, it cannot be said that the 
Eighth Republic recognised the serious realities of corruption. 
10.2. Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 
It can be said that the corruption control of Kim Dae-Jung's republic was more aimed at 
low rank officials than high rank officials. 
First, the corruption of high rank officials had not been punished strictly similarly to 
the other previous republics. The corruption cases that the republic detected and high 
rank officials involved were as follows; the corruption case of the head of civil petitions 
of the ruling party33 \ the corruption case of lawyer Lee J ong -Ki 332, the corruption case 
of the wife of the Ministry of Justice333. The republic did not punish strictly the involved 
officials including the Minister of justice in the above cases334. From these series of 
cases, it can be said that the Eighth Republic was not strict on high rank officials, 
although the two sons of the President were arrested on the suspicion of bribery in July 
2002. 
329 The philosophy of the Eighth Republic, The secretary's office for the President, 
1999. pp.21-23 
330 The history of thirty years of the Office for Government Policy Coordination, The 
Office for Government Policy Coordination, June 2003, p.522 
331 This was the case that the head of civil petitions of ruling party received graft from 
many petitioners and put pressure on government high rank officials. 
332 This was the case that lawyer Lee gave a bribe to many public prosecutors when 
they moved to other position. 
333 This was the case that the wife of a big corporation bought high price clothes for the 
wife of the Ministry of Justice. 
334 This arrest was regarded as a result of the pressure of public opinion. 
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However, the republic was very strict on officials from the middle ranks and below. The 
republic established 'a countermeasure against the corruption of middle and below rank 
officials' in 1999. In this countermeasure, the republic stressed the necessity of the 
control of chronic corruption which was deep-rooted in middle and lower rank officials. 
Furthermore, the republic contended that the corruption of high rank officials was 
already sufficiently lessened when the republic explained the motivation for the 
countermeasure against the corruption of middle and below rank officials.335 
Therefore, it can be said that the Eighth Republic did not have enough political will to 
target high rank officials. 
10.3 Long-Term Strategy 
As described in Chapter 4, the core of the corruption control activities of the Eighth 
Republic was the Comprehensive Countermeasures for Corruption Control that were 
published twice in the period of the Republic. The countermeasures were long-term 
plans which adopted a preventative, comprehensive, practical and systemic approach. 
These kinds of long-term plans are the first long-term corruption control plans in 
Korean government. 
As described in the above Chapter 4, the countermeasure suggested comprehensive and 
radical prescription for various administrative institutions that needs long-term 
commitment to those prescriptions. In conclusion, it can be said that a Long-Term 
335 Park, Jung-Hoon, 'The contents and assessment of the people's government(Eighth 
Republic)' corruption control', The Korea public republic journal, (Seoul: The Korea 
Institute of Public Republic, 1999 Winter), p.116 
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Strategy was most active in the Eighth Republic among the Korean republics.336 
10.4 Frequency of Efforts 
As seen above, the corruption control of the Eighth Republic had different phases 
between the earlier and the later periods of the regime. The corruption control of the 
earlier half in the Eighth Republic was not much more than a fragmentary response 
against individual cases of corruption as they occurred. 
The detailed corruption control activities in the former period are as follows. 337 
First of all, the republic tried to punish corrupt high ranking officials including 
politicians, who were related to the corruption cases that had occurred in the previous 
seventh republic, through strict investigation. 
Secondly, discipline among middle and below ranking officials was enforced. 
Thirdly, a special office for reporting corruption was opened at public prosecutor's 
office all over the country, and ten articles that government officials were obliged to 
comply with were established. The ten articles were 1) a ban on the acceptance of 
money for congratulation or condolences 2) a ban on the acceptance of free meals and 
free golf 3) a ban on the receiving of flowers or plants for congratulation or condolences 
4) a ban on the acceptance of farewell money 5) a ban on receiving a present that cost 
over fifty thousand Won (about twenty five pounds) 6) a ban on the use an official 
vehicle by government officials' family 7) a ban against weddings at a luxury hotel 8) a 
336 Park, Won-Soon, The comprehensive assessment about the Comprehensive 
Countermeasure for Corruption Control, Working Paper, July 2000 
337 Park, Jae-Wan, 'The assessment and problem of anti-corruption policies' , Social 
Science Review (Yonsei University, Seoul) Vol. 30, 1999, pp. 246-252 
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ban against the use of a luxury entertainment spot 9) prohibition of high ranking 
officials' wives gathering together 10) a ban against joining political parties and against 
donating to politician's campaigns. These articles were severely criticized because they 
went against the traditional Confucian customs of Korea. Especially, a ban on accepting 
money for congratulation or condolences was much criticized, so finally the ban was 
applied only to first rank officials and Ministers and deputy Ministers. 
Fourthly, the making public of the military service records of first and above rank 
government officials and their family was introduced in 1999. This was introduced 
because of the growing scandal that many high-class members of society had been 
paying a bribe in order to be exempted from military duty. 
Fifthly, as seen in the previous section, there were many kinds of institutions indirectly 
affected by corruption control, such as regulatory reform. 
Along with these institutional reforms, there was detection and punishment by 
various corruption control agencies as the previous republic. 
During the Eighth Republic, the degree of intensity of punishment on corrupt 
officials was almost same as that of the previous republic. According to the statistics 
from the government, as seen in table 10.1, the government officials who were 
submitted to a disciplinary measure mounted up to a 4,500 yearly mean from 1998 to 
2002. That is about 1,000 persons fewer than the yearly average of the Seventh 
republic's, 5,500, but still more than the yearly average of the Sixth Republic's, 4,000, 
as shown in table 2.3 in Chapter 2. The ratio to total officials in the Eighth Republic, 
about 0.6%, was also the same as that of the previous Republic, as seen in table 2.3. 
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TablelO.l The state of disciplinary punishment in the Eighth Republic 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of officials 6,140 5,866 4,507 3,682 disciplined 3,898 
Total number of 888,334 875,672 869,676 868,120 
officials 889,993 
Ratio to total officials 0.69% 0.66% 0.51% 0.42% 0.43% 
* Source: The annual report of the Ministry of General Affairs, 2003. p.180 
In addition, it can be perceived from the results of the investigations of the 
Prosecutor's Office that the Eighth Republic pushed slightly softer measures than the 
previous republic. As seen in table 10.2, the number of criminal prosecutions of corrupt 
government officials had decreased a few as follows, 9,413 in 1998, 8,640 in 1999, 
7,602 in 2000, 6,748 in 2001 and 6,900 in 2002 respectively. That is about 900 persons 
fewer than the yearly average of the Seventh republic's, but still much more than the 
yearly average of the 3rd to Sixth Republic's, of about 1,500, as shown in table 2.3 in 
Chapter 2. The ratio to total officials in the Eighth Republic also slightly decreased from 
that of the previous Republic. 
TablelO.2 The number of criminal prosecutions of corrupt government officials 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of officials 9,413 8,640 7,602 6,748 6,900 prosecuted 
Total number of 888,334 875,672 869,676 868,120 889,993 
officials 
Ratio to total officials 1.05% 0.98% 0.87% 0.77% 0.77% 
Source) The annual report of Public Prosecutors Office, 2003, p.132 
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In addition, the republic continued corruption control activities stressing institutional 
reform after the Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption Control was announced 
twice. 
As a whole, the frequency of corruption control in Kim Dae-Jung's republic was high, 
especially in institutional reform. 
10.5 Mobilisation of Support 
The corruption control of the Eighth Republic had a characteristic that the government 
and nongovernmental sector worked together to control corruption. The Chairman of the 
Special Committee for Anti-Corruption did not come from a government official and 
half of the members of the committee came from the non-governmental sector. 
In addition, the chairman and members of Korea Independent Commission against 
Corruption, which was installed as a successor of the Special Committee for Anti-
Corruption, also came from the non-governmental sector. 
Furthermore, as seen in the above section, the non-governmental sector participated in 
the research to produce the Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption Control. 
In addition, after the promulgation of the Anti-Corruption Law, it became possible to 
detect corruption not only in governmental agencies but also in non-governmental 
organisations, because of the introduction of a protection system for whistle blowers. In 
other words, the era had come that the non-governmental sector cooperated with the 
government and watched over it at the same time. On the other hand, with the 
introduction of a protection system for whistle-blowers, the institutional basis in which 
corruption control from inside of government was equipped. 
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In conclusion, the Eighth Republic made an effort to get support from inside and 
outside of government. 
10.6 Conclusion 
In contrast to the corruption control of the previous republic and the early period of the 
Eighth Republic, which was fragmented and transient, the first and second 
Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption Control had a macroscopic and step-by-
step long-term plan. The Comprehensive Countermeasure included all aspects related to 
corruption control such as the analysis of realities and causes of corruption, the 
infrastructure of corruption control, culture and environment, spirit of government 
officials, measures of six vulnerable areas, etc. 
It is hard to eradicate corruption with only one or two measures. Furthermore, there is 
a limit to cutting corruption only by punishment. Therefore it is very desirable to 
mobilise various measures like the Comprehensive Countermeasure. In addition, the 
installing of the Special Committee for Anti-Corruption and the Korea Independent 
Commission against Corruption which were led by nongovernmental persons could be 
assessed affirmatively. From these organisations, corruption control policies can 
maintain consistency through tuning discord between many anti-corruption agencies. 
Moreover, corruption control activities could be neutral and special by nongovernmental 
persons. 
Anyway, the corruption control of the Eighth Republic committed more strikingly than 
the previous republic. It had a long-term strategy. It was also frequent and mobilised 
nongovernmental sector's support first time. 
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However, the republic did not recognise the serious realities of corruption and did not 
target high rank officials. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the corruption control of the Eighth Republic had 
high sustainability, but did not have enough seriousness. Therefore, the type of 
corruption control activities of the Eighth Republic belongs to Type 2 in the matrix 
mentioned in the section 4 of chapter 1. 
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Chapter 11: Conclusion 
Corruption control has always been a major issue in Korea from the First Republic to 
present republic. Every previous government promised to eradicate corruption whenever 
they have chances, but there was not any proof that the corruption was eradicated. 
Criticism that the corruption control efforts of governments were ineffective continues 
to this day. The essence of the criticism was that corruption control efforts in Korea 
were performed for political purpose, that is 'display purpose only', by illegitimate 
regimes and there were only fragmentary responses. As a result of those efforts, 
corruption control policies became ineffective and led to a lack of confidence in Korean 
society in the ability of the government.338 In other words, corruption control policies 
were regarded as a political tool to attempt to bolster credibility to illegitimate regimes. 
As mentioned in the first chapter, this research focused on political will, on the 
hypothesis that the political will of corruption control efforts in Korea was not enough 
and the lack of strong political will was the cause of the failure of corruption control in 
Korea. 
Hereafter, we will synthesize the corruption control efforts of Korean republics in 
terms of political will by indicators, analyse the efforts of each republic and show 
contrasts between all the republics. In addition, we will examine the value of 'political 
will approach' for corruption control. 
11.1 The political will by indicators 
338 Kim, Tae-Ryong, The assessment and problem of the corruption control o.f 
successive governments, The research of social sciences, (Gang Won UniverSIty, 
Dec.2002) Vol. 41, pp.55-74 
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1) Degree of Seriousness in the Initial Stages 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, seriousness in the initial stages is very important to the 
success of corruption control policies. Government should recognise the serious realities 
of corruption and undertake in-depth analysis in the initial stages of their terms for 
effective corruption control. 
The First Republic did not recogmse the senous realities of corruption and set 
corruption control as a policy agenda. As a result, the republic failed to eradicate 
corruption and lost the support of the people. 
The Second Republic recognised the harmfulness of corruption and the importance of 
corruption control. The republic tried to analyse the cause of corruption, in contrast to 
the First Republic, but the analysis was not realised. 
The Third Republic more seriously recognised the necessity of corruption control. 
President Park stressed many times that the purification of corrupt government officials 
was important. However, the Third Republic did not place corruption control among the 
principal subjects of state affairs. 
The Fourth Republic developed a more systematic corruption control than before 
through the anti-corruption movement called the Seo Jung Soai Sin (Government's 
Purification Campaign) movement. For the first time, the republic defined corruption 
that was applied in the movement and obviously suggested the harm caused by 
corruption. However, the Fourth Republic recognised the cause of corruption, not as the 
exclusive possession of power and secular authority of government officials but as 'a 
reckless pursuit of Western style liberal democracy'. It can be said that this recognition 
related to the political situation. During this time, President Park amended the 
Constitution, called Yusin Constitution, on the grounds of developing a new style of 
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institutions best suited for Korean democracy. 
The Fifth Republic started with a more wide range of corruption control with the so 
called Sa Hoe Jung Hwa (Society's Purification Campaign) movement instead of the 
Seo Jung Soai Sin (Government's Purification Campaign) movement in the Fourth 
Republic. As a result, the meaning of corruption in the Fifth Republic was wide, but the 
standards were vague. Basically, the recognition of the cause and harm of corruption 
was similar to that of the Fourth Republic, but the Fifth Republic recognised that 
corruption was a product of fast economic development. Relative importance of 
corruption control assignment in the Fifth Republic was increased in comparison with 
that in the Fourth RepUblic. The Fourth Republic treated the task of corruption control 
as a means of National Security, but the Fifth Republic directly placed the task of 
corruption control on the government's main agenda. 
The Sixth Republic took on democratic and self-imposed corruption control from the 
beginning. The Republic also understood corruption to be a social phenomenon in a 
transitional period, from an authoritarian society to a democratic society. Because of this 
recognition, the Sixth Republic defined corruption as wide-ranging misbehaviour. The 
republic emphasised corruption control in order to establish law and social order for 
democracy. 
The Seventh Republic interpreted corruption very widely including irrationality in 
service as well as the standard meanings of corruption like bribery and extortion as had 
the previous republic. However, the Seventh Republic considered the cosy relations 
between politics and business, and the opacity of politics and government officials' 
society, as the most important source of corruption. Also, the republic clearly recognised 
the harmfulness of corruption and managed corruption control tasks as the most urgent 
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and important affair of the country. In conclusion, the Seventh republic had the clear 
recognition of the phenomenon of corruption and its causes, and set up corruption 
control task as the top priority matter of the Government's affairs. 
The Eighth Republic recognised that corruption occurs from structural weaknesses in 
society. President Kim suggested that corruption could be eradicated if democracy and 
market economy became harmonised, and participative democracy was realised. The 
Republic did not deal with corruption control as a major task of the government 
although the Republic made a 'Comprehensive Countermeasure'. It also did not 
recognise the serious realities of corruption. 
2) Target Rank and Credibility of Sanctions 
It is difficult to discover the targeted political rank of the First and Second Republics' 
corruption control policies due to the overall lack of corruption control policies. 
However, taking into account the activities of corruption control agencies, the First 
Republic punished low rank officials relatively severely. 
The Third and Fourth Republics were founded on the basis of the coup's motto of 
'corruption control'. President Park stressed several times that he would punish corrupt 
officials however high their position. It may be said that the republics had the political 
will to punish all corrupt officials without consideration of rank. The Fourth Republic 
especially, treated corruption more strictly than the previous republic with the beginning 
of the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement. 
The Fifth Republic focused on high-ranking officials for the purification in the Sa 
Hoe Jung Hwa movement. However, the ratio of disciplined government officials did 
not show that the republic actively targeted high rank officials. 
250 
The Sixth Republic targeted middle and low rank officials at the early stage, but 
strengthened corruption control activities on the high rank officials as the republic came 
to the latter half of the regime. 
In the Seventh Republic, under the banner of so called 'corruption control without 
sanctuary', all kinds of government organisations and their members were targeted. The 
republic had strongly coped with so called 'power corruption' by exercising 
governmental power 'without any sanctuaries'. The activities of the anti-corruption 
campaign in Seventh Republic proceeded without any limits. 
The corruption control of the Eighth Republic was more aimed at low rank officials 
than high rank officials. The republic established 'a countermeasure against the 
corruption of middle and below rank officials' in 1999 on the assumption that the 
corruption of high rank officials was already sufficiently lessened. 
3) Long-Term Strategy 
The First Republic did not make any long-term measures for corruption control 
because the priority of the affairs of state focused on nation building. The only thing 
they did which influenced long-term corruption control was to establish organisations 
with corruption control duties, like the Commission of Inspection. In general, their 
corruption control strategy was not to arrange systematic long-term measures. 
The Second Republic could not make institutions and long-term strategies as well. 
The Third Republic did not attain enough Long-Term Strategy. The focus of corruption 
control was placed on ex post facto control in that the republic put weight on detection 
and punishment of corruption which had already occurred. 
The Fourth Republic introduced various institutions, such as a collective 
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responsibility system, to enhance the effect of corruption control efforts with a massive 
purge under the slogan of the Seo Jung Soai Sin Movement. These movement 
influenced corruption control through diminishing government officials' power and by 
making governmental processes transparent to public scrutiny. However, the Fourth 
Republic had no long-term strategy. The RepUblic focused on piecemeal and 
fragmentary corruption control activities rather than on long-term strategy. 
The Fifth Republic focused on activities to improve responsibility and morality of 
government officials through such measures as enacting the Government Officials' 
Ethics Law. In addition, the republic performed the improvement of minor institutions, 
which had both inefficiencies and irrationalities. The Fifth Republic still had not 
instituted a long-term corruption control strategy directly. However, the Republic relied 
on the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement, which is indirectly long-term commitment. 
The Sixth Republic defined corruption to have a wide meaning, and suggested various 
countermeasures including institutional and environmental measures at the beginning. 
However, as time passed, the Republic moved the focus of its corruption control to law 
enforcement. In conclusion, the Sixth Republic lacked a long-term strategy. 
The Seventh Republic took decisive steps to institutionalise several systems in order 
to decrease the opportunities for corruption and to increase the penalties of corruption, 
such as the Committee for Corruption Prevention Policies, Real-Name Financial 
Transaction System, etc. In conclusion, the Seventh Republic put more weight on the 
institutional reform for corruption control than any other government that had been 
before, even though there was not any synthetic and long-term plan directly for 
corruption control. 
The Eighth Republic published the Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption 
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Control twice in its period. The Countermeasure suggested proper direction for 
corruption control in Korea and a comprehensive and radical prescription for various 
administrative institutions. Therefore, it can be said that the Eighth Republic had a long-
term strategy. 
4) Frequency of Efforts 
The First Republic, under Lee, was launched with a relaxed responsibility of 
government officials because of the results of the colonial period. Therefore, the 
corruption control efforts of the Lee republic were meagre. 
The Second Republic's corruption control effort was not frequent because of the 
brevity in power. 
The corruption control efforts in the Third Republic were more extensive III 
comparison with those of previous republics although the Third Republic did not deal 
with corruption control within the principal objectives of State affairs. However, the 
efforts focused mainly on detection and punishment. 
The Fourth Republic undertook a massive purge of corrupt government officials after 
the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement fully got underway. Equally emphasised was the sure 
reward of merit which helped to establish the sincere, honest and incorruptible image of 
the public servant. In short, the corruption control efforts of the Fourth Republic were 
very active and frequent with the assistance of the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement. 
The Fifth Republic introduced various institutions and measures, and strong law 
enforcement was in place. The institutions which were introduced in the early years 
were relatively well maintained until the end of the Fifth Republic, but law enforcement 
slowly weakened as time passed. 
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The Sixth Republic emphasised democratic and self-imposed corruption control from 
the beginning. As a result, there were not frequent efforts those days. However, two 
years into the Republic, it restarted a stricter method to control corruption. Although the 
Republic showed its strong political will against corruption through intensifying law 
enforcement in the end, it did not keep its several promises to adopt institutions for 
corruption control. In conclusion, it can be said that the position on corruption control 
of the Sixth Republic was not consistent and that the corruption control efforts were not 
frequent. 
During the Seventh Republic, the degree of intensity of punishment of corrupt 
officials was much higher than that of the previous ones. Along with law enforcement 
activities, the Seventh Republic determined the construction of rules and institutions as 
being one of the important concepts of corruption control efforts, and actually 
committed to make them. In other words, the frequency and actualization of corruption 
control efforts of the Seventh Republic had been reinforced significantly compared with 
that of the previous republic. 
The Eighth Republic controlled corruption frequently with not only institutional 
reforms like the Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption Control, but also 
detection and punishment by various corruption control agencies like the previous 
republic. 
5) Mobilisation of Support 
It is hard to assess whether the First Republic tried to mobilise the support of 
stakeholders, but it can be said that the First Republic did not try to mobilise support 
from inside and outside of government. During the First Republic, criticism by the 
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opposition party was limited by the autocratic ruling party, and civil society was not 
sufficiently established to mobilise effective opposition against the government. 
The Second Republic passively dealt with the corruption of the First Republic though 
the people's demand to control corruption was high. Accordingly, the Second Republic 
lost the support of people and provided the grounds for a military coup. 
Most activities for corruption control in the Third and Fourth Republics were a 
reflection of Presidential instruction. The Republics strove to raise the salary of 
government officials to make for an anti-corruption atmosphere. However, the efforts 
for creating a more systematic anti-corruption network involving the whole of society 
were not achieved. In particular, although the Seo Jung Soai Sin movement was a 
nation-wide anti-corruption movement, it had not yet progressed to the stage where the 
people actively participated in the movement, despite the fact that the Fourth Republic 
had intensified its propaganda programme in order to gain the support of the people. 
In the Fifth Republic, most of the initiative such as the commencement, contents and 
procedure of the anti-corruption campaign, the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement, started 
from the order of the President. The Fifth Republic did not try to mobilise the support of 
civil organisations, even though the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement received strong public 
support at least initially when it started in 1980. 
Like the Fifth Republic, the intention of the regime was the main source of support for 
corruption control activities in the Sixth Republic. As had the previous republic, the 
Sixth Republic only tried to mobilise the support of government officials for corruption 
control by improving working conditions. However, the civil society still had not been 
organised enough yet to demand a control to corruption. 
During the Seventh republic, the activities of civil organizations were started, but it is 
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hard to say that these activities were strong enough to be a watchdog to the 
government's anti-corruption campaign. The President's will was still regarded as the 
main factor to decide direction and contents of corruption control activities much the 
same as it was with the previous republic. Overall, it is obvious that the endeavours to 
obtain support from inside and outside of the government, e.g. government officials and 
civil groups, were not enough. 
The Eighth Republic made an effort to get support from the inside and outside of 
government. The non-governmental sector participated in the research to produce the 
Comprehensive Countermeasure for Corruption Control and the committee to control 
corruption. In short, the government and nongovernmental sectors worked together to 
control corruption in the Eighth Republic. 
6) Conclusion 
Putting the above analysis by indicators, we can understand the development of 
corruption control efforts in Korea. 
As we expected, the result of assessment by indicators from the First Republic to the 
Eighth Republic was of that of dissatisfaction. Not one single indicator shows a 
consistently high enough score. 
First of all, the recognition on the serious realities of corruption was not in the First 
Republic, but it became stronger as republics changed to new republics and re-
weakened at the Eighth Republic. The recognition on the harmfulness of corruption had 
become stronger as time passed. The analysis on the cause of corruption had become 
more in-depth as each republic passed. That is, the recognition of the cause of 
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corruption had been developed from personal problems to socio-economic problems. 
Some republics treated corruption control as a priority national task. It depended on the 
socio-political situation. 
The target of corruption control of Korean republics generally showed strong political 
will with the exception of the first two and the Eighth Republics. The Republics 
generally targeted high ranking officials without consideration of ranks. 
A long-term strategy had become steadily more active as each Republic passed. The 
indirect long-term plans for corruption control became active. However, a direct long-
term strategy only began with the Eighth Republic. 
Table 11-1 The indicators by republics 
~ 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th Indicators 
Degree of Very Middle High High High Middle Very Middle 
senousness m Low High 
the initial stages 
Target Rank and Very Very Very Very Middle High High Low 
credibility of Low Low High High 
sanctions 
Long-Term Low Very Low Middle Middle Low High Very 
Strategy Low High 
Frequency of Very Very Middle High Middle Low High High 
efforts Low Low 
Mobilisation Very Very Low Low Low Low Low High 
of support Low Low 
Type of Type I Type 1 Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 Type 2 
corruption 
control 
activities 
The frequency of corruption control activities was considerably high except during 
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the First and Second Republics. But, mostly, the corruption control efforts of each 
republic were active at the early stages, and there were not enough cases that the 
corruption control efforts had continued to the end. 
All the republics, with the exception of the Eighth Republic did not commit actively 
to mobilise the support from inside and outside of government. 
Putting the results of indicators by republics, it is as Table 11-1. 
1 1.2 The Political Will by Republics 
We can confirm that, generally, many republics in Korea except 1 st, 2nd and Eighth 
Republics seriously undertook corruption control, but had not high sustainability, that is, 
Type 3 in the matrix mentioned in the Section 4 of Chapter 1. 
It can be said that the authoritarian republics, from third to SIX, (which were 
established by military power), needed corruption control activities to get the support of 
the general populace. For this political purpose, the republics undertook serious efforts 
to get visible results, but could not make sustained effort. This means that those 
republics had not enough strength of political will to eradicate corruption, so corruption 
was not controlled. 
The Seventh Republic put weight on corruption control and suggested vanous 
institutions under the slogan of "clear off the past". From the political and social 
situation, it can be said that the Seventh Republic, as a civilian origin government, did 
not need corruption control for political purpose such as the supplementation of 
legitimacy. The Seventh Republic undertook corruption control seriously in spite of a 
lack of political necessity because the previous governments were recognised as 
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corrupted ones. Although one of the indicators, mobilisation of support, was not 
assessed with a high score, the Seventh Republic showed a stronger political will, than 
the previous Republics. 
The Eighth Republic did not recognise the necessity of corruption control when the 
Republic was launched. It can be said that the reason why the Eighth Republic 
neglected corruption control when it was launched, is that the republic concentrated on 
recovering the economic crisis of that time. However, as time passed, the Eighth 
Republic reinforced corruption control efforts following the advice of the World Bank 
and civil society. 
In conclusion, we can confirm that there was no Republic in Korea that had enough 
political will with serious undertaking and high sustainability together, which 
corresponds to Type 4 in the matrix mentioned in the Section 4 of Chapter 1 . 
The undertaking of corruption control became serious from the Third Republic, but it 
was not a priority for the Eighth Republic who once again failed to take it seriously. 
Sustainability was very low at first few republics but became strengthened as the 
republic passed to the Eighth Republic. It can be said that the reasons why the 
sustainability was reinforced as the Republic passed, are related to the failure of 
punishment-centred short-term measures which were habitually used from Third to 
Sixth Republics, and the maturity of social atmosphere which is not satisfied with short-
term measures. 
In short, it can be said that the corruption control in Korea has not so far had high 
political will. This low political will was the cause of failure in corruption control 
efforts in Korea, even though Korean republics continued to emphasize corruption 
control whenever the republic changed. 
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11.3 Conclusion 
From the above analysis, it can be said that the corruption control strategy in Korea has 
been changed, as time passed, from a simple and fragmented strategy to a diverse and 
comprehensive strategy. In addition, the measures for corruption control have been 
progressively developed and changed. In other words, the laws and institutions for 
corruption control have been varied and established gradually. However, the corruption 
control in Korea has not so far been commenced with both enough seriousness and 
sustainability together. In conclusion, the characteristics of corruption control in Korea 
that were deduced from this research are as follows: 
First, it is very important for corruption control to understand the genuine cause of 
corruption from the initial stages. It can be said that the dishonest approach and vague 
purpose of corruption control in the previous Korean governments made ineffective 
corruption control activities. 
In Korea, it is a well-known fact that the political authority, especially in President Park 
Jung-Hee republic to President Roh Tae-Woo republic, received massive political 
funding from the private sector in the course of economic development led by the 
government. The illegitimate republic needed much political funding to recover its 
illegitimacy. In addition, in those Korean republics, decisions were made in secret, 
behind closed doors without the participation of the public. In this process, the 
government officials had played an important role to distribute the resources for a 
government-led economy and had been tempted to corruption. This means that the heart 
of corruption appears to be corrupt exchanges between politicians, business 
corporations and government officials, and the government officials' corruption is 
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related to the corruption of top political authority. Furthermore, chronic corruption in 
top political authority brought a numbness of public morality and came to be a deep-
rooted and widespread corruption in the whole society. In other words, the political 
authority exclusively possessed the power to mobilise and distribute the resources in the 
course of economic development. This exclusive possession tied with illegitimacy of 
government then developed into corruption. 
This way, the political authority and the crony capitalist are firstly responsible for 
Korean corruption. However, the purpose of corruption control in Korea was abstract 
and the view of corruption stayed focused on government officials' corruption. Without 
solving the problem of clandestine co-dependence between the world of politics and the 
world of business and the exchange of favours that it entails, it will be difficult to 
effectively control bureaucratic corruption in South Korean society. 
Therefore, any corruption control in Korea should have an understanding about the 
politico-economic aspect that deals with the decentralization of exclusive power 
possessed by the political authority and the opening closed decision-making process. 
Second, the corruption of higher ranking government officials needs to be controlled 
more tightly instead of the corruption of low ranking officials. In addition, legal 
sanctions are found to be an important, if not the best, deterrent to corruption. 
339· . d . h I k f According to many survey results in Korea ,corruptIOn was aSSOCIate WIt a ac 0 
certain and severe punishment, leading to a lower level of perceived threat of legal 
sanctions among government officials. Considering the inefficiency of the activities of 
the criminal justice authorities at present, an elevated level of the perceived threat of 
punishment is needed to deter civil servants from further corruption. 
339 Yeon, Sung Jin, Corruption Among Public Officials and Its Control, Korean 
Institute of Criminology, 1998, pp.206-208 
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Third, the corruption control methods in Korea did not rely on systematic and 
synthetic strategies for effective corruption control, but propagandistic slogans, such as 
the Sa Hoe Jung Hwa movement, and personal and social ethics. In other words, the 
republics approached corruption control not as institutional matter but as personal ethics 
matter. In addition, the approach of only ex post facto punishment had a limit as well. To 
cope with these weaknesses, it needs to stress more concrete recognition of the essence 
of corruption and preventive corruption control within institutions. Besides, it needs to 
focus on strengthening transparency of society with a broader point of view. 
Fourth, a top-down approach in corruption control, which relied only on the order and 
authority of top political leaders, is inefficient and unsustainable. There is a difference 
between the situation where the top political leader has a firm political will for 
corruption control and the situation where the approach of corruption controls is top-
down. In successive Korean republics, the leadership of the President had been damaged 
rapidly when the people surrounding the President, such as their families are implicated 
in corruption cases. This damage ultimately is linked to a weakened driving force of 
corruption control. In other words, the promoting of corruption control without the 
participation of government officials had difficulty to settle because of the estrangement 
between the introduced institutions and actual culture of government. The 'ten 
articles' that should be obeyed by government officials, which failed to take root in the 
early days of the Eighth Republic, is a good example of this. Job satisfaction, measured 
by salaries and promotion, has a significant effect on the tolerant attitude toward 
corruption in the organisation. Considering a generally lower level of salaries amongst 
government officials compared to those of workers in the private sectors in Korea, a 
salary raise is essential and it should have a positive effect on reducing the level of 
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corruption among government officials. In conclusion, a bottom-up approach for 
corruption control, which mixed with a firm political will of the top political leader and 
active participation of government officials and civil society, is indispensable for 
sustainable corruption control. 
Fifthly, a tolerant attitude toward routine corrupt practices is a crucial variable in 
explaining government official's corruption. Without the eradication of such attitudes 
and with corrupt routines at an organisational level, there is no way of resolving 
corruption amongst officials. For that matter, various institutions, such as a whistle-
blower protection systems, should be adopted in order to change the organisational 
culture, which is associated with corruption. 
In conclusion, to cope with the deeply rooted, structured, and routine corruption in 
Korea, strong and sustainable efforts are indispensable. 
From this analytical result of the Korean case, we can confirm that political will 
should be high in order that corruption control is successful, and that the political will 
model works significantly in the analysis of corruption control efforts. 
In other words, this 'political will approach' provided a useful analytical 
framework to assess the corruption control efforts of a government, especially a 
government which has lost legitimacy, and in a case when there is a debate whether the 
efforts are related to political (or display) purposes or not. In addition, this 'political will 
approach' confirmed, through the case study of Korea, the fact that the lack of one of 
the indicators for 'serious undertaking' and 'high sustainability' causes the failure of 
corruption control. In details, although stress should be placed on all indicators, each 
Korean republic neglected at least one of indicators; those are Seriousness on the Initial 
263 
Stages, Targeting high Rank and Credible Sanctions, Long-Tenn Strategy, Frequent 
Efforts and Mobilisation of Support. 
Furthermore, this research verified that political will is a very important variable 
for the success of a government's (anti -corruption) policies. In the past researchers and 
governments tried to attribute the reasons for policy failure as being due to three 
possible main reasons; human, structural and circumstantial. However, this research 
suggests that political will should now also be considered as a new variable to be taken 
into account when assessing the success of a government's policies. 
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